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1 Introduction
The essence of a free-market economy is the ability of private parties to enter
into voluntary agreements that govern the economic exchange between them.
Consequently, the law that governs such agreements is critical to the functioning
of such economies. While the law of property determines the configuration of
entitlements that form the basis of production and exchange, and the law of
torts protects those entitlements from involuntary encroachment and expropri-
ation, it is contract law that sets the rules for exchanging individual claims to
entitlements and, thus, determines the extent to which society is able to enjoy
the gains from trade. Accordingly, economists interested in the welfare proper-
ties of specific institutions in particular, or the micro-foundations of exchange
generally, have good reason to take account of the law of contracts.
This chapter, accordingly, surveys the main issues arising in the economic
analysis of contract law. We discuss both the main features of contract law as
they relate to the problem of economic exchange, and how relevant legal rules
and institutions can be analyzed from an economic perspective. In this introduc-
tory section, we set out the basic scope, methodology, and organization of the
discussion to follow. Subsection 1.1 discusses why formal and informal contracts
exist, and what economic functions they serve. Subsection 1.2 distinguishes be-
tween positive and normative issues in the economic analysis of contract law,
and discusses some methodological problems associated with applying standard
economic analysis to legal institutions and when engaging with legal scholarship.
Subsection 1.3 identifies limits on the chapter’s scope and provides bibliographic
recommendations for material we don’t cover; and subsection 1.4 sets out the
organization of the remainder of the chapter.
A caveat is in order at the outset: although it is conventional to present
contract law as a discrete field, one should understand that, to a significant
extent, the operation of the rules and institutions discussed below will depend
on other aspects of the law, including the fields of tort, bankruptcy, procedure,
and evidence. Lawyers have a cliche´ that describes this interdependence; they
say that “the law is a seamless web.” It is useful to keep in mind that many
issues that economists would regard as contractual, including some important
limits on contractual freedom, are governed not by contract but by tort law.
Additionally, the rules relating to certain categories of exchange, such as con-
sumer, employment, insurance, and information-licensing contracts, have devel-
oped specialized content to the point that they are often treated as distinct legal
fields. Finally, the practical ability of contracting parties to assert their legal
entitlements depends importantly on the procedural rules that govern courts
and other enforcement institutions. Many of the specific features of contract
law that we discuss below cannot be understood except as a response to the
costs and other limitations of such institutions.
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Seller
Buy insurance Don’t buy
Buyer
Buy insurance −pb, −ps −pb, 0
Don’t buy 0, −ps −b, −s
Figure 1: Coordination of insurance payments
1.1 The economic motive for contracts
In a neoclassical exchange economy of the sort analyzed by Walras (1874) or
Arrow-Debreu (Arrow and Debreu, 1954; Debreu, 1959), there is little need for
contracts or contract law, since buyers and sellers can exploit all gains from trade
through spot transactions. Indeed, in spot markets, such as public bazaars,
the parties manage reasonably well without formal contracting. Contracting
becomes worthwhile when there is a temporal element to their exchange or one
party, at least, is unsure as to what her counterparty will do. For example,
when the item to be exchanged needs to produced or the service being rendered
takes time. Absent a contract, the parties could be reluctant to trust each
other to complete the agreed upon exchange at the called-upon time, and thus
valuable exchange is forgone. Conversely, contracts can be worthwhile even in
non-exchange settings, as when advance commitment enhances the value of a
gift by enabling reliance by the beneficiary (R. Posner, 1977, and Shavell, 1991)
or when a supplier’s commitment to remain in a market notwithstanding short-
run losses deters competitive entry by rivals (e.g., Rasmusen et al., 1991) or
encourages entry by producers of complementary goods. The central question
then becomes why commitment is valuable, to which there are several answers.
1.1.1 Coordination
The most straightforward reason to use contracts is to coordinate independent
actions in situations of multiple equilibria. As an illustration, consider the
game depicted in Figure 1, in which a buyer, b, and a seller, s, are independently
deciding whether to purchase insurance against the loss of a good in transit. The
parties’ payoffs net of this decision are normalized to zero. Denote the insurance
premium when purchased by party i by pi and the expected loss suffered by party
i when no insurance is purchased by i. Assume that b + s > pb > ps; that
is, going uninsured is more expensive than buying insurance, but it is cheaper
for the seller to buy the insurance than for the buyer to do so. (This is perhaps
because the seller, who packages the goods for shipment, is better able to control
moral hazard and thus can obtain a better rate.)
If the parties make their choices independently, there are three Nash (1951)
equilibria to this game: one in which the seller buys insurance, one in which
the buyer buys insurance, and a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which both buy
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insurance with positive probability. Of these, the first equilibrium is the efficient
one (and it is also more efficient than any disequilibrium outcome). A contract
to play this efficient equilibrium could serve to ensure this outcome is achieved.
Formal contracts are of course not the only way for parties to coordinate
among multiple equilibria. The efficiency of the seller-buys equilibrium could
make it a focal point for the parties (Schelling, 1960). The literature on “cheap
talk” (e.g., Farrell, 1987a, 1993) suggests that such coordination can, in princi-
ple, also be achieved by having the parties announce their intentions in advance.
In actual institutional settings, however, contracts offer more stability than
focal points or mere announcements. In particular, they provide permanent
authoritative records that can be used by parties who suffer from imperfect
recall or by those who need to delegate performance to their agents or successors.
Note that when contracts are used for pure coordination purposes, they are
self-enforcing in the sense that it is in each party’s private interest ex post to
comply with the chosen equilibrium. Hence, those designing such contracts
can devote most of their attention to problems of formation and interpretation,
and relatively little attention to problems of enforcement. This coordination
function of contracts has been rather less discussed in the law and economics
literature than the incentive mechanism functions discussed below, but it may
be by far the most important purpose that contracts serve in practice. As
Myerson (2004) suggests, coordination games could be the best models through
which to understand legal institutions generally.
1.1.2 Implementing exchange over time
A second reason for using contracts is to implement exchanges that depend on
future events. For instance, consider an insurance contract that covers a loss
that occurs in state 1, but not in state 0. Under this contract, the insured pays a
premium to the insurer, in exchange for a casualty payment received in state 1,
but not in state 0.
In the standard model of risk allocation, goods are state-contingent com-
modities; for example, an apple in state 0 is considered a different good than
an apple in state 1. Treating goods as state-contingent commodities has the
advantage of allowing direct application of standard analyses of exchange, but
has the disadvantage of abstracting from real institutional issues. In particular,
exchange that is mutually beneficial ex ante may not be mutually beneficial ex
post . In the insurance example, the insured will not wish to pay the premium
ex post if state 0 is realized, and the insurer will not wish to make the casualty
payment ex post if state 1 is realized. Such exchanges cannot, therefore, be
implemented in spot markets and require some form of advance commitment.
In the typical insurance context, the transaction is motivated by the insured’s
risk aversion. But the need to contract across different states is more general
than that and is not reliant on risk aversion. For instance, consider purely
speculative exchange between risk-neutral parties, in which trade is motivated
by differences of opinion regarding the probability of future events. If one trader
thinks the price of orange juice will rise next year and another thinks it will fall,
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they can make themselves better off ex ante by entering into a forward exchange
in which the second promises to deliver to the first. As with the insurance
contract, this exchange requires a commitment mechanism since ex post one of
the parties is sure to regret the deal.
An analogous problem arises with the rental of capital assets or the extension
of credit. Even though the owner of an asset may not be its highest-value, she
may be unwilling to yield possession to a higher-value user for fear that she will
be unable to get it back at the end of the rental period. The law of property
provides a partial solution to this problem by entitling the owner to reclaim
her asset, but evidentiary difficulties make this alternative an imperfect one (as
illustrated by the old maxim, “possession is nine tenths of the law”). The party
in possession could claim, for instance, that the transaction was a gift or a sale,
or that the agreed lease period had not yet expired. In such settings, a contract
that specifies the parties’ relative rights and duties makes the borrower’s promise
to return the asset more credible, facilitating exchange.
More generally, some form of commitment is necessary in any exchange in
which performance is sequential, because the party who performs first is effec-
tively extending credit to the party who performs second. It may be possible to
structure the exchange so that each stage of a party’s performance is timed to
coincide with the performance of her counterparty (e.g., an installment sale of
goods in which each shipment is delivered c.o.d.), but in many instances such
timing may be infeasible or costly. For instance, consider a grocery that requires
regular delivery of a perishable commodity such as milk. The costs of making
and receiving payment (keeping cash on hand, updating accounts, preventing
embezzlement, etc.) generate substantial scale economies if disbursements for
multiple shipments are combined into a single monthly payment.
Contracts can also be useful in situations of hidden information. In Ak-
erlof’s (1970) lemons model, for example, adverse selection can prevent efficient
exchange when the quality of the good to be traded is known to the seller but
not to the buyer, even if the buyer values the good more. This problem can
be overcome if the seller of a high-quality good can signal its quality by taking
an action that is cheaper for her to take than it would be for the seller of a
low-quality good. A common action in this regard is to offer a warranty against
the good’s proving to be substandard (Grossman, 1981). Conversely, the buyer
could screen for quality by offering a premium to any seller who agrees to pro-
vide a warranty. The signal (screen) works only if the seller is bound to honor
the warranty, because a low-quality seller can offer (agree to) a worthless war-
ranty just as cheaply as a high-quality one can. Some form of commitment is,
thus, needed to implement the exchange.
1.1.3 Implementing production over time
Finally, contracts are valuable in promoting production in advance of exchange.
Advance production typically increases the surplus available from exchange, but
requires sinking resources in ways that may be unrecoverable if the contemplated
exchange is not completed. For example, a clothing manufacturer can increase
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the price it receives for its products by producing them to meet the needs of its
buyers, either very specifically (e.g., custom-tailored suits) or only moderately
so (e.g., cutting them so they will be in style for a limited time only). Once the
materials used to make the clothing are combined in a particular way, however,
they can no longer be easily reconfigured to produce other items. In such set-
tings, producers will be reluctant to sink such expenditures up front unless they
can be assured that they will recover their costs ex post (see Williamson, 1975,
for a seminal analysis of holdup problems).
As Katz (1996a) discusses, suppliers typically cannot capture all the sur-
plus their upfront (pre-trade) investments generate; some of this surplus will
go to the buyer. Absent binding purchase commitments prior to investment,
suppliers’ incentives to invest will be suboptimal, possibly to the point that no
investment and, so, no trade occur. Binding contracts can restore proper in-
centives. Conversely, buyers can also increase their surplus from exchange by
making up-front investments, whether out-of-pocket (e.g., buying complemen-
tary inputs) or implicit (e.g., ceasing to maintain alternate sources of supply).
Because such investments are often relationship specific, however, buyers will
not make them unless they can be assured that the exchange price will stay suf-
ficiently low. In some cases, the parties may be able to provide such assurance
by manipulating property rights (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 1989)
or industrial structure (e.g., Shepard, 1987) ex ante, but when they cannot do
so cheaply, contracts could be a cost-effective alternative.
1.1.4 Limitations of contracts as commitment devices
While contracts are often useful for achieving commitment, they can be imper-
fect devices for doing for some of the following reasons.
Specification costs. Because it is costly to foresee or to write down all the
potential contingencies that might be relevant to the performance of the parties’
contractual obligations, actual contracts are often left incomplete. Incomplete-
ness has at least two meanings: first, the contract could simply fail to provide
for certain contingencies, in which case a tribunal called upon to enforce the
contract, or the parties themselves, would have to decide after the fact what
to do if such contingencies arise. Second, the contract could cover all relevant
contingencies, but not in as fine-tuned a manner as would be ideal insofar as the
contract does not distinguish finely enough, in terms of consequent obligations,
among the possible contingencies. In either event, the contract will, with posi-
tive probability, fail to assure commitment or commit the parties to a course of
action that is suboptimal ex post .
Enforcement costs. It is never costless to hold a party to his commitment
if he is inclined to try to escape it. If the contract is being enforced through
the courts, for instance, lawyers must be hired and evidence assembled, and
performance or damages are likely to be awarded only after some delay. Such
costs make enforcement incredible when the damages from breach are relatively
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small and parties can exploit this lack of credibility by holding the level of breach
below the threshold necessary to provoke suit (Menell, 1983; Priest, 1978).
Unobservable and unverifiable actions. Even if legal commitment has
been established and the means for its enforcement are available, the beneficiary
of a contractual promise may be unable to determine whether the promise has
been kept or broken. For instance, the typical purchaser of a complex consumer
product is not in a position to tell whether the product has been manufactured
according to warranted specifications; at most she can observe whether the
product works as she expected. Even if a promisee can determine that there
has been a breach, she may nevertheless be unable to demonstrate that fact
to a third-party enforcer at reasonable cost. For instance, a supplier might
deliver substitute goods that appear reasonably equivalent to a lay person or to
a generalist court, but which the parties themselves know to be substandard.
In such situations, the promisee’s inability to prove that the promise has been
breached renders it ineffective as a method for assuring commitment. On the
other hand, as we discuss in §4.3.1, the parties can sometimes contract around
the court’s lack of expertise (see, e.g., Hermalin and Katz, 1991; Maskin and
Tirole, 1999).
Dynamic inconsistency. In cases where the purpose of contractual com-
mitment is to promote specific investment, the parties’ incentives to stick with
their deal may change after the investment has been completed (e.g., Laffont
and Tirole, 1988; Aghion et al., 1994). In particular, the parties may all wish
to modify or renegotiate their bargain. But if the parties anticipate that rene-
gotiation will take place, it could prove impossible to induce them to undertake
efficient investments ex ante.
The need for pre-contractual commitment. Some commitments, in
order to serve their purpose, must be undertaken before the parties are in a
position to engage in voluntary contracting. For example, parties may spend
resources on finding contractual partners or on determining whether exchange is
worthwhile. Even once an available partner and potential transaction are iden-
tified, it typically takes time and expense to negotiate terms; and commitments
are often less valuable if they are delayed until bargaining is completed. (For an
extreme example, consider the case of an emergency paramedic who must decide
whether and how to treat an unconscious accident victim who is not carrying
an insurance card.) In ongoing or repeated relationships it is possible for the
parties to agree to accept liability in advance of a final bargain, but in one-shot
or new relationships it is not.
The law of contracts has recognized most of these problems and has devised
a variety of doctrinal arrangements to deal with them; and the succeeding sec-
tions of this chapter will discuss such arrangements in more detail. The reader
should appreciate at the outset, however, that because these legal arrangements
are themselves imperfect, parties will often want to use legal contracts in com-
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bination with other legal and non-legal commitment devices, such as deposits,
third-party guaranties, reputational bonds, repeated dealing, mutual threats,
hostage exchange, investing in altruistic preferences, and the like. The success
of formal contract law, accordingly, depends importantly on how well it func-
tions in combination with these substitute and complementary devices, and not
just on how well it works in isolation.
1.2 Law & economics issues in contracting
1.2.1 Normative issues
Much normative discussion relating to contract law revolves around the issue of
freedom of contract—to what extent will unregulated private contracting lead
to desirable social consequences? We discuss this issue, and its relationship to
standard issues in welfare economics, in §2 below. At the outset, however, it is
worth observing that the dominant normative consideration here, even more so
than in other fields of law and economics, is transactional efficiency. In part, this
dominance follows the implicit assumption, shared by most commentators, that
externalities and analogous market failures are a less significant phenomenon
in this field of law than they are in, say, tort law. But the focus on efficiency
also stems from the general recognition that much of contract law, putting aside
specialized categories such as consumer and employment contracts, is designed
for the purpose of facilitating exchange between business firms and analogous
commercial entities. Such entities are motivated primarily by economic gain as
opposed to nonpecuniary considerations, enter into legal obligations deliberately
and at arms length, and are rational in the standard economic sense. It is thus
easier to justify applying the efficiency norm to such voluntary arrangements
than to the typical tort case involving persons drawn together involuntarily and
outside of market institutions.
A more complete account of social welfare, however, would consider compet-
ing normative values such as fairness, equity, etc. to the extent they affect social
well-being. While there has been relatively little economic analysis of contract
law in this regard, we will discuss these values insofar as they are relevant to
specific analytical and doctrinal topics.
1.2.2 Positive issues
While most work on the economics of contract law has sought, at least in part,
normative conclusions, there is a segment of the literature devoted to predict-
ing and explaining how different contractual rules affect private transactions,
and why contracting parties might choose one contractual device rather than
others. For example, a variety of authors (e.g., Joskow, 1987; Crocker and
Masten, 1988; Pirrong, 1993) have investigated the connection between the use
and duration of contractual agreements and the extent of relationship-specific
investments. Other authors (e.g., Klein, 1980; Goldberg and Erickson, 1987;
Hadfield, 1990; Gergen, 1992) have sought to explain the common use of indef-
inite or open terms in otherwise clearly negotiated agreements; and still others
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(e.g., Weinstein, 1998; Goldberg, 1998, 2000) have sought to explain particu-
lar risk-sharing or option terms. In the field of commercial contracts, there is
a vigorous literature discussing the determinants of secured lending (see, e.g.,
Scott, 1986; Schwartz, 1989; Triantis, 1992; Mann, 1997a,b). The antitrust lit-
erature has considered whether certain contractual practices are more likely to
have efficiency or anticompetitive motivations (e.g., Cheung, 1969; Kenney and
Klein, 1983, 2000; Crocker and Masten, 1988; Klein and Murphy, 1988; Masten
and Snyder, 1993). While a full survey of this literature is beyond the scope of
this chapter, the reader should be aware that many of the issues discussed in
the later sections have been discussed empirically. At the same time, however,
it also true that the empirical study of contract is relatively less developed than
the theory, leaving much room for future researchers.
1.2.3 Economic versus non-economic theories of contract law
In recent years, the majority of contracts scholarship in the legal academy has
reflected a methodology based on economic analysis, and most legal scholars
in the field have become conversant with economic concepts such as efficiency,
moral hazard, adverse selection, and the like. (Conversely, over the same period,
economic theorists have increasingly come to appreciate the importance of legal
concepts such as principal and agent.) Nonetheless, a considerable amount of
discussion in legal circles continues to reflect alternative conceptual frameworks;
and economists engaged in interdisciplinary work should be aware of these com-
peting frameworks and their underlying assumptions. Three major competing
perspectives are worth brief discussion here; we denote these as the corrective
justice, liberal autonomy, and social constructivist perspectives.
Corrective justice. Corrective justice, the most longstanding of these per-
spectives, has intellectual roots that trace back to classical writers such as Aris-
totle. This perspective holds that judicial institutions are only justified in act-
ing to redress unjust or wrongful situations. Examples of such redress in the
contractual setting would include restitution of unjustly received benefits or
compensation for wasted expenditures incurred in reliance on a broken promise.
The corrective justice approach seeks the restoration of some past or proper
state of affairs, and thus can stand at odds with the economic approach to law,
which tends to regard past gains and losses as sunk and to emphasize incentives
for future behavior (e.g., Easterbrook, 1984). It is less clear, however, that the
corrective justice approach has any implications at all for ex ante analysis of
legal problems; and many legal writers in this tradition (e.g., Dworkin, 1980)
have distinguished between the use of economics in judicial settings, which they
regard as requiring decisions according to principle, and its use in legislation
and contractual planning, which may legitimately be designed to promote goals
of social policy or private advantage.
Liberal autonomy. The liberal or autonomy-based perspective (see, e.g.,
Barnett, 1986) emphasizes the individual as opposed to the collective interest.
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From this point of view, individual rights should take priority over more gen-
eral concerns of society. Such a perspective is plainly more consonant with the
economic approach than is the corrective justice perspective. Standard eco-
nomic measures of welfare are based on aggregates of individual utility, and
under conventional assumptions of welfare economics, liberal freedoms tend to
lead to desirable economic outcomes (see §2.2 below). There will be tension be-
tween the liberal and economic approaches, however, whenever market failures
or transaction costs prevent the completion of efficient exchanges, as Sen (1970)
has shown through social choice theory. In a contractual setting, for instance,
liberal theorists might argue that obligations to which the parties have not
knowingly consented may not be imposed on them even when those obligations
would be both efficient and distributionally equitable. Conversely, libertarians
might argue that the law should protect even anticompetitive agreements, such
as price-fixing, on the basis that the conduct is voluntary and that consumers
have no inherent right to trade with producers on any particular terms.
Social constructivism. The social constructivist perspective takes the po-
sition that the normative goals of society—and in the view of many writers, its
descriptive categories as well—are determined by collective and ongoing delib-
eration among its citizens, and accordingly, that the main goal of legal insti-
tutions should be to provide adequate opportunity for such decision making.
So defined, this perspective can be seen to encompass a variety of more spe-
cific normative positions, including those of writers who emphasize civic virtue
(Kronman, 1987), democratic self-government (Pildes and Anderson, 1990), an
egalitarian distribution of political and economic power (Kennedy, 1982), or
the primacy of particular substantive values, which economists would call merit
goods (Radin, 1987). On such views, the constituted citizenry may well decide
to pursue economic goals such as efficiency, but may, with equal legitimacy,
decide to pursue other procedural or substantive goals. For example, if the citi-
zenry decided the well-being of local manufacturers were sufficiently important
to outweigh productive efficiency or economic liberty, this decision would legit-
imize restricting interregional trade. It follows that there is no particular reason
why individualist institutions, like contract or the market, are more legitimate
venues for such decision making than collective or political ones.
Relationship between economic and non-economic theories. These
three rival perspectives can and often do combine to provide overlapping argu-
ments against the use of economic analysis in contract law. For example, the
most prominent alternative theory of contract law to be put forward in recent
years, the so-called “will theory” (e.g., Fried, 1981), holds that promises ought
to be kept for their own sake, in part because promise-breaking is a deonto-
logical wrong that needs to be rectified as a matter of corrective justice, and
in part because enforcing promises is necessary to respect the autonomy of the
promisee (and arguably the promisor as well). In response to such arguments,
more economically oriented writers (e.g., Craswell, 1989a; Shavell, 1991) have
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replied that most economic analysis of contract law is aimed at filling the gaps
in incomplete agreements and setting default rules that operate when the par-
ties have expressed no preference regarding a particular issue. If we accept that
most business contracts have economic purposes, economic analysis will help
those interpreting contracts to better implement the parties’ will.
The will theorists might offer, as a rejoinder, the observation that there is a
difference between what most contracting parties subjectively understand when
they make and receive promises, and what would be most efficient for them to
do. For instance, most people, even those with substantial business experience,
intuitively understand promises to bear inherent moral force and believe that
the mere fact that it turns out to be suboptimal to carry them out should not
count as an excuse for non-performance. If this claim is true—and it should
be plain that it is an empirical claim—then will theorists (e.g., Charny, 1991)
would argue that it violates the parties’ autonomy and dignity for the state to
enforce the efficient bargain, which they perhaps should have made, rather than
the actual arrangements that they did make.
An obvious response for economists to such non-economic considerations is
to incorporate them into a larger welfare analysis in which the relevant non-
economic values are interpreted as arguments to be traded off against one an-
other in a Bergson-type social welfare function (swf). Shavell and Kaplow
(2002) have presented such an analysis at length, but have achieved mixed suc-
cess in persuading non-economically-oriented legal scholars of its merits. Ob-
serve, in this regard, that the three main categories of non-economic theories
vary in their compatibility with the swf approach. Pure corrective-justice the-
orists would reject the swf on the grounds that legally appropriate actions can
only be justified with reference to right and wrong, and never with reference to
consequences. Liberal autonomy theorists tend to be somewhat more accepting
of the swf approach, but they would reject the idea that rights could be traded
off against each other or against economic values (formally, this is equivalent to
adopting a lexicographical preference ordering for the swf). Social construc-
tivists would view the whole swf approach as logically circular, since they view
the social values that would underlie any swf as endogenously determined by
political and cultural processes of which economic policy discussions are an inte-
gral part. In their view, starting with a swf and then attempting to maximize
it is putting the cart before the horse.
Most importantly, economists who study legal institutions should recognize
that lawyers and legal commentators often employ different methodologies than
they do. In particular, legal scholars do not typically draw the same sharp
distinction between positive and normative analysis as economists do. On the
contrary, many seemingly descriptive statements made by lawyers or appearing
in legal texts are understood in context to carry significant normative overtones,
and vice versa. Non-lawyers who are insufficiently appreciative of the mixed na-
ture of such discourse may miss an important part of what is being said, and may
be led to model the phenomena under discussion in an incorrect or misleading
way (Katz, 1996a). Similarly, lawyers’ customary method of reasoning induc-
tively from individual cases, rather than deductively from general principles,
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makes many lawyers reluctant to accept some of the standard methodological
practices of economists, including formal modeling and the use of statistical ag-
gregation. When presenting positive arguments or analyses to legal audiences,
accordingly, it is generally necessary to lay out one’s methodological assump-
tions explicitly and at the outset. Otherwise, one risks being misunderstood
by those lawyers who are accustomed to assuming a normative subtext or an
individualist perspective whenever legal topics are being discussed.
1.3 What this chapter is not
1.3.1 A guide to contract theory
Not surprisingly, there is a strong link between the law and economics of con-
tracts and the economic sub-discipline of contract theory.1 Contract theory
provides a framework to analyze the scope and limits of what contracts can
accomplish, at least at a theoretical level. It is, however, beyond the scope of
this chapter to offer a comprehensive guide to contract theory. To be sure, some
contract theory will be discussed as appropriate within the context of the issues
discussed below; but no one should mistake such a scatter-shot approach for an
attempt at a systematic treatment of the subject.
For readers interested in contract theory, there are a number of excellent
introductions. Most new graduate microeconomics texts devote at least a chap-
ter to the subject (see, e.g., Kreps, 1990; Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Varian, 1992).
Good book-length introductions are Laffont and Martimont (2002) and Bolton
and Dewatripont (2005). For those looking for cheap—in fact free—introduc-
tions, one of us (Hermalin) hosts two introductory manuscripts (Caillaud and
Hermalin, 2000a,b) on his web page.
1.3.2 A guide to the law of contracts
While this chapter discusses most of the important economic issues relating to
the law of contracts, it does not attempt to present a survey of major legal
doctrines in the field. It is worth noting, as a general observation, that many
legal doctrines may seem indistinguishable from an economic viewpoint. Never-
theless, they vary in their specific content and their differences are of practical
importance to lawyers and clients. For example, the doctrines of mistake, impos-
sibility, and frustration of purpose all excuse contractual liability in extreme or
unexpected circumstances and thus allocate risk to the recipient of a contractual
promise, but their legal application varies.
Economists interacting with lawyers or pursuing research in contract law,
accordingly, should be aware of distinctions such as these and of the associated
views of major legal authorities. The most useful general treatise on us contract
law is probably Farnsworth (2004), available in both one- and three-volume
editions; a shorter introduction to the subject can be found in Chirelstein (2006).
1Whether this link is a valuable one is, however, a matter of debate. See, for instance, the
Yale Law Journal debate among E. Posner (2003a), Ayres (2003), and Craswell (2003).
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For statutory material applicable to us contracts for the sale of goods, the best
source is White and Summers (2000).
Less attention has been paid by economists to non-us legal systems, mak-
ing them a potentially fruitful source for future research; here leading English-
language treatises include Honnold (1999) and Schlechtreim (1998) on interna-
tional sales contracts, Bonell (1997) on other international commercial contracts,
Atiyah (2003) and Treitel, ed. (2003) on English contract law, and Lando and
Beale, eds. (2002) on the contract law of the civil law systems of continental
Europe. In this chapter, however, most discussions of legal doctrine will be
restricted to us law.
1.4 Organization of the chapter
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections corresponding to the
major conceptual divisions of contract doctrine. Section 2, entitled “Freedom of
Contract,” discusses the scope of private parties’ power to create binding con-
tractual obligations. It analyzes the major doctrines that govern which bargains
will be recognized and enforced by state legal institutions, and which parties are
empowered to create enforceable bargains. It also considers how doctrinal lim-
its on freedom of contract correspond to the economic criteria for determining
whether decentralized trade will lead to optimal welfare outcomes.
Section 3, entitled “Formation of Contracts,” discusses the extensive body
of legal doctrine that governs the procedural mechanics of exchange, as well as
the rules that govern the parties’ obligations before they enter into exchange.
These formal rules, by attaching consequences to the various acts and omissions
that bargainers can choose from in searching for and negotiating with potential
contractual partners, affect parties’ incentives to make and to respond to offers,
to delay, to bluff, and to communicate with one another in the first place.
Section 4, entitled “Interpretation of Contracts: Contractual Incomplete-
ness,” discusses the problems that arise when it is unclear whether those parties
who are empowered to create binding contracts have actually done so, and if
they have, what specific obligations they have created. Recent work in microeco-
nomic theory has also been concerned with this problem, especially as it relates
to the ability of third-party enforcers to verify the parties’ bargain. From a
legal perspective, the problem is governed by the various doctrines dealing with
contract interpretation, and this section shows how the legal rules in this area
affect and respond to the economic problem of incomplete contracts.
Section 5, entitled “Enforcement of Contracts,” discusses how the foregoing
rules and institutions are translated into effective costs and benefits that can
motivate parties to comply with their obligations and to insure against others’
lack of compliance.
Finally, the concluding section offers some overall perspectives on the entire
discussion, relates its main points to analogous or complementary doctrines in
related fields of law, and offers some speculations regarding the path of future
legal and economic developments in the area.
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2 Freedom of Contract
The threshold issue in any discussion of contract law is freedom of contract—the
extent to which the law sanctions the use of contracts as a commitment device.
No legal system enforces all voluntary private agreements, but in the us and
other industrial democracies, most contracts that support legitimate economic
exchange are at least presumptively enforceable. Still, the limits of freedom
of contract vary among Western countries and are an important element of
regulatory policy. This section, accordingly, analyzes and evaluates those limits
in economic terms. Subsection 2.1 defines the scope of the issues included under
the framework of contractual freedom; subsection 2.2 reviews the presumptive
economic case in favor of freedom of contract; subsections 2.3 and 2.4 discusses
the main arguments, economic and otherwise, that are typically used to justify
limits on private contracting; and subsection 2.5 outlines the major doctrinal
limitations on freedom of contract that are in force in the us and in related
systems, and relates those doctrines to the economic arguments set out in the
prior subsections.
2.1 Freedom of contract defined
2.1.1 State regulation versus state enforcement
The concept of contractual freedom encompasses a number of distinct consider-
ations. One important distinction is between negative and affirmative govern-
ment sanction: are the parties permitted to enter into a given contract versus
will the law enforce it? These two questions are not equivalent: there are many
agreements that cannot be enforced in the courts but that can still be useful as
commitment devices if the parties can manage to implement them privately. For
instance, prior to the passage of the Sherman Act, contracts in restraint of trade
were unenforceable under us common law; this reduced their incidence, but not
to the point of elimination. Under modern antitrust statutes, in contrast, gov-
ernment disapproval of anticompetitive conduct goes beyond non-enforcement
to include active interference through civil liability and, in some cases, criminal
prosecution.
In the remainder of this section, accordingly, we focus on those limits on
contractual power that are motivated by regulatory concerns that the agree-
ment itself is socially undesirable for reasons of inefficiency, inequity, and other
substantive objections.
2.1.2 Positive versus negative contractual freedom
The freedom to enter into contractual liability would be rather less meaningful
were it not accompanied by the complementary freedom to avoid liability for
contracts into which one does not wish to enter. In general, this negative free-
dom applies to most types of contractual obligations, but not all. In traditional
common law, for instance, some businesses (e.g., mills, ferryboats, railroads,
and the like) are designated as common carriers and are obliged to enter into
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exchange on standard terms with anyone who wishes. Modern statutes have
expanded such duties in a variety of ways: for instance, the essential-facilities
doctrine in antitrust law requires vertically integrated firms to make certain
stages of production available on a contractual basis to their non-integrated
competitors; and anti-discrimination laws require businesses to deal with cus-
tomers and suppliers on an equal basis without regard to race, religion, or the
like.
Additionally, some rules of tort and property law have the effect of requiring
rightholders, under some circumstances, to transfer their entitlements to persons
in need or to the general public. For instance, the doctrine of eminent domain
requires landowners to convey their property to the state when required for an
appropriately defined public use. (As in the us, the government could be con-
stitutionally obliged to pay just compensation when it takes private property.)
Similarly, the tort doctrine of necessity allows parties in dire need to make use
of others’ property when voluntary contracting is not feasible (as with an en-
dangered hiker who breaks into an empty cabin to find food or shelter) so long
as compensation is paid ex post .2 Such doctrines are typically conceptualized
by legal theorists as internal limits on the underlying entitlement at issue rather
than as restrictions on contractual freedom; however, they usually amount in
practice to restrictions on contractual freedom because of the infeasibility of
contracting around them. One could theoretically imagine contracting in ad-
vance with the government not to exercise its right of eminent domain, but such
contracts are rare and it is doubtful whether they are immune to abrogation by
subsequent governments.
Finally, some doctrines of contract law impose promissory liability even when
the promisor has not actually intended to enter into a contractual exchange.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel, for instance, holds parties to promises on
which a reasonable person would foreseeably rely, at least to the extent neces-
sary to protect the promisee’s reliance; and the doctrine of trade usage holds
parties to contracts that experienced market participants would view as legally
enforceable under similar circumstances, even if the parties had not themselves
subjectively intended to be bound in the particular instance. For the most part,
such doctrines provide rules of interpretation rather than of substantive contrac-
tual freedom, in that it is possible to avoid liability by being sufficiently explicit
in one’s communications. In some cases, however, the law does not allow one
to disclaim liability for one’s representations or promises; for instance, com-
mercially sophisticated parties dealing with less sophisticated counterparts can
find themselves bound to statements made to the less experienced party even
if sophisticated persons would understand such statements do not entail legal
obligation. Such restrictions on disclaimers are usually motivated by consider-
ations of market failure, transaction cost, or distribution, as discussed below.
2Modern legal theorists, following Calabresi and Melamed (1972), use the concept of prop-
erty and liability rules, further discussed in this Handbook, to identify situations in which such
involuntary exchanges are authorized by law: entitlements subject to such imposition are said
to be protected by a liability rule, while entitlements that are immune from such imposition
are said to be protected by a property rule.
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2.1.3 Mandatory versus default terms
Finally, as the example of promissory estoppel illustrates, it is useful to dis-
tinguish between mandatory contract terms, which the parties are not legally
free to change, and default terms, which the parties are theoretically free to
change but which govern the contract to the extent the parties are silent. An
example of the former would be the constitutional prohibition on involuntary
servitude, which, for instance, prevents people from pledging their future labor
for long periods, even when they might find wish to do so, such as to provide
collateral for a loan. An example of the latter would be the various warranties
of quality that are implied under current us law in contracts for the sale of
goods. Sellers are generally permitted to disclaim such warranties, subject to
some limits imposed by consumer-protection and product-liability law, by fol-
lowing the requisite procedures, which usually require some specific notification
to the buyer.
Because it is costly to write complete contracts, all systems of contract law
must provide default terms to cover the issues over which the parties do not
specifically bargain (see §4.4.1 below). The regulatory effects of default terms,
however, are bounded by the costs of contracting around them. It could be a
reasonable approximation to ignore such effects in many instances, especially
in the commercial setting where parties are sophisticated and have access to
legal advice. In some cases, however, re-contracting costs are substantial and
the choice of default rule will have the effect of privileging one outcome over
others. For example, in mass transactions in which parties communicate through
standard forms, it is impractical to reconcile all the discrepancies between the
various forms; and under modern doctrine, the legal default applies to all issues
on which the forms do not agree. This often has the consequence of providing
broad product warranties and leaving the seller open to liability for damages
following breach, even if the seller attempted to disclaim such liability.
As with the decision to withhold enforcement, the provision of default rules
may be motivated either by regulatory purposes or by the desire to conserve
on transaction costs. In situations where there is some doubt about whether a
specific contract term should be discouraged, for example, a default rule supplies
some deterrent effect while still allowing parties whose gain from the term is
sufficiently high to opt out of the default at a price. For example, Camerer
et al. (2003) advocate using default rules as a relatively libertarian method of
regulating against poor decisions caused by bounded rationality. Or, as Ayres
and Gertner (1989, 1992) have suggested, and as we discuss further in §4.4.1
below, a default rule may be employed as a screen to induce parties to reveal
private information that might be relevant to ex post interpretation or to the
ex ante decision whether to enter into exchange.
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2.2 The economic case for freedom of contract
2.2.1 Welfare economics
An economic case for or against freedom of contract is based on the consequent
welfare implications. In this section, we briefly review what a welfare analysis
of markets suggests about freedom of contract.
Economists typically use two welfare criteria. One, known as Pareto effi-
ciency, evaluates a proposed allocation among a set of actors by asking whether
there exists a second allocation that (i) none of the actors prefer less than the
proposed allocation and (ii) at least one of the actors actually prefers to the
proposed allocation. If such a second allocation exists, the proposed allocation
is deemed inefficient (alternatively, Pareto inferior or Pareto dominated). The
second allocation in this case is deemed Pareto superior. If no such second
allocation exists, the proposed allocation is deemed efficient.
While the Pareto criterion is useful for ruling out undesirable allocations, it
doesn’t always serve as a useful guide for selecting a desirable allocation. For
instance, it offers no guidance as to who should receive an indivisible object;
any allocation other than throwing it away is Pareto efficient because a switch
to another allocation would not be favored by the party losing the object.
An alternative welfare measure is to consider a function that aggregates, in
some way, the preferences of the actors in question. A full discussion of welfare
functions is beyond the scope of this chapter.3 We will limit attention to the
utilitarian welfare function, W =
∑
i∈I ui, where I is an index set over the
actors and ui is the utility the ith actor enjoys from the proposed allocation
(if there is a stochastic aspect to the allocation, ui should be understood to be
i’s expected utility). Any allocation that maximizes social welfare, W , must be
Pareto efficient;4 but Pareto efficiency does not necessarily imply that social
welfare is maximized. For instance, as noted, any allocation of an indivisible
object (other than throwing it out) is Pareto efficient, but only the allocation
that awards it to the person who values it most is welfare maximizing.
A stronger connection between the two welfare criteria can be achieved if
one accepts the existence of a transferable good (typically taken to be money).
Now the “losers” from moving to a social welfare-maximizing allocation can
receive payments from the “winners” as compensation. If preferences can be
captured by a quasi-linear utility function (i.e., of the form u + y, where y is
money and u is utility from other goods), then an allocation is Pareto efficient
3The interested reader is directed to Chapter 22 of Mas-Colell et al. (1995) or Chapter 6
of Laffont (1988). Also see Arrow’s (1963) classic book.
4Proof: Suppose not. Then, although the allocation a maximizes W , there is another
allocation a˜ that Pareto dominates a. Let ui and u˜i denote the utilities under the allocations
a and a˜ respectively. By the definition of Pareto dominance, u˜i ≥ ui for all i and there is at
least one i such that u˜i > ui. But, then,
 
i∈I
u˜i >
 
i∈I
ui ,
which contradicts the assertion that a maximizes social welfare.
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if and only if it maximizes welfare.5 For this reason, economists are generally
satisfied with social welfare (total surplus) as an appropriate welfare standard
when transfers are feasible.6 Note that this analysis relies on the marginal
utility of the transferable good being constant across individuals, so that we are
still seeking to maximize
∑
i∈I ui; transfers among the actors are irrelevant to
maximizing welfare because the benefit one actor gets from receiving a dollar is
completely offset by the cost another incurs transferring that dollar.
Competitive markets are typically seen as doing well with respect to the
Pareto efficiency criterion. Under somewhat stringent conditions—in particular,
(i) that complete markets for all commodities (including commodities such as
clean air and water) exist, (ii) that no actor has market power (i.e., acts as
a price setter rather than a price taker), and (iii) symmetric information—a
general equilibrium of the economy will be Pareto efficient (see, e.g., §6.3 of
Debreu, 1959). This result is known as the First Welfare Theorem.7
The First Welfare Theorem applies to the economy as a whole. If the entire
economy is an Arrow-Debreu economy and in equilibrium, then any particular
market within the economy must be “efficient,” insofar as any change in it
5Proof: Footnote 4 supra established that welfare maximization implies Pareto optimality.
Consider a Pareto optimal allocation of real goods and money. Let ui and yi denote the utility
components under this Pareto optimal allocation. Suppose this allocation does not maximize
welfare. Then, there exists another allocation of real goods, with utility components u∗i such
that
 
i∈I
u∗i >
 
i∈I
ui .
Because the “ui” allocation is Pareto efficient, it cannot be that u
∗
i ≥ ui for all i; that is, a
change in allocation must create “losers,” for whom ui < u
∗
i . Let L be the set of losers and L
be the number of elements in L. As just noted, L > 0. Similarly, there must be winners (i.e.,
those for whom u∗i ≥ ui). Let W be the set of winners. For losers, define τi = ui − u∗i . For
winners, define ti = u
∗
i − ui. Because the “u∗i ” allocation is welfare maximizing,
 
i∈W
ti −
 
i∈L
τi ≡ G > 0 .
Finally, consider the allocation of real goods that produces utilities u∗i , allocates yi − ti in
money to each winner and yi + τi + G/L to each loser (note the additional transfers sum to
zero, hence are feasible). For a winner, u∗i +yi− ti = ui +yi, so winners are indifferent. For a
loser, u∗i + yi + τi +G/L = ui + yi +G/L, so losers are strictly better off. But, then, we have
an allocation (including money) that Pareto dominates our original allocation, contradicting
its Pareto optimality. The result follows by contradiction.
6The Kaldor-Hicks criterion is even more flexible: An allocation, α, over real goods is a
Kaldor-Hicks efficient allocation if there is no other allocation over real goods α′ and no profile
of transfers, t, such that the overall allocation (α′, t) Pareto dominates the overall allocation
(α,0), where 0 means no transfers are made. It is sufficient that t exist—whether or not
these transfers are made—for α′ to dominate α according to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. If
all individuals have utility ui + yi, where ui is an individual’s utility over real goods and yi is
his allocation of money (transfer), then an allocation of real goods is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if
and only if it maximizes

i∈I ui. See Chapter IV of Arrow (1963) for details.
7There is also a second Welfare Theorem that has to do with the ability of prices to serve as
appropriate incentive devices in a competitive (Arrow-Debreu) economy; that is, any Pareto
efficient allocation can be supported as a general equilibrium of the economy by selecting the
appropriate prices (see §6.4 of Debreu for details).
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changes at least part of the overall allocation and no other overall allocation is
Pareto superior. If, however, one doubts the Arrow-Debreu model adequately
models the entire economy, one can still ask, in certain circumstances, whether
a particular market in it is achieving an efficient allocation.
A single competitive market (i.e., a market in which neither buyers nor sellers
exercise market power) will achieve an equilibrium at the price that equates
demand and supply. Under normal assumptions, this equilibrium is unique.
Assume the demand curve is a good approximation for the social marginal
benefit curve (i.e., there are essentially no positive externalities from the good
in question and income effects are de minimis).8 Assume, further, that the
supply curve is a good approximation for the social marginal cost curve (i.e.,
there are essentially no negative externalities from the good in question). Then,
as is well known, welfare is the area beneath demand and above supply from 0
to the number of units traded. This area—that is, total welfare—is maximized
by exchanging the quantity that corresponds to the intersection of supply and
demand. But this quantity is precisely the quantity that will be exchanged in
competitive equilibrium—the competitive equilibrium maximizes total welfare
and, thus, achieves a Pareto-efficient allocation.
2.2.2 Theoretical justifications for freedom of contract
The welfare-theoretic arguments of the previous subsection rely on the assump-
tion of competitive markets. Many writers, however, have had the intuition that
freedom of contract is desirable much more generally.
In the law and economics literature, this intuition is most prominently as-
sociated with the work of Ronald Coase and his widely-cited “Coase Theorem”
(Coase, 1960). Despite its formal sounding name, the Coase theorem is not
a theorem in the traditional sense (nor did Coase suggest it was). Indeed, as
Medema and Zerbe (2000) point out, there is not even an agreed upon statement
of it. We offer the following version:
Theorem 1 (Coase theorem) Consider a bilateral contracting situation in
which (i) the parties are rational with respect to their individual self-interests;
in which (ii) the parties can agree on any contract without incurring transaction
costs; and in which (iii) the parties’ utilities are additively separable over the
allocation of real goods and monetary transfers (i.e., are of the form ui + yi,
where ui is party i’s utility from the allocation of the real goods and yi is his
or her net transfer). Then the allocation of real goods after contracting will
maximize total welfare regardless of the initial allocation of real goods.
In this formulation, the Coase theorem is a true theorem with the following
proof: Let α be any real-good allocation that does not maximize welfare. We
need to show that no such α will be implemented via contracting. Let α∗ be
a welfare-maximizing allocation. Clearly, if ui(α∗) > ui(α) for both parties
8For a detailed discussion of measuring consumer benefit and the consequence of income
effects for such measurements see Chapter 10 of Varian (1992). Also see Willig (1976).
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i, then α will not be implemented—because both parties act rationally and
they can costlessly contract, they won’t settle for α. Consider the only other
possibility: ui(α∗) > ui(α) for one party and uj(α∗) ≤ uj(α) for the other.
Let τM = ui(α∗) − ui(α) and τm = uj(α) − uj(α∗). The optimality of α∗
entails τM > τm. Pick any transfer τ such that τm < τ < τM . Then a contract
that selected allocation α∗ and had i transfer an additional τ to j would be
preferred by both parties to a contract that implemented allocation α. Costless
contracting and the parties’ rationality thus rule out α being the contracted-for
allocation.
Corollary 1 Under the assumptions of the Coase Theorem, interference or re-
strictions on the contract the parties sign cannot increase total welfare; that is,
under these assumptions, there should be freedom of contract if the only welfare
issue is the total welfare of the parties to the contract.
How strong a case the Coase Theorem makes for freedom of contract depends
on the appeal of its assumptions. Consider, first, assumption (iii); that the
parties have quasi-linear utility functions. That assumption is common to most
welfare analyses of partial-equilibrium settings. Although the assumption can
frequently be justified, it is not always.9 Suppose, for instance, that one party’s
utility is u + y if y ≥ 0, but −∞ if y < 0. An interpretation is that this party
simply cannot survive if made to make transfers. Now the Coase result could fail
to hold if this party is the one who must transfer to ensure a welfare-maximizing
outcome. On the other hand, if this party is the recipient of transfers, then
welfare-maximization would continue to hold.
As Medema and Zerbe (2000) note, the Coase Theorem has two conclu-
sions. One is an efficiency conclusion—private contracting will lead to a welfare-
maximizing solution. The other is an invariance conclusion—the initial alloca-
tion is immaterial for whether a welfare-maximizing solution is reached. As
just discussed, relaxing condition (iii) can undermine both conclusions, but, in
a sense, it primarily undermines the invariance result. Efficiency, as judged by
the Pareto criterion, will generally still be attained:
Theorem 2 (Modified Coase Theorem I) Consider a bilateral contracting
situation in which (i) the parties are rational with respect to their individual
self-interests, but are not mean-spirited; and in which (ii) the parties can agree
on any contract without incurring transaction costs. Then the allocation after
contracting will be Pareto efficient regardless of the initial allocation.
Proof: We need to show that the parties will never settle on an allocation, a,
that is Pareto dominated (note, now, an allocation may include the transferable
good). Consider such an allocation. By definition, there exists at least one other
allocation, a∗, such that
ui(a∗) ≥ ui(a) (1)
9Willig (1976) provides justifications for assuming quasi-linear utility that are applicable
in many contexts.
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for both i and such that ui(a∗) > ui(a) for at least one i. Case 1: The inequality
in expression (1) is strict for both i. Then a will not be implemented—both
parties act rationally and they can costlessly contract, so they won’t settle for
a. Case 2: (1) is an equality for one i. Then that i will refuse to implement a∗
over a only if he is mean-spirited, which we have assumed he isn’t. Hence, a
Pareto-dominated allocation will not be implemented.
The modicum of altruism in the modified Coase Theorem—that the parties
not be mean spirited—is unnecessary if we assume a strict-tradeoff condition:
Condition 1 (Strict Tradeoff) Let A be the set of feasible allocations and a1
and a0 be two elements of A. Then, if u1(a1) ≥ u1(a0) and u2(a1) ≥ u2(a0)
with at least one inequality holding strictly, there exists an aˆ ∈ A such that
u1(aˆ) > u1(a0) and u2(aˆ) > u2(a0).
The strict-tradeoff condition entails that if a is a Pareto-dominated allocation,
then there exists a feasible allocation that strictly Pareto dominates a; in which
case, we need only Case 1 of the proof of the modified Coase Theorem and we
can dispense with the case that relied on no mean-spirited behavior:
Theorem 3 (Modified Coase Theorem II) Consider a bilateral contract-
ing situation in which (i) the parties are rational with respect to their individual
self-interests; in which (ii) the parties can agree on any contract without incur-
ring transaction costs; and in which (iii) the set of feasible allocations satisfies
the strict-tradeoff condition. Then the allocation after contracting will be Pareto
efficient regardless of the initial allocation.
With respect to freedom of contract, we have
Corollary 2 Under the assumptions of the modified Coase Theorems, interfer-
ence or restrictions on the contract the parties sign cannot increase the Pareto
efficiency of the contracted-for outcome; that is, there should be freedom of con-
tract if the only welfare issue is the efficiency of the outcome achieved by the
contract from the perspective of the parties to the contract.
Clearly, all the Coase theorems rely on the rationality assumption. We
explore the consequences of relaxing this assumption later (see §2.3.4 and §4.2.1).
The no-transactions-cost assumption is also important. In the proofs, it
serves to guarantee that the parties will not agree to a non-optimal contract
because they can, without cost or impediment, choose an optimal contract in-
stead. Relaxing this assumption would, thus, seem to have the potential for
undermining the conclusions of these theorems—a point made by a number of
authors (see, e.g., Farrell, 1987b).
As Farrell notes, the economic literature on bargaining is generally sanguine
about the prospects of an efficient outcome when the parties bargain under
symmetric information. The literature is much more pessimistic, however, when
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Figure 2: Consequence of transactions costs on bargaining outcomes under sym-
metric information.
they bargain under asymmetric information.10 We discuss the consequences of
bargaining under asymmetric information in §2.3.2. The rest of this section
considers what can still potentially go wrong under symmetric information and
concludes with Coase-theorem-like propositions that account for the potential
of costly bargaining.
The potential consequences of transactions costs with symmetric information
are illustrated in Figure 2. Suppose two parties, A and B, wish to enter into a
contract. To do so, however, they must expend costs cA and cB , respectively.
Once those costs are sunk (e.g., lawyers are retained), the parties bargain over
the contract terms. Let the payoffs, in money, be a and b, respectively. Because
bargaining is conducted under symmetric information, theory predicts that the
outcome will generally be efficient (see e.g., Farrell, 1987b, or Sutton, 1986);11
that is, the contract will be on the Pareto frontier, which is shown in the two
panels of Figure 2 as a solid curve.
The first problem, illustrated in Panel I, is that cA and cB are so large that
one or both sides prefer not to enter into negotiations. For instance, if bargaining
would result in contract C1, then neither side would be willing to negotiate; at
C1, we have a < cA and b < cB . Moreover, while there are contracts that, if
adopted, would induce one side to participate (e.g., C2, for which b > cB), there
10See the survey on bargaining by Sutton (1986).
11Although efficiency is expected, it should be noted that one can construct perverse bar-
gaining games that don’t achieve efficiency even under symmetric information; see Hermalin
and Katz (1993).
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is no contract that would induce both to participate.
The problem illustrated in Panel I can serve to justify default contracts.
That is, if the law stipulated that, absent a contract, the implicit contract was
C1, then that would clearly be an improvement. Observe that this improvement
stems from two factors. First, the parties get to the Pareto frontier when they
otherwise wouldn’t. Second, they avoid the expenditures cA and cB . Note,
however, that this analysis does not rely on C1 being mandatory ; this is not an
argument for mandatory contracts.
A related problem, and one that could justify mandatory contracts, is illus-
trated in Panel II. Suppose that bargaining would lead the parties to contract
C3. Because a < cA at C3, party A would refuse to enter into negotiations. This
is undesirable, especially as there exist contracts, such as C4, that, were they
the outcome of bargaining, would induce both parties to negotiate. Now there
is scope for limitations on contracts. If terms were limited, so that the only
contracts that could be considered were on the arc segment between the dotted
lines (i.e., the segment containing C4), then both A and B would be willing to
enter into negotiations and they would get an outcome on the Pareto frontier.
Of course, one may wonder how the law would know that C1 is a good de-
fault contract or to limit contracts to those in the neighborhood of C4. If the
law incurs costs arriving at default or mandatory contract terms, or lacks the
information to design optimal contract, then it could be better to leave things
in private hands. In other words, while it is true that restrictions on private
contracts can possibly enhance efficiency when the private parties incur trans-
actions costs, one must assess that observation in light of real-life limitations on
what the legal system can do and the cost at which it can do it.
Before leaving the issue of transactions costs, it is worth considering how
far we can go in relaxing the no-transactions-cost assumption and still establish
a Coase-like case for freedom of contract. Our objective is to have a precise
statement for a result of the form if bargaining leads the parties to a second-best
efficient12 contract and does so in a way that minimizes bargaining costs, then
the legal system can do no better than to leave the private parties’ choice of
contract unrestricted.
To establish such a result, it is helpful to switch from working with alloca-
tions to working directly with contracts. Let C denote an arbitrary contract.
Contract terms are assumed not only to fix the allocation of real goods (pos-
sibly contingently), but also the allocation of transfers (possibly contingently)
between the parties. Let Ui(C) denote party i’s utility (possibly expected)
should the parties agree to contract C.
We can restate the strict tradeoff condition as
12Second-best efficiency refers to the optimal outcome taking into account the informational
constraints faced by the parties. For instance, in the standard hidden-action agency problem,
the first-best outcome would entail the agent expending some ideal level of effort for a flat
wage. But that outcome is typically infeasible once the constraint that the agent’s action
is hidden from the principal is taken into account; the second-best solution in such cases
typically requires the agent to bear risk, which is inefficient from a first-best perspective.
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Condition 2 (Strict Tradeoff) Let C be the set of feasible contracts and con-
sider any two contracts C0 and C1 in C. If U1(C1) ≥ U1(C0) and U2(C1) ≥
U2(C0), with at least one inequality holding strictly, then there exists a contract
C2 ∈ C such that U1(C2) > U1(C0) and U2(C2) > U2(C0).
Given the Strict Tradeoff condition, the following Coase-like theorem can be
established:
Proposition 1 (Hermalin and Katz (1993)) Suppose the two parties to a
contract are symmetrically informed prior to and during bargaining and that
bargaining consists of alternating offers. Assume the costs of delay in achieving
an agreement are due to discounting. Assume that the set of possible contracts,
C, is invariant over rounds of bargaining and that the set {(U1(C), U2(C))|C ∈
C} is convex and compact. Assume that there is at least one C ∈ C that each
party strictly prefers to no agreement (the status quo). Finally assume either
the Strict Tradeoff condition is satisfied or both parties are risk neutral and non-
contingent (lump-sum) transfers in any amount are feasible. Then there is an
essentially unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in which bargaining ends in the
first round with agreement on a Pareto-efficient contract.
The qualifier “essentially unique” captures the fact that there could be more
than one contract that yields the unique equilibrium utility levels.
Proof: Follows from Lemma A2 and Proposition 4 of Hermalin and Katz
(1993).
Because bargaining ends in the first round, there are no transactions costs
on the equilibrium path. Hence, there is no possibility of increasing efficiency by
reducing transactions costs. Moreover, because the resulting contract is efficient,
there is no scope for increasing efficiency with respect to the contract chosen.
In sum, under the assumptions of Proposition 1, there is no gain to be had from
restricting private contracts; that is, Proposition 1 makes a case for freedom of
contract.
On the other hand, Proposition 1 relies on a number of assumptions. Fortu-
nately, some of these can be relaxed if one is willing to impose refinements on
the subgame-perfect solution concept as applied to bargaining games. Specifi-
cally, we wish to rule out the possibility that the parties fear proposing efficient
contracts because the equilibrium specifies a continuation game following the
proposal of an efficient contract by party i that is unfavorable to party i (see
Hermalin and Katz, 1993, for an example of such a perverse game). To that
end, consider the following equilibrium refinements:
Condition 3 (Monotone Acceptance Condition) Suppose that, at some
date (round) t, a party would accept an offer of contract C0. Suppose that an-
other contract, C1, would yield that party a higher expected utility level. Then,
he or she will also accept contract C1 at date t.
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Condition 4 (Stolen Thunder Condition) Suppose that the equilibrium
entails one party’s making an offer of contract C at date (round) t on the equi-
librium path for some t > 1. Then he or she would accept an offer of C by the
other party in round t− 1.
As Hermalin and Katz (1993) discuss, both refinements seem reasonable for
bargaining games of complete information.
Given these refinements one can establish a stronger result:
Proposition 2 (Hermalin and Katz (1993)) Suppose the two parties to a
contract are symmetrically informed prior to and during bargaining and that
bargaining consists of alternating offers. Assume the costs of delay in achieving
an agreement are due to discounting or from per-round fixed costs. If the Strict
Tradeoff, Monotone Acceptance, and Stolen Thunder conditions are satisfied,
and there is at least one contract that each party strictly prefers to no agreement
(the status quo), then bargaining ends with their agreeing to a Pareto-efficient
contract in the first round of bargaining.
Proof: This is Proposition 5 of Hermalin and Katz (1993).
Propositions 1 and 2 make the case that, when society is solely concerned
with the wellbeing of the parties to the contract and those parties are symmet-
rically informed at the time of contracting, there is no reason to believe that
restricting the parties’ freedom of contract will improve efficiency.
2.3 The economic case against freedom of contract
So far, we have focused on the economic case for freedom of contract. Now
we review the case against. Our discussion of the Coase Theorem suggests two
potential grounds on which to argue against (complete) freedom of contract:
(i) actors who are not party to a contract (third parties) are affected by exter-
nalities resulting from the contract; and (ii) problems in negotiating a contract
prevent the parties from writing the optimal contract.
2.3.1 Third-party externalities
As we saw in §2.2.2, the efficiency of markets and private contracting is con-
tingent on there being no third-party externalities. For instance, the market
equilibrium with a competitive, but heavily polluting, industry does not maxi-
mize welfare—the supply of the good in question is determined by the private
costs incurred by the manufacturers rather than the social costs that account for
both those private costs and the harm the pollution imposes on society. Because
social costs are greater than private costs, more than the welfare-maximizing
quantity gets sold.
The inefficiency of the market when externalities are present can justify re-
strictions on private contracts. For instance, to deal with negative externalities,
society does better by restricting the freedom of buyer and seller to set price;
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there exists a price floor above the market-equilibrium price that forces trade
to occur at the welfare-maximizing level.13
A strong believer in the Coase Theorem might object to this conclusion,
arguing that polluters and their victims could contract to set the pollution level
optimally. While that might be plausible in the context of a single polluter and
a single victim (e.g., noise pollution issues between neighbors), most situations
of interest involve multiple polluters and millions of victims. It is difficult to
imagine that significant expenditures of time and effort aren’t required for a
multitude of parties to reach an agreement on the terms of a contract. More-
over, as Farrell (1987b) notes, the unknown intensity of the parties’ preferences
typically means that any such bargaining would occur under asymmetric infor-
mation. When such real-life transactions costs are accounted for, restrictions on
contracts could be the more efficient means of solving the externality problem.
The transactions-cost issue is worse when the victims of the externality are
not even known at the time parties enter into a contract. Aghion and Bolton
(1987) nicely illustrate the problem: A monopolist (e.g., a manufacturer), con-
cerned about entry into its market, signs long-term exclusive-dealing contracts
with buyers (e.g., retailers). An entrant enters only if it is more efficient (has
a lower marginal cost) than the incumbent monopolist. Whether such an en-
trant will exist is unknown ex ante by the incumbent monopolist and any given
buyer;14 but both know the distribution of the potential entrant’s marginal cost.
Because of the potential for entry, the buyer can expect to earn more surplus
in the future than it currently does; as noted by Bork (1978) and R. Posner
(1976), this will make the buyer reluctant to enter into an exclusive dealing
contract with the seller. However, some of the surplus generated by the entry of
a more efficient entrant is captured by the entrant itself. Hence, if the buyer and
incumbent seller collude—that is, enter into an exclusive-dealing contract with
a liquidated-damages provision that the buyer must pay the incumbent seller if
it switches to the entrant—then buyer and incumbent seller can capture some
of the entrant’s surplus. The entrant must lower its price vis-a`-vis the price
it would have charged absent any liquidated damages provision by the amount
of the liquidated damages to induce the buyer to switch to it. If the entrant
lowers its price, then surplus is being transferred from it to the buyer-seller
combination. The problem with such exclusive-dealing contracts is that the
buyer-seller combination is like a non-discriminating monopolist,15 it sets the
liquidated damages provision too high—in the combination’s desire to capture
more surplus from the most efficient entrants, it deters entry from those that
13A price floor is not the only policy tool that could improve efficiency relative to the
unfettered market. Other possibilities are an excise tax on the good, a pollution tax, or
permitting the manufacturers some ability to cartelize their industry.
14Later in their article, Aghion and Bolton relax this assumption and assume the incumbent
monopolist has superior information; the implications of that assumption will be addressed
later in §2.3.2.
15For a discussion of the welfare issues connected to a non-discriminating monopolist, see
§2.3.3 infra.
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are only moderately more efficient. Consequently, prohibiting exclusive-dealing
contracts increases expected welfare by increasing the probability of entry by a
more efficient producer.
Observe that it is difficult to invoke the Coase Theorem in response to the
Aghion and Bolton model. Because the entrant is unavailable at the time the
incumbent seller and buyer contract, there is no possibility of them signing a
three-way contract that achieves efficiency.16
Following Rasmusen et al. (1991), exclusive dealing can illustrate another
externality problem. Consider an incumbent monopolist who sells to N buyers.
Normalize the surplus that each buyer enjoys under monopoly pricing to zero.
Assume that, if there were entry, each buyer would enjoy surplus s > 0. Assume
that entry is feasible only if an entrant can attract at least Nˆ buyers, where
1 < Nˆ < N . Observe, therefore, that if the incumbent can lock up at least
N − Nˆ + 1 ≡ N∗ buyers through exclusive-dealing contracts, the incumbent
blocks entry. Consider a point in time prior to the arrival of an entrant; and
consider the following offer made simultaneously by the incumbent to each of the
N buyers: In exchange for signing an exclusive-dealing, the incumbent provides
the buyer surplus ε > 0 (e.g., the incumbent cuts its price by a small amount).
The buyers respond independently and simultaneously to the incumbent. Take
ε to be small enough that Nε is smaller than the amount the incumbent would
stand to lose should entry occur; that is, the incumbent does better paying
out Nε and keeping its monopoly than not paying that amount and facing
competition. Note this will often entail ε < s.
Proposition 3 There is a Nash equilibrium in which all N buyers sign an
exclusive dealing with the incumbent.
Proof: If a given buyer believes that the other N − 1 buyers will sign, then
that buyer believes entry has been blocked (recall Nˆ > 1). Hence, that buyer
expects to get 0 if she doesn’t sign and ε if she does. Because ε > 0, it is, thus,
a best response to sign.
The equilibrium of Proposition 3 is undesirable insofar as social welfare is re-
duced by the deadweight loss resulting from the preservation of monopoly pric-
ing. Limitations on freedom of contract (i.e., a prohibition on exclusive-dealing
contracts) would be welfare enhancing.
As, however, Rasmusen et al. note, the equilibrium of Proposition 3 is not
unique if ε < s. Another Nash equilibrium is for all buyers to refuse the
contract—if no other buyer will sign, then signing would mean forgoing s in
exchange for ε. Moreover, as Segal and Whinston (2000) point out, if one al-
lows the buyers to form “coalitions,” then the only Nash equilibrium will be the
16There is also a further problem insofar as the entrant’s cost is its private information, so
there is an asymmetry of information problem that would impede efficient contracting even if
the entrant were known ex ante. We elaborate on this point in §2.3.2.
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If you, a buyer, sign and
1. if fewer than N∗ buyers (including you) sign in total, then you
will receive ε, but you will be released from the exclusive-dealing
provision (i.e., you can buy from the incumbent or the entrant);
alternatively,
2. if exactly N∗ buyers (including you) sign in total, then you receive
s+ ε and you must buy from the incumbent; alternatively,
3. if more than N∗ buyers (including you) sign in total, then you
receive ε and you must buy from the incumbent.
Figure 3: A Clever Contract
one in which all buyers refuse the contract.17
Unfortunately, as Segal and Whinston go on to show, there is still scope
for entry-deterring exclusive-dealing contracts. For instance, it is possible that
N∗s is smaller than the amount the incumbent would stand to lose should entry
occur. Hence, there exists an η > 0 such that N∗(s + η) is smaller than the
amount that entry would cost the incumbent. Then the incumbent could offer
just N∗ buyers an exclusive dealing contract in which each buyer received s+η.
Because s+ η is greater than what a buyer receives even if entry occurs, it is a
dominant strategy for each of these N∗ buyers to accept this contract.
Indeed, building on ideas in Dal Bo´ (2003), it is possible for the incumbent
to induce all the buyers to sign an exclusive-dealing contract at a cost to itself
that is arbitrarily close to zero. Consider the contract in Figure 3.
Proposition 4 If the incumbent offers the Figure 3 contract to all buyers, then
it is a dominant strategy for each buyer to accept the contract. Hence, the
unique Nash equilibrium is for all buyers to accept the contract, which entails
the incumbent’s paying a total of Nε to block entry.
Proof: Consider a given buyer and let n be the number of other buyers it
expects to sign (so N − n − 1 is the number of other buyers it expects not to
sign). There are three cases to consider:
1. n < N∗−1. If the given buyer signs, she will be released from the exclusive
dealing and her total surplus will be s + ε. If she doesn’t sign, it will be
just s. Hence, she should sign.
17The word coalition in this context has a specific game-theoretic meaning; roughly a coali-
tion in this context refers to a self-enforcing agreement. That is, here, an agreement to reject
the incumbent’s offer would be self-enforcing because it is a Nash equilibrium for all buyers to
reject. For the situations below in which the incumbent offers a contract to only N∗ buyers
or the incumbent uses a “clever contract,” then an agreement among the buyers not to accept
would not be self-enforcing—because it is a dominant strategy for some or all buyers to ac-
cept, they would not honor their agreement with their fellow buyers; that is, those contracts
are robust to the formation of “coalitions.” We elaborate on this point below.
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2. n = N∗ − 1 (i.e., the given buyer is pivotal). If the given buyer signs, she
will be obligated to buy from the incumbent, but she will be paid s+ ε in
surplus. If she doesn’t sign, then entry will occur, but her surplus will be
just s. Hence, she should sign.
3. n ≥ N∗. If the given buyer signs, she will be obligated to buy from the
incumbent, but she will be paid ε in surplus. If she doesn’t sign, then,
because entry is blocked, she will get no surplus. Hence, she should sign.
Because, as shown, signing is best regardless of what the buyer thinks n is, sign-
ing is a dominant strategy. Because the given buyer was arbitrary, this holds
for all buyers; that is, all buyers will sign. Because more than N∗ buyers sign,
the incumbent blocks entry, and does so at a cost of only Nε.
Although we have presented the inefficiencies illustrated by Propositions 3
and 4 in the context of exclusive dealing, they are, in fact, examples of a broader
phenomenon. Segal (1999b) considers the general issue of a single contract pro-
poser, P , who can enter into a number of bilateral contracts with other actors,
A1, . . . , AN , and derives conditions under which a set of unconstrained bilateral
contracts will fail to maximize welfare due to externalities.18 Other contexts in-
clude vertical relations (e.g., exclusion of retailers or resale price maintenance),
takeover battles (P is a raider and A1, . . . , AN incumbent shareholders), debt
workouts (P is “equity,” which offers a debt-equity swap to the creditors, the
As), and network externalities (P sells a network good and the As purchase it).
Again, a strong believer in the Coase Theorem might object to these conclu-
sions on two grounds. First, a single grand contract among all the participants
would achieve efficiency if there is no asymmetry of information. Second, a bind-
ing agreement among the N actors (e.g., the retailers) in advance of bilateral
contracting with P (e.g., the incumbent monopolist) would ameliorate, if not
eliminate, the problem. There are, however, a number of counter-objections:
• If N is large, then the transactions costs are likely to be so large as to
make contract restrictions more efficient.
• Some of the N actors could be unknown or not yet exist (i.e., similar to
the problem in Aghion and Bolton).
• Contracting among the As could generate other concerns. For instance,
there could be legitimate antitrust concerns if all the retailers of a good
or in an area were allowed to write a contract among themselves.
2.3.2 Asymmetric information
As has been known since Akerlof’s (1970) seminal work, asymmetric informa-
tion between parties can result in market distortions. A number of authors
18For the latest on the general theory of bilateral contracting with externalities, see Segal
and Whinston (2003).
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(Aghion and Bolton, 1987; Aghion and Hermalin, 1990; Johnston, 1990; Spier,
1992; Hermalin, 2002, among others) have applied this idea to the issue of con-
tract design; showing that asymmetric information between the parties at the
time a contract is negotiated can lead to distortions in the resulting contract
vis-a`-vis the contract that would have been negotiated under symmetric infor-
mation. Unless the equilibrium under the symmetric-information contract is,
itself, second best, such distortions must imply a loss of welfare vis-a`-vis the
symmetric-information benchmark.
Whenever the parties negotiate imperfect contracts, the question arises whe-
ther there is scope for the legal system to improve matters, either by restricting
the set of possible contracts ex ante or through appropriate court action ex post .
Aghion and Hermalin (1990) explore the former possibility in the context of a
signaling game.19,20 Their analysis can be motivated as follows. A well-known
restriction on debt contracts is that the contract cannot contain an enforceable
waiver by the debtor to her right to declare bankruptcy. Indeed, many states
in the us impose even further protections, allowing a bankrupt debtor to keep
certain assets (e.g., a car or house) under certain circumstances. Can such
restrictions enhance efficiency or total welfare?
To be concrete, consider an entrepreneur who needs to raise capital for a
project. She knows how likely it is that her project will succeed; that is, whether
it is a good project, which has a probability of failing of Fg or a bad project,
which has a probability of failing of Fb > Fg. Using a short-hand common
to information economics, call the entrepreneur with a good (alt. bad) project
the good-type (alt. bad-type) entrepreneur. While the entrepreneur knows her
type, a potential investor does not. His knowledge is limited to knowing that
there is a probability θ ∈ (0, 1) that the project is good. Assume that if a
project fails, it is impossible for the entrepreneur to repay the investor fully.
19Signaling games, first studied by Spence (1973), are games of asymmetric information in
which the better informed party takes actions that have the potential to convey—“signal”—
her information to the less well informed party. The classic example (Spence) is a worker who
signals information about her ability to potential employers through the amount of education
she acquires. An equilibrium of a signaling game is called separating if the equilibrium actions
of the informed player vary with her information (e.g., workers who know themselves to be
more talented acquire more education than workers who know themselves to be less talented).
A pooling equilibrium is one in which the equilibrium actions of the informed player do not
vary with her information (e.g., all workers get the same level of education).
20Section II.B.2 and Appendix C of Johnston (1990) also considers the implications of sig-
naling on contract formation in the context of evaluating limited-liability rules. Unlike Aghion
and Hermalin, Johnston is concerned with default rules rather than binding restrictions. How-
ever, as Ayres and Gertner (1992) argue, Johnston’s emphasis on default rules undermines
his arguments; Ayres and Gertner show that the choice of default rule is irrelevant in a world
with costless contracting.
A recent paper by Anderlini et al. (2003) is another contribution to this literature. They
focus on ex post actions by the courts, specifically whether the court should void certain con-
tracts in some states of the world. Unlike Aghion and Hermalin, who focus on how restrictions
can shift the equilibrium from an inefficient separating equilibrium to a more efficient pooling
equilibrium, Anderlini et al. show how the expectation of the court’s ex post actions creates
the possibility of an efficient separating equilibrium when otherwise the equilibrium would be
a less efficient pooling equilibrium.
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Investing is, therefore, risky and the risk is greater investing in a bad project
than in a good project. For this reason, the entrepreneur can get more generous
terms from an investor, the more likely he thinks it is that her project will
succeed. Consequently, the entrepreneur has an incentive to signal the investor
that her project is good through the terms of the debt contract she offers the
investor. Specifically, because the expected cost of a large payment to be paid
if the project fails is greater for a bad-type entrepreneur than a good-type
entrepreneur, a good-type entrepreneur can signal that she has a good project
by promising a large payment to the investor should the project fail. The cost of
signaling in this manner is that the entrepreneur exposes herself to considerable
risk (e.g., losing her house if the project fails).
Restricting the amount the entrepreneur can promise to repay in the case of
failure can potentially generate Pareto superior outcomes. To see why, note that,
because of the additional risk, an entrepreneur with a good project might prefer
not to signal if silence were interpreted by the investor as meaning her project
was “average” (i.e., had a failure probability of θFg + (1− θ)Fb). The difficulty
is that, under a reasonable solution concept for the game,21 the investor will
interpret silence as evidence that the project is bad ; and given the choice between
looking good (signaling) and looking bad (not signaling), an entrepreneur with
a good project will prefer to look good. If, however, signaling is restricted (e.g.,
bankruptcy laws limit what the entrepreneur can pay in the event of failure),
then not signaling is no longer informative. The investor will, therefore, treat
all entrepreneurs as if they have an average project. Both types of entrepreneur
are better off—an entrepreneur with a bad project now looks average, while
an entrepreneur with a good project avoids the additional risks imposed by
costly signaling. Because the investor is always held to his reservation utility
conditional on his equilibrium beliefs, he is no worse off. Thus, restricting the
possible terms of the contract would be Pareto superior.
Aghion and Hermalin formalize this argument in the entrepreneur-investor
context. They go on to suggest, but not model formally, that the idea of
contract restrictions eliminating “wasteful” signaling is more general than the
entrepreneur-investor example. For instance, it could justify limits on penalties
for breach of contract: To signal that she is very likely to be able to deliver a
product on time, a good-type supplier might offer “too high” a penalty to be
paid were she to be late; where “too high” means that she would be happier
with a lower promised penalty if only the buyer wouldn’t interpret that lower
penalty as indicating she was the bad-type supplier. Barring excessive penalties
would prevent the buyer from making that interpretation, which in turn would
lead to a contract that both good and bad-type suppliers preferred.
While Aghion and Hermalin prove that restrictions on contracts can be
welfare enhancing in the context of signaling models, they do not establish
that restrictions will always be welfare enhancing. For some set of parameters,
restrictions enhance welfare; for others, they don’t. Moreover, in the latter
21Specifically, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (pbe) satisfying the Intuitive Criterion of Cho
and Kreps (1987).
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case, the imposition of binding restrictions will reduce welfare (see Figure 5b
of Aghion and Hermalin and connected discussion). Intuitively, there exist
parameter values such that the separating pbe under asymmetric information
replicates the equilibrium that would hold under symmetric information. In
those situations, given our earlier discussion, it is not surprising that restrictions
can only reduce, not enhance, welfare. Furthermore, if the contracting situation
is already problematic, the fact that the informed player must signal can improve
matters: Aghion and Bolton (1987), for instance, point out that the introduction
of asymmetric information in their model pushes down the average liquidated
damages penalty, thereby increasing the likelihood of efficient entry.
The lack of a clear normative conclusion from Aghion and Hermalin admit-
tedly limits the practical application of their results. Eric Posner (2003a) sees
this as a fatal flaw, supporting his overall indictment of contract theory as a
guide to the law of contracts. But, as Craswell (2003) notes, there is no reason
to require economic analysis to reach “all or nothing” conclusions before the
analysis is useful normatively.
A signaling game is a particular kind of game of asymmetric information;
in the context of contract design, it corresponds to a situation in which the
informed party (e.g., the entrepreneur) makes a contract offer to the uninformed
party (e.g., the potential investor). But there are other possible contract-offer
games. An obvious alternative is for the uninformed party to make a contract
offer to the informed party (a game known as screening). Can restrictions on
contracts improve the efficiency of the outcomes of screening games?
The answer, as demonstrated by Hermalin and Katz (1993), is effectively no.
The argument is as follows, let CU be the set of unrestricted contracts and let
CR be the subset of restricted contracts (i.e., CR ⊂ CU ). Let C∗i be the contract
offered by the uninformed party and accepted by the informed party in the game
where the relevant contract space is Ci.22 Let vP (C) be the uninformed party’s
expected utility under contract C. Because the uninformed party cannot signal
information, changing the contract space cannot change the informed party’s
acceptance rule. Hence, by the nature of optimization,
vP (C∗U ) ≥ vP (C∗R) . (2)
Clearly, if the inequality is strict, then restrictions on contracts cannot be Pareto
improving. If expression (2) is an equality, then there is no reason for the
uninformed party not to offer C∗R if it Pareto dominates C
∗
U and, hence, it
is unclear why we shouldn’t expect C∗R to be offered even absent restrictions.
Moreover, if the Strict Tradeoff condition (Condition 2) holds, then C∗R cannot
Pareto dominate C∗U if expression (2) is an equality. To see this, were C
∗
U
dominated by C∗R, then, by the Strict Tradeoff condition, there would exist
22As is typical in contract theory, we can, without loss of generality, add the “refusal
contract” to the set CR (and, thus, to CU ); where the refusal contract stipulates the same
payoffs to the parties as would result if the informed player refused the uninformed player’s
offer. In other words, there is no loss of generality in assuming acceptance of some contract
in equilibrium.
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a third contract Cˆ ∈ CU that the uninformed player strictly preferred to C∗U
and which the informed player would accept. But the existence of such a Cˆ
contradicts the optimality of C∗U . Therefore, C
∗
R cannot Pareto dominate C
∗
U .
A robust conclusion, therefore, is
Proposition 5 Restrictions on contracts cannot be Pareto improving in screen-
ing situations if either (i) the uninformed party is not mean spirited; or (ii) the
contract space satisfies the Strict Tradeoff condition (Condition 2).
Why do signaling and screening models yield different conclusions? Exter-
nalities offer an explanation. Although the informed player in a signaling game
is a single entity, one can nonetheless view her as being two (e.g., the bad-type
entrepreneur or the good-type entrepreneur). The fact that a bad type is po-
tentially willing to pretend to be a good type forces the good type to distort the
contract she offers so that she won’t be mistaken for the bad type (i.e., select
a contract, though not ideal for her, that the bad type would not be willing to
offer). The problem is that there is no way for the bad type to internalize this
externality that her potential mimicry imposes on the good type. When, how-
ever, it is the uninformed party who makes the contract offer, he is in a position
to internalize the costs and benefits of attempting to differentiate the different
types of the informed player. In essence, signaling can impose an externality,
while screening cannot.
We can also consider social welfare in screening models of contract bargain-
ing. Obviously, if restrictions are Pareto improving they also enhance welfare.
However, as we’ve just seen, it will generally be the case that restrictions will
not be Pareto improving with screening. Hence, we limit attention to the case in
which expression (2) is a strict inequality. The question of whether restrictions
can enhance welfare then boils down to whether the informed party’s (average)
gain from the restrictions exceeds vP (C∗U )− vP (C∗R) > 0.
To see that restrictions can enhance welfare, consider the following example.
The uninformed player is a seller and the informed player is a potential buyer.
The buyer’s private information is his knowledge of the benefit, b, he derives
from a single unit of the good being sold by the seller. Assume that b is drawn
prior to contracting from a uniform distribution on [0, 1] and this fact is common
knowledge. For convenience, assume the good holds no intrinsic value for the
seller, so her cost is zero. While the buyer knows his benefit from purchase at
the time of contracting, the seller knows only it was drawn from the uniform
distribution. The unconstrained contract offered by the seller will be a contract
to sell the good at a price of 1/2, which yields total expected welfare of 3/8 (of
this 1/4 is expected profit for the seller and 1/8 is the expected surplus captured
by the buyer).23 Consider the restriction that p ≤ 0. Within this constrained
23At price p, the buyer will buy if b ≥ p. The probability b ≥ p is 1 − p. The seller’s
expected profit from a price p is, thus, p(1 − p), which is maximized by p = 1/2. If the unit
is traded, welfare is just b; hence, expected welfare is
 1
1/2 bdb = 1/2− 1/8 = 3/8.
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space, the seller will set a price of p = 0. All types of buyer buy, so expected
welfare is 1/2 (all of which is captured by the buyer).24
Observe that the welfare loss that arises in an unrestricted world occurs
because of asymmetric information. If the seller knew the buyer’s valuation,
then the seller would set p = b. All types of buyer would buy, so expected welfare
would be 1/2 (all of which would be captured by the seller). Alternatively, if
the buyer did not know his valuation at the time of contracting—so the parties
are symmetrically informed insofar as they both know only that b ∼ U[0, 1]—
then welfare would be maximized by a contract that set p = 1/2 and the buyer
always bought; the seller gets 1/2 for sure and the buyer’s expected surplus is
zero, so total welfare is 1/2. Note this last result is consistent with the view that
asymmetries of information that arise after contracting are not justifications
for restrictions; a point made more generally by Hermalin and Katz (1993)—see
Propositions 1 and 2 above.
In §2.2.1, we observed that the welfare criteria of Pareto efficiency and so-
cial welfare often coincide when transfers between the parties are feasible. It
is worth, therefore, considering why that coincidence breaks down with asym-
metric information. When there is asymmetric information, transfers are called
upon to serve double duty. They continue to be a means of transferring surplus
so that the welfare-maximizing allocation might be viewed as Pareto efficient
by the parties. But, with asymmetric information, they are also a means of
screening the different types. As our simple example illustrates, this second
duty impedes transfers from doing the first optimally.
To summarize: In a signaling situation, restrictions on contracts can lead to
Pareto superior outcomes and, thus, can increase total welfare. In contrast, in
a screening situation, restrictions on contracts generally cannot be expected to
generate Pareto improvements, although they can increase total welfare.
2.3.3 Market power
As discussed above, competitive markets can be expected to maximize wel-
fare in the absence of externalities. When, however, one or more entities have
market power, the market can no longer be expected to yield the social welfare-
maximizing allocation. It is well known that a firm with market power (i.e.,
that faces a downward sloping firm-specific demand) produces less than the
welfare-maximizing quantity. So, at least in the standard static framework,
market power reduces welfare.25 Consequently, public policy should generally
oppose contracts that promote market power over competition, such as cartel
agreements. This logic extends to other contracts, such as exclusive-dealing con-
24Expected welfare is
 1
0 bdb = 1/2.
25In a dynamic framework, one may need to consider the incentive effects of monopoly
profits for innovation; that is, in some contexts, without the monopoly profits that intellectual
property protection (e.g., patents) afford, the innovator would lack sufficient incentive to
innovate. No innovation means zero units are traded, which yields even less welfare than the
monopoly outcome.
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tracts,26 that firms might sign to maintain, establish, or extend market power.
It is important to recognize that the welfare loss that comes from market
power (i.e., non-discriminating or simple monopoly pricing) is an example of the
adverse welfare consequences of asymmetric information in a screening model
(see §2.3.2).27 While buyers know their valuations for each unit, the monopolist
does not. Hence, the monopolist sets her price both to affect the transfer of
surplus from buyers to herself and to screen the buyers. As before, asking a
single instrument to serve two roles leads to distortions in welfare.
The fact that the monopoly-pricing problem is a screening problem also
implies that if the monopolist knew each buyer’s valuation schedule for all the
units he could conceivably wish to purchase, then it could achieve the welfare-
maximizing allocation. That is, as is well known (see, e.g., Tirole, 1988, §3.1), a
perfect price-discriminating monopolist maximizes social welfare.28 Hence, the
welfare loss typically seen with monopoly stems not from market power alone,
but from the combination of market power and asymmetric information.
Price discrimination in the real world is imperfect. Depending on the form
of discrimination, the structure of demand, and other circumstances, allowing
a monopolist to engage in price discrimination versus simple monopoly pricing
can enhance or diminish welfare (see Chapter 3 of Tirole, 1988, for a review
of the welfare consequences of imperfect price discrimination). Consequently,
it is difficult to assess, at a general level, what policy should be towards the
enforceability of contractual terms that facilitate price discrimination.
For example, it is not obvious from a welfare perspective whether airlines
should be free to issue tickets that contain restrictions (e.g., an obligation to
stay a Saturday night before returning to one’s point of origin).29 Such matters
need to be studied on a case-by-case basis.
Note too that market power is connected to bargaining power. Indeed, the
screening problem associated with a non-discriminating monopolist can be in-
terpreted as stemming, in part, from the seller having all the bargaining power,
26Recall the discussion of Aghion and Bolton (1987) and Rasmusen et al. (1991) in §2.3.1.
27It follows from the Coase Theorems (Theorems 1–3) or Propositions 1 & 2, as appropriate,
that bargaining power should generally be irrelevant in a standard welfare analysis absent
asymmetries of information.
This is not to say that there couldn’t be other social reasons for concern about inequities
in bargaining power, such as distributional concerns (consider, e.g., Kennedy, 1982). As
E. Posner (2003a) notes, courts have been known to declare contract unconscionable because
of unequal bargaining power. See also §2.4.1 and §2.5.2 infra.
28Of course, because a perfect-discriminating monopolist captures 100% of the surplus, there
could be distributional or equity grounds for this outcome not to be favored.
29Saturday night restrictions are a form of second-degree price discrimination whereby an
airline can screen business travelers (those with a high value of flying and a high cost of staying
over Saturday) from non-business travelers (those with lower values of flying and lower costs
of staying over Saturday). If banning such restrictions caused the airlines to price so that
far fewer non-business travelers flew, then the ban would almost surely be welfare reducing.
If, however, the ban led the airlines to price so as to keep non-business travelers flying, then
eliminating the distortionary effects of the Saturday-night restriction would almost surely be
welfare enhancing.
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so that she gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to buyers. The welfare loss
from monopoly would disappear if it were the buyers who could make take-it-
or-leave-it offers (assuming they knew the seller’s marginal-cost schedule).
2.3.4 Capacity and bounded rationality
The parties in traditional law & economics analyses are presumed to be so-
phisticated and possess the requisite capacity. Consequently, any contract into
which they voluntarily enter is, in rational expectation, superior for them to
their no-contract (status quo) position. That is, each party correctly estimates
that their expected utility from contracting exceeds that from not.
Observe that the rationality being assumed has two components. First,
neither party would enter into an agreement that he or she thought would make
him or her worse off, in expectation, than not contracting. Second, each party
is forming these expectations in an objectively correct manner. For instance,
if you respond to some get-rich-quick spam email, you presumably expect to
enrich yourself, but such expectations are not rational; that is, you are rational
in the first sense, but not the second.
It is difficult to argue that people aren’t rational in the first sense (putting
aside certain pathologies such as compulsive self-destructive behavior), but there
has long been some unease with the assumption that people are rational in the
second sense (see, e.g., Simon, 1972, or Rubinstein, 1998, for a discussion).
More recently, a movement has arisen within law & economics generally (see,
e.g., Jolls et al., 1998; Korobkin and Ulen, 2000) that also questions the as-
sumption of rationality in the second sense. This movement has been labeled
“behavioral law and economics,” and it resembles related work in economics in
its emphasis on cognitive errors, framing effects, time-inconsistent patterns of
discounting, and similar phenomena. Within the formal modeling of contracts,
however, assumptions of bounded rationality have been largely limited to the
issue of explaining incomplete contracts (or justifying assuming that contracts
are incomplete). We take up this use of bounded rationality in §4.2.1 below.
While, to the best of our knowledge, capacity and sophistication have not
been formally modeled in the context of contract theory, such issues have re-
ceived attention by law & economics scholars in law reviews (see, e.g., Eisenberg,
1995; Korobkin and Ulen, 2000; Bar-Gill, 2005).30 Korobkin and Ulen, for in-
stance, argue that mandated contractual terms can be justified when one side
lacks sophistication. They take as an example the former practice of insur-
ance companies to cover only one day of hospital stay for maternity and the
legislative reaction that required these companies to cover longer stays. They
argue that legislative action was necessary because “the possible permutations
of coverages that could, in principle, be provided by a given health insurance
policy are numerous and . . . can overwhelm even sophisticated consumers . . .
[and their] agents . . . who might be making purchasing decisions”(Korobkin and
30Although, as we discuss infra some formal models (e.g., Katz, 1990b; Rasmusen, 2001)
touch on related issues.
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Ulen, p. 1082).
While it is difficult to argue against the proposition that the majority of
consumers do not fully understand the provisions of their insurance contracts,31
the example of maternity benefits seems a poor one from which to argue for
intervention on the basis of inattention. The legislative reaction to this issue,
and the strong public outcry that prompted it, suggest that the limited coverage
insurers had previously been offering was not due to any consumer inattention.
A more likely explanation was insufficient willingness to pay.32 Put a bit dif-
ferently, given the apparent awareness of the market to how much maternity
stay was being covered, one would have expected the “unregulated market” to
provide the desired level of maternity benefits if maternity benefits had been
important to those who actually decided about policies.
A more plausible variant of the Korobkin and Ulen idea is developed by
Eisenberg (1995). Although Eisenberg presents his argument verbally rather
than mathematically, it is helpful to add some degree of formalism.33 Suppose
there are two possible future states, a rare one, which occurs with probability r;
and a more likely one, which occurs with probability 1−r. Eisenberg is interested
in the case where r is small, but not zero. Consider contracting between two
parties, P and A. For convenience, assume that the bargaining between them
always results in a contract that yields monetary benefits Bi (gross of direct
transfers) to party i in the more expected state (i.e., the state that occurs
with probability 1 − r). Suppose that the contract can contain a stipulation,
s ∈ S, that governs what happens in the rare state. Let bi(s) denote party i’s
monetary benefit gross of direct transfers in the rare state under stipulation s.
Assume that the stipulation that maximizes P ’s benefit in the rare state, sˆ, is
not the stipulation that would maximize the sum of the parties’ benefits. Let
31See, for example, Eisenberg’s (1995) discussion (p. 242) of Gerhardt v. Continental In-
surance Cos. (48 N.J. 291, 295 A.2d 328), in which he quotes the justices of the New Jersey
Supreme Court expressing their difficulties in understanding the terms of the insurance con-
tract in question.
32Korobkin and Ulen cite statistics (their footnote 111) that 90% of insured Americans get
their health insurance through their employer. This fact, however, is potentially problematic
for their argument. The employers could be quite sophisticated and are simply shopping for a
bargain in insurance. That is, the problem is due to agency (the employers obtaining insurance
on their workers behalf) rather than bounded rationality. Korobkin and Ulen might argue that
workers suffer the same cognitive limitations bargaining with their employers; but, depending
on worker-employer bargaining, the relative political power of workers versus employers and
insurers, and the incidence of the cost of increased medical coverage, it is nevertheless possible
that everything can be explained within the rational-actor paradigm.
33Katz (1990b) and Rasmusen (2001) are two articles that also model “reading costs” for-
mally.
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that stipulation be s∗. Mathematically,
bP (sˆ) ≥ bP (s) for all s ∈ S ,
bP (sˆ) > bP (s∗) ,
bA(s∗) + bP (s∗) ≥ bA(s) + bP (s) for all s ∈ S , and
bA(s∗) + bP (s∗) > bA(sˆ) + bP (sˆ) . (3)
Observe that there must be s ∈ S, including s∗, that A prefers to sˆ. Define
Δi = bi(s∗)− bi(sˆ). By construction,
ΔA > ΔA +ΔP > 0 > ΔP .
Eisenberg is interested, in part, in situations in which P proposes the stipula-
tion for the rare state and it costs A some amount, k, to evaluate or understand
the stipulation that P has proposed. One can view k as the cost of consulting
an attorney or the cost of time spent trying to understand the small print. If
A is particularly unsophisticated, one might even set k = ∞ to reflect the idea
that A is simply incapable of understanding what P has proposed. Suppose
that if A does understand the stipulation, then P and A would bargain to some
term that A found acceptable. In keeping with our earlier analysis of bargain-
ing under symmetric information, we may as well assume that they would then
agree on s∗. A critical assumption, however, is that
k > rΔA ; (4)
in other words, the expected gain that A stands to reap from understanding the
stipulation for what should happen in the rare state is smaller than the cost of
obtaining that understanding (we will see in a moment that, when A doesn’t
understand the stipulation in the rare state, P should propose sˆ). Observe that
expression (4) holds if k is large or if r or ΔA are small; Eisenberg can be read
as being primarily concerned about the situation in which r is small—we will
return to this point later.
To close the model, suppose that the bargaining process is such that P can
be seen as proposing a contract subject to A’s acceptance, where A accepts only
if his expected net benefit at least meets a reservation level βA; that is,
(1− r)BA + rb˜A − p ≥ βA , (5)
where b˜A is the benefit A expects in the rare state and p is a transfer to P (if
p < 0, then the transfer is from P to A). P ’s utility is
(1− r)BP + rb˜P + p ,
where b˜P is what she gets in the rare state.
Suppose that A will not expend the k necessary to understand the stipulation
for the rare state; then it is irrelevant for A’s acceptance rule (5) what stipulation
P actually makes because A won’t understand it and, thus, his expectation,
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b˜A, cannot depend on it. Given this, it is clearly a best response for P to
choose sˆ.34 In equilibrium, A must form his expectations correctly,35 so b˜A =
bA(sˆ). Observe, given (4), it is indeed a best response for A not to expend k
on understanding even if A anticipates P is proposing sˆ. In equilibrium, total
welfare will, thus, be
Ŵ ≡ (1− r)(BA +BP ) + r
(
bA(sˆ) + bP (sˆ)
)
.
From expression (3), it follows that total welfare is not being maximized.
If we suppose that P has sufficient bargaining power so that expression (5)
is binding, then P ’s equilibrium utility is
(1− r)(BA +BP ) + r
(
bA(sˆ) + bP (sˆ)
)− βA ,
from which we see that it is P who bears the full cost of this loss in welfare.
Normally when a party bears the full cost, that party would take steps to elimi-
nate the efficiency loss. However, here, P can’t—there is no credible way for her
to commit to A that she has stipulated s∗; that is, any promise of s∗ is cheap
talk because P knows A will not understand if P substitutes the stipulation
that favors her.
There are some ironies in this result. First, while Korobkin and Ulen and
Eisenberg appear to suggest that it will be the unsophisticated party who suffers
in these situations, the truth could well be that it is the sophisticated party
who suffers. Second, even though, as noted by Schwartz and Wilde (1979), the
sophisticated party has a motive to internalize the value of the superior contract
term, there is no way for her to do so.36
Conversely, suppose that, due to competition among the P s, it is the As who
capture the surplus; that is,
(1− r)BP + rbP (s) + p = KP ,
where KP is P ’s reservation utility (cost). Observe this expression can be
rearranged as
p(s) ≡ KP − (1− r)BP − rbP (s) . (6)
From expression (6), it follows that the price a P charges if the term is sˆ is
lower than if it is s∗; that is, p(sˆ) < p(s∗). In this environment, we can assess
34One might wonder why P bothers to worry about what to stipulate if the state really is
rare. One answer, suggested by Eisenberg, is that P deals with many As (e.g., the contract is
a form contract that P uses with many customers); hence, even though the expected gain to
P from stipulating sˆ over s∗ is small for any one transaction, in aggregate it is large enough
to induce P to invest in choosing the best stipulation for her.
35This imposition of rationality on A might seem at odds with the bounded rationality
approach of Eisenberg. We will discuss this point later.
36In Katz (1990b), the sophisticated party can take actions costly to it that lower the
unsophisticated party’s cost of understanding the contract terms. On the other hand, if those
costs are incurred on a per-transaction basis (e.g., they represent the expense of a person
explaining terms to a potential buyer), then such actions could well fail to be cost effective,
especially if the terms in question pertain to a rare event.
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Schwartz and Wilde’s claim that if some of the As have a low enough cost of
evaluating the stipulation for the rare state, then competition will lead the P s
to stipulate s∗ rather than sˆ. Suppose there are two kinds of As, those with low
evaluation costs, k, and those with high evaluation costs, kh. For the moment,
set k = 0, so the -type As always evaluate. For the h-type As, kh satisfies
expression (4). Suppose the presence of the  types led all P s to stipulate s∗.
Competition among the P s would then require them each to charge p(s∗) and
earn zero profits. Consider a deviation from this candidate equilibrium in which
a P stipulated sˆ. Although she would lose all business from  types, she would,
at least in the short term, keep the h types. Moreover, at a price of p(s∗),
she would realize an expected gain of −rΔP > 0 from a contract with an h
type. Hence, deviating from the candidate equilibrium—stipulating sˆ rather
than s∗—is profitable for that P , which means the candidate equilibrium isn’t
an equilibrium at all. In other words, there is no equilibrium in which all P s
stipulate s∗ for sure.37
In fact, if we set k > 0, we can see a second reason why an s∗-only equilib-
rium cannot arise. Define Δ˜A = bA(s∗)− b˜A; that is, Δ˜A is the expected gain for
A that he expects from negotiating the contract from the expected stipulation
in the rare state to s∗. Observe, even for an  type, it is only worth evaluating
the stipulation if
k ≤ rΔ˜A .
Suppose all P s were expected to stipulate s∗; then, Δ˜A = 0. Hence, no types
of A would bother to evaluate the stipulation. But, as we’ve seen, if A won’t
evaluate, then P should always stipulate sˆ. The conclusion is, thus, that it is
impossible for A to ever be certain that P has stipulated s∗ unless A checks (we
might dub this the “Eisenberg uncertainty principle”).38
Although this model is somewhat rudimentary, it does demonstrate that
the problem identified by Eisenberg and others is unlikely to be eliminated
by private action. This suggests that intervention could be beneficial. Such
intervention could be ex ante, i.e., the law could disallow any stipulation but
s∗; or the intervention could be ex post , i.e., the courts could grant A damages
should it be shown that the stipulated term was other than s∗.
As we observed earlier, a critical condition is (4), which makes it rational for
A not to seek to understand the terms stipulated for the rare state. If condition
(4) fails, as it will if the relevant terms (r or ΔA) are large, then the argument
for intervention collapses.39 While either r or ΔA small enough is sufficient
for condition (4) to hold, the situation in which it holds because ΔA is small
37What is the equilibrium in this game depends on what additional assumptions we make.
If, for instance, we assumed that  types could, in negotiations, change the contract from
sˆ to s∗ in exchange for an increase in price from p(sˆ) to p(s∗), then an equilibrium can be
constructed in which all P s offer contracts at p(sˆ), but end up negotiating different terms with
the -type As.
38Katz’s Lemma 2 makes the same point.
39Although, even when (4) fails, there could still be cause to be concerned due to the
Eisenberg Uncertainty Principle.
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could be relatively uninteresting—presumably A will need to take some action
to enforce restrictions on s (e.g., sue to have an illegal contract voided or to
recover damages); but if ΔA is small, then A’s motive to do so could be small
as well. That is, it could be difficult to implement intervention in cases in which
ΔA is small. The situations in which r is small are, as Eisenberg suggests, the
more important ones. The ex post injustice could be large, but the motive of
a single A to address it ex ante could be too small to make feasible a private
solution.
Admittedly, we have imbued A in our formal model with rather more ratio-
nality than Eisenberg intended. Like others (e.g., Jolls et al., 1998; Korobkin
and Ulen, 2000; Bar-Gill, 2005), he observes that research in psychology and
behavioral economics suggests that most people are poor at estimating proba-
bilities correctly, especially probabilities of small events.40 To the extent that
they systematically underestimate the probability of a rare event (e.g., likeli-
hood of an insurance claim), they will use too small an r in deciding whether
to invest in understanding what the contract stipulates for rare states. While
the addition of such cognitive biases have the potential to enrich the analysis,
our simple model demonstrates that they are not essential to obtain the main
conclusion.
Katz (1990b), among others, notes there is a relation between the analysis in
this subsection and Akerlof’s lemons model. Although, here, we have a problem
of moral hazard—the contract proposer chooses her “type”—whereas Akerlof
is concerned with a problem of adverse selection—the informed party’s type is
exogenously determined—it is true in both that the uninformed party expects
adverse terms of trade. A major difference, however, is that here all valuable
exchanges take place, but just not under the optimal contract. In the lemons
model, in contrast, buyer suspicion about quality can push the price below the
level at which high-quality sellers are willing to sell, leading to inefficient exit of
the high-quality sellers from the market. Admittedly, if the terms in question
were important enough to the uninformed party, but yet not important enough
to incur the reading costs, then it is theoretically possible that no trade could
occur because of the uninformed’s suspicions about the adverse nature of the
contract. These issues have been discussed informally in the legal literature
as well (see, for example, Kennedy, 1982; Craswell, 1993, 2000; and Eisenberg,
1995).
2.4 Other arguments for regulating private contracts
2.4.1 Distributional fairness
The Second Theorem of Welfare Economics holds that given convex production
and utility functions, complete markets, and costless redistribution, any Pareto
efficient allocation can be implemented as the general equilibrium of a competi-
tive economy (see, e.g., §6.4 of Debreu, 1959). In the real world, however, these
40See Rabin (1998) for a survey.
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necessary assumptions are frequently violated, so that the same policy instru-
ments must be used to promote both efficiency and distributional justice, with
the two goals being traded off in a second-best fashion (Okun, 1975). Accord-
ingly, much economic regulation has in practice some distributional component
(R. Posner, 1971, and Polinsky, 1974).
In the field of contracts, however, as opposed to other bodies of law such as
tort or property, it is relatively difficult to use private law rules as instruments of
distribution. This is because contractual obligations are in general voluntarily
undertaken, so that changes in legal rules will be accompanied by changes in
the parties’ reservation prices for exchange, tending to shift the incidence of a
regulation to its intended beneficiary (e.g., Buchanan, 1970). But restrictions on
price will redistribute between marginal and inframarginal market actors, and in
cases of market power, can redistribute between the two sides of the market (as
can readily be seen from the example of a monopolist subject to a price ceiling
set between the monopoly price and marginal cost). And restrictions on non-
price terms can similarly redistribute between marginal and inframarginal actors
if they differ in the value they attach to such terms (Spence, 1975; Craswell,
1991).
Similarly, policies that internalize externalities have distributional effects as
well, and from a political economy viewpoint such effects—because they are
larger—are probably more important than any efficiency gains in explaining the
pattern of regulation. For example, in situations of adverse selection (the most
important externality arising in the contractual setting), policies that force in-
formation revelation or limit entry or exit from a market can cause redistribution
across informational types.
2.4.2 Liberty and autonomy
In the context of contract law, the liberal perspective tends to support argu-
ments for contractual freedom, although on libertarian rather than economic
grounds. As indicated in §1.2.3, however, liberal and economic theories of con-
tract can diverge in cases of market failure or transaction costs. A canonical
illustration is provided by the phenomenon of standard-form contracts. Stan-
dardized contracts are an inevitable by-product of a mass production economy,
but many legal commentators (e.g., Kessler, 1943; Rakoff, 1983) have regarded
them with distrust on the grounds that most persons presented with standard
forms quite reasonably do not bother to familiarize themselves with the specific
contents, relying instead on the drafter’s reputation and on the knowledge that
other contracting parties regularly do business on like terms. Such commenta-
tors take the position that these facts vitiate the non-drafting party’s consent
and justify state regulation of fine-print terms, although other writers, more
influenced by an economic or commercial perspective (e.g., Llewellyn, 1960,
pp. 362–371) are willing to read implied consent into the overall situation. This
issue is discussed at greater length in §3 and §4 below, where we take up the
problems of contract formation and interpretation.
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2.4.3 Inalienability and commodification
Finally, both popular morality and legal institutions commonly limit transac-
tions dealing with matters thought to be fundamental to citizenship or personal
identity; common examples include prohibitions on slavery, sexual prostitution,
and the transfer of political rights such as suffrage or military service. The
entitlements subject to such restriction are often described in political terms
as inalienable, a concept not easily incorporated into economic accounts of ex-
change. Sometimes, as in the case of sexuality or body parts, restrictions are
imposed on market exchange but not on other transfers: a situation that Radin
(1987) labels “market-inalienability.”
In some cases, restrictions on alienability can be justified in terms of market
failure such as asymmetric information (e.g., the use of in-kind benefits to screen
out those not in need, as in Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988) or externality (when
Pigouvian taxes are administratively infeasible). But many such restrictions are
better explained by the idea that exchange of the relevant entitlement injures
some fundamental interest of the restricted agent not captured by his utility
function, or some social interest that cannot be translated into material or
pecuniary terms. In economics, this idea finds historical roots in the classical
Marxian idea of commodification, or the change in the social meaning of a good
that occurs when it becomes the subject of economic exchange.
The concept of commodification can be translated into neoclassical economic
terms by interpreting it as sort of a cultural externality (e.g., when sexual pros-
titution is said to diminish the quality of other people’s relationships) or as a
lexicographical preference ordering on the social welfare function (so that equal-
ity in the distribution of certain goods trumps other allocative or distributional
considerations, as in Tobin, 1970). But this interpretation does not do justice
to the sense in which those who advocate the concept are concerned with the
social construction of perceptions and preferences. Accordingly, the concept
is best explained (see, e.g., Kelman, 1981) as relating to potential changes in
the content of individual utility functions or of the cumulative social welfare
function.
2.5 Legal doctrines regulating freedom of contract
To a considerable extent, the actual legal doctrines restricting freedom of con-
tract can be understood in economic terms, in that most doctrinal restrictions
roughly correspond to situations of market failure or high transaction costs, of
the sort discussed in the previous subsections. This correspondence is not exact,
however; and a survey of the main restrictions will illustrate the roughness of
the relationship.
2.5.1 Formal requirements for contracting
The law imposes a number of formal requirements that must be satisfied in
order for contractual agreements to be enforceable in court. In general, as
Hermalin, Katz, & Craswell Freedom of Contract 43
discussed in §2.1.1 above, failure to satisfy these requirements results merely
in denial of public enforcement rather than any negative sanction. Under us
law, for instance, a contract for the sale of goods with market value above
$500 (a threshold that has not been adjusted for fifty years) is not ordinarily
enforceable in the absence of a writing.41 Nonetheless, there are no penalties for
entering into an oral contract of this sort and in fact such bargains are regularly
concluded and performed without incident.
In many other situations, though, denial of public enforcement operates as
a binding sanction, especially in one-shot deals where the potential gain or
loss from breach of contract is high compared to the value of future business
relations. For instance, few businesses would use oral contracts to govern the
production and sale of custom-made machinery; and fewer lawyers would advise
their use. In such cases, formal requirements can have important regulatory
consequences; and their costs can deter exchanges from taking place (as when a
business decides not to go public because of the burden of complying with the
sec’s disclosure and auditing requirements).
Most legal formalities, like many default terms of the sort discussed above
in §2.1.3 are justified, at least in part, by the need for coordination or by ad-
ministrative needs of the legal system. The rules of offer and acceptance, for
instance, discussed below in §3, are typically interpreted as social conventions
that serve to help contracting parties ensure that they attach similar meaning
to their words and actions and that this meaning will be understood by third
parties interested in the agreement. Similarly, the law encourages parties to
structure their arrangements and to create and present evidentiary records in a
way that lowers the ex post costs of contract enforcement—both because of the
economies of scale involved in setting up any particular administrative regime,
and because it is judged infeasible or politically undesirable to tailor court fees
to the individual costs of dispute resolution.
Many formalities, however, also serve regulatory purposes. For example, the
requirement that litigation documents be submitted on standard size paper (a
formality imposed by virtually all court systems) serves purely administrative
purposes, but the requirement that a minor’s application for a marriage license
be signed by a parent or guardian is also intended to help prevent the minor
from making a hasty and irrevocable decision. And some formalities, such as the
doctrinal rule that silence in the face of an offer does not ordinarily constitute
acceptance, serve both coordinating and regulatory functions.42 Such a rule
indeed comports with standard interpretive conventions, but it also serves to
discourage parties from sending purely opportunistic offers in the hopes that
the recipient will somehow overlook them.
When viewed as restrictions on contractual freedom, formalities are plau-
sibly justifiable on at least three of the theories of market failure discussed in
41UCC 2–201.
42See Restatement (Second) of Contracts 69 (1979). In exceptional circumstances,
however, such an inference is justified, as when there has been a course of dealing that leads
the offeror to expect a response.
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§2.3 above. First, formalities can operate to correct informational problems.
Parties entering into contracts may not always realize that they are doing so,
especially if they are amateurs or newcomers to the relevant commercial commu-
nity; similarly, they may not understand all of the specific obligations entailed
by contracting. Formalities that warn such parties against assuming unintended
or unwanted obligations can thus prevent inefficient exchanges as well as unde-
sired distributional transfers from the uninformed to the informed. (On the
other hand, as many anti-formalist critics have argued, hidden formalities can
also mislead na¨ıve agents into thinking they have entered into binding legal
obligations when in reality they have not.)
Second, formalities may provide an effective response to bounded rationality
if their presence triggers some cognitive or institutional process that operates as
a safeguard against the specific dysfunctional behavior at issue. For example,
the federal regulation requiring a “cooling-off” period before completion of a
consumer door-to-door sale allows time for additional reflection at a remove
from any pressure imposed by the salesperson; and in an organizational setting,
writing requirements allow principals more easily to know when an obligation
has been undertaken and to monitor their agents for making bad bargains.
Third, formalities can help to correct various negative externalities, espe-
cially those that are moderate in magnitude or related to informational asym-
metry, by attaching an additional cost to the externality-producing behavior.
In markets affected by adverse selection, for instance, formalities that make it
harder to disclaim warranties or opt out of medical coverage may keep some
high-quality agents from exiting the market, supporting a higher quantity of
exchange. Additionally, uncertainty regarding the existence and enforceability
of contracts may in some settings adversely affect third parties whose economic
fortunes are linked with the contracting agents. Such externalities may explain
the traditional common-law rule requiring a writing for contracts for the sale
of land or in consideration of marriage—both transactions with potentially sig-
nificant implications for other members of the contracting parties’ family and
community. Finally, formalities can help deter rent-seeking by opportunistic
agents hoping to take advantage of the informational and behavioral problems
discussed just above.
To illustrate these possibilities, we briefly discuss two of the more important
formalities imposed by the common law of contracts: the doctrine of consider-
ation, and the statutory requirement that certain contracts be executed in the
form of a writing.
The doctrine of consideration. In the us and in other legal regimes that
descend from the English common law, contractual promises are not enforceable
at law unless supported by what lawyers call consideration. The precise meaning
of this concept has long been debated, but its overall import is to require the
contract to relate to an exchange that is understood as such by both parties. A
promise to make a future gift is not enforceable under the law of contracts, for
instance, although it may be possible to achieve a similar result by using some
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other legal device such as an equitable trust. While the consideration doctrine
has at times been viewed as a substantive limit on contractual freedom, modern
commentators (following Holmes, 1897, and Fuller, 1941) view it largely as
matter of form, in that it can often (though not always) be avoided by the use
of some other formal device such as a special writing, the transfer of a nominal
sum, or delivery of a symbolic token. As such, it raises the relative cost of
entering into those contracts to which it applies.
Although its grounding in exchange would seem to suggest a close connection
between the consideration doctrine and the promotion of economic welfare, the
doctrine would seem to diverge from simple efficiency in at least two respects.
First, many non-exchange promises also enhance economic welfare. A donor’s
commitment to make a gift, for example, enables the beneficiary to engage in
specific anticipatory investment, thus lowering the donor’s cost of providing
the beneficiary with any given level of utility (R. Posner, 1977, and Shavell,
1991). Second, the lawyer’s understanding of what counts as an exchange is
narrower in practice than an economist’s would be. In traditional common
law, for instance, a promise to guarantee the debt of another person was not
enforceable unless the party seeking to enforce could show that the promisor
received a specific promise or benefit in exchange for the guaranty; it did not
suffice to observe that commercial parties do not typically make such guaranties
unless they stand to gain from the extension of credit and are hoping to induce it.
Similarly, certain open-ended promises, such as promises to buy or sell goods in a
quantity to be specified by the promisee, were traditionally deemed unsupported
by consideration, on the theory that the promisee retained discretion to fix terms
that would eliminate all benefits received by the promisor.
The doctrine of consideration has long been controversial; and civil law sys-
tems, such as those in continental Europe, do not employ it. In its application
to donative promises, the doctrine is probably best justified as a response either
to bounded rationality or to ex ante rent seeking by potential beneficiaries. It is
at least plausible that impulsive promises are a greater problem when motivated
by generosity rather than self-interest, and requiring more elaborate formalities
before such promises become enforceable may be justified in order to protect the
interests of the donor or of other potential beneficiaries of his largesse who might
fare better upon more thorough deliberation. Similarly, there is an obvious in-
centive for overreaching by potential beneficiaries, and requiring an additional
formal protection such as an equitable trust, which imposes fiduciary duties on
the trustee and in practice requires the participation of a legal professional to
assure its effectiveness, probably serves to police such opportunism better than
a mere writing requirement would.
Writing requirements. While written documents are typically regarded as
better guides to the intention of the parties than oral testimony or circumstantial
evidence, the general common-law rule is that most contractual promises are
enforceable without a writing, if they can be proven to a court’s satisfaction.
Certain categories of contracts, however, must be evidenced in writing to be
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legally enforceable. In common-law systems, such contracts include contracts
for the conveyance of interests in real property, contracts in consideration of a
party’s marriage, third-party guaranty contracts, contracts in which an executor
agrees to pay the debts of an estate, contracts that cannot be completed within
a year, and, as indicated above, contracts for the sale of goods above a monetary
threshold (in the us, $500). These various writing requirements are collectively
referred to as the “Statute of Frauds” because they derive originally from a
parliamentary statute of 1677 that was justified by its proponents as a safeguard
against false claims of contractual agreement. Similar writing requirements have
been extended by statute to a variety of other transactions, including contracts
that designate property as collateral for a secured loan and contracts for the
sale of any personal property with value over $5000; and in some settings, such
as option and guaranty contracts, a written promise suffices as a substitute for
consideration.
These various requirements surely serve the purposes of ex post efficiency
in the enforcement setting; for example, courts might well wish to screen out
contractual disputes where the key evidence is not just oral but stale (the usual
rationale for the one-year provision of the Statute of Frauds). Given that the
interpretation of oral evidence is typically more uncertainty, allowing high-value
contracts to be alleged on purely oral evidence is particularly costly in terms of
incentives for ex post rent seeking. And given the considerable private incentives
for contracting parties to memorialize their agreement in writing even apart
from the prospects of a dispute, the absence of a writing justifies, on Bayesian
grounds, the inference that further proceedings are unlikely to be of much value.
Most of these requirements, however, also correspond to some standard type
of market failure such as externality or bounded rationality. Guaranty contracts,
secured lending, and contracts for the conveyance of land, for instance, all im-
plicate the interests of third parties, and in former times, so did contracts in
consideration of marriage. Requiring such transactions to be evidenced in writ-
ing reduces information costs for third parties trying to determine the status
of assets in which they may also have a claim. Similarly, the expected costs of
bounded rationality are especially great in high-value contracts, contracts likely
to be entered into under circumstances of emotional stress, and contracts that
reach far into the future. In such cases, the extra transaction costs of a formal
writing may be justified because they deter impulsive or myopic decisions.
2.5.2 Substantive limitations on contracting
In addition to the practical restrictions imposed by formal requirements for
contracting, some agreements are simply unenforceable as a matter of substance.
Such limits on enforceability could serve to strike the entire contract, providing
an affirmative defense to any liability for breach; or they could strike certain
terms of the contract only, leaving the rest of the contract fully enforceable
but with the offending terms replaced by default terms, or by terms the court
deems fairer (see Craswell, 1993, for a discussion). The major defenses we
consider here include fraud, lack of capacity, mistake, duress, undue influence,
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unconscionability, and offense to public policy.
Fraud and unilateral mistake. All legal systems refuse to enforce con-
tracts that are based on sufficiently incorrect or asymmetric information, at
least in cases where the uninformed party is unaware of his informational disad-
vantage. Enforcement is especially disfavored when one party to the exchange
has caused the other to become misinformed, for example by misrepresenting
material facts relating to a proposed exchange. Under the common law, this
disfavor is reflected in the defense of fraud.
The fraud defense is justified on efficiency grounds for two reasons. First, it
deters inefficient exchanges that would not have taken place but for the fraud;
and second, in cases where fraud takes the form of undertaking efforts to de-
ceive others, it discourages rent-seeking. Determining what statements count
as fraudulent, however, is not always easy. Vague or ambiguous statement may
raise interpretation issues of the sort discussed infra in §4; and even statements
that are literally true may be interpreted as making an implied fraudulent rep-
resentation. For economic discussions of this issue, see Ayres and Klass (2005)
and Craswell (in press).
Additionally, the defense is not limited to cases of affirmative deception:
it can also be asserted when one party withholds critical information that the
other reasonably expects to be disclosed. Such fraud by omission is controversial
from a legal perspective because of the difficulty of determining when there is a
duty to disclose, and from an economic perspective because the duty to disclose
information will affect incentives to acquire it.
Similarly, the doctrine of unilateral mistake allows a party to escape a bar-
gain if his assent was based on a significant misapprehension that the other
party could have easily corrected (as when a contractor underbids a job because
of a calculation error that is evident from the large discrepancy between the
mistaken bid and all others received). Here the law takes the position that
the small effort required to correct the mistake is justified by the dislocation
imposed on the mistaken party and the significant chance that the bargain is
inefficient.
In order for doctrines like fraud or unilateral mistake to be welfare-improving
in practice, however, courts must have a reliable way to distinguish between
asymmetric information on the one hand, and conscious risk-taking in the set-
ting of incomplete but symmetric information on the other, else too many ex
ante efficient transactions will be avoided. In this area, accordingly, there is
potential for divergence between what the law provides and what would be
most efficient from a second-best perspective. In general, the courts have been
sensitive to such concerns and have limited the scope of the doctrines to fairly
significant imbalances of information (and in the case of fraud, have imposed
special requirements of proof and pleading).
Incapacity. When one of the parties to a contract is incapable of weighing
costs and benefits, there is no longer any basis to presume that the contract
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is efficient. Similarly, the law declines to enforce contracts entered into by
children, intoxicated persons, and the mentally disabled; this result also deters
rent seeking by those who would take advantage of the incompetent. In contrast
to the situation of fraud and mistake, however, there are circumstances in which
an incompetent person will be held to his bargain. One such circumstance is
when the contract is for the sale of “necessities” (e.g., clothing or shelter that
are judged to be in the objective interest of the buyer). Another is when the
competent party could not have known that the counterparty lacked capacity,
although many courts will still supervise the bargain in such cases to ensure its
substantive soundness.
The different treatment of the capacity and fraud defenses is justified by the
differing costs of overcoming the specific transactional failure at issue. In the
case of fraud, the failure can be overcome at no cost by abstaining from misrep-
resentation, and in the case of unilateral mistake, the failure can be overcome at
low cost by correcting the mistake. In cases of incapacity, however, it may not
be possible to correct the problem without losing the transaction entirely, so
the law allows plainly efficient exchanges (or in the case whether the incapacity
is hidden, exchanges where it is plain that no rent-seeking took place.)
Mutual mistake. In some cases, the law refuses to enforce bargains in which
the parties’ ex ante beliefs were sufficiently different from the state of the world,
even when those beliefs are the same and when neither party could easily have
corrected the error. For example, in the celebrated case of Sherwood v. Walker,
the court allowed the seller of a pregnant cow to void the deal on the grounds
that, at the time of the bargain, both parties mistakenly thought that the cow
was barren and set a price that corresponded to its slaughterhouse value. This
doctrine, known as the defense of mutual mistake, is subject to much confusion
and there is no canonical economic explanation of it. The legal confusion results
because it is difficult in practice to know whether the parties were truly mistaken
or just engaged in a hedging transaction. From the economic viewpoint, Posner
and Rosenfield (1977) view the doctrine as substituting, in a situation of costly
contracting, for a complete contingent contract in which it is efficient to call off
the sale in the state of the world where the mistake is discovered. Ayres and
Rasmusen (1993), on the other hand, argue that the mutual mistake doctrine,
in contrast to unilateral mistake, undermines incentives for information acquisi-
tion, and conclude that it is dominated by a suitably limited unilateral mistake
doctrine. Indeed, some legal commentators (e.g., Chirelstein, 2006) suggest that
in practice the mutual mistake doctrine is used when the court suspects fraud or
unilateral mistake but cannot clearly make out the elements of those doctrines
under the facts. The doctrine, accordingly, may afford a good opportunity for
further theoretical investigation.
Duress and restrictions on contractual modifications. The doctrine
of duress denies enforcement to contracts formed under conditions of unaccept-
able coercion; the standard hypothetical is a contract signed at gunpoint. The
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key to the doctrine, of course, consists of which conditions are deemed un-
acceptable. Some courts and commentators have held that difficult economic
circumstances can amount to duress; while others suggest that hard bargaining
is permitted unless the beneficiary of the promise is responsible for the diffi-
cult situation (for example by having isolated the promisor from other potential
contract partners) or owes some duty with regard to the difficult situation (for
example, by having been granted a local monopoly). Whether a contract is
void for duress, however, depends not just on external conditions but also on
the content of the contract. For instance, a contract to salvage the cargo of a
sinking ship at 10% of the value of the cargo might be enforced, while one that
set a price of 90% of cargo value probably would not.
A similar functional problem arises in contracts that modify duties created
by previous contracts, because many modifications are entered into under cir-
cumstances where one of the parties is dissatisfied with the original contract
and is threatening to breach it. For example, in the case of Alaska Packers
v. Domenico, the court held unenforceable a modification that provided a 66%
increase in wages to a crew of sailors who threatened to strike on short notice
in remote waters.
Much of the legal commentary on this doctrine justifies it on the norm of
party autonomy, on the theory that a choice made under coercive circumstances
is no choice at all. This justification is difficult to square with the economic
viewpoint, however, unless one interprets it as claiming that the harsh circum-
stances somehow interfere with the exercise of rationality. But in most cases in
which the doctrine is applied, rationality does not seem at issue—even in the
gunpoint hypothetical, the victim acts rationally in choosing life over money.
For this reason, some have argued (e.g., Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 2004) that
the doctrine be made unavailable in circumstances where the coercive threat is
credible—that is, where the party making it would actually find it in its interest
to carry it out if the coerced party does not agree to the exchange in question.
A better economic justification of the doctrine is found in the phenomenon
of rent seeking (e.g., Tullock, 2005)—that we wish to discourage investments in
coercion or against coercion. In the gunman hypothetical, the rent seeking is
obvious, but as Cooter (1982) and Cooter et al. (1982) suggest, a similar argu-
ment can apply to ordinary hard bargaining in situations of bilateral monopoly.
Even when an exchange is efficient, in the absence of a well-defined mechanism
for dividing the gains from trade, the parties may destroy part of the surplus
in attempting to influence its distribution.43 Additionally, in dynamic settings,
the prospect of earning such rents may lead to overinvestment or excess entry
(cf. Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). Thus, by reducing the set of possible threats,
the law can, in principle, limit the available rents and encourage a more efficient
equilibrium.
The rent-seeking explanation is especially apposite in the case of contrac-
43Although when the bargaining is conducted under symmetric information it is difficult
from a game-theoretic perspective to see why surplus would be destroyed (see Hermalin and
Katz, 1993, and the discussion in §2.2.2).
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tual modifications, because parties who make specific investments in an initial
contract become vulnerable to holdup. In many circumstances, parties will be
reluctant to make specific investments in settings in which contract renegotia-
tion contract is possible; accordingly, it is, in principle, beneficial for them to
commit not to renegotiate if they can credibly do so (Aghion et al., 1994).44
The law of contracts has been unwilling to allow parties to rule out modification,
however, perhaps because of concerns for imperfect information and bounded
rationality (Jolls, 1997). It has, however, used various strategies over the years
to limit modifications that appear motivated by opportunism. In particularly
egregious cases, as Shavell (2006) points out, courts will void the attempted
modification on grounds of duress or unconscionability. In less extreme situa-
tions, more flexible tools are available. Traditionally, such regulation operated
under the formal rubric of the consideration doctrine, on the theory that a modi-
fication that unilaterally altered the contract in one party’s favor was not a true
exchange. The modern approach, however (e.g., Hillman, 1979) requires the
modification to pass a substantive test of fairness or good faith. For instance,
a modification made in proportionate response to new circumstances, unantici-
pated at the time of contracting, would generally be enforced, while an outright
attempt to rewrite the original terms of the bargain would not. Because it is
difficult to identify objective criteria for which circumstances are unanticipated
and what sort of adjustment would be proportionate, however, the standard of
enforcement is uncertain, so that some incentives for rent seeking do remain.
Undue influence. A fourth standard limitation on contractual freedom is
undue influence. This defense applies when one party is deemed to have such
influence over the other that the latter lacks the requisite autonomy for contract-
ing. Classic examples include contracts between lawyer and client, physician and
patient, caregiver and invalid, and, traditionally, husband and wife.
The undue influence doctrine overlaps in function with the other substan-
tive doctrines listed above. It shares with incapacity the element of bounded
rationality, in that the influential relationship may be thought to interfere with
the vulnerable party’s ability to exercise independent judgment (and as with
incapacity, undue influence does not entirely bar the enforcement of a contract,
but rather subjects its terms to ex post regulation on grounds of substantive
rationality and distributional fairness). It also shares with fraud the element of
asymmetric information (in that the relationship entails a reposition of trust),
and with duress the element of rent seeking (in that assent may be given in
response to an implicit threat to withdraw the relationship and its associated
benefits).
Undue influence is less commonly invoked in the context of person-to-person
contracts than the other doctrines discussed above, but it operates as a cor-
nerstone of the law of fiduciary relationships, and thus of much law governing
professional relationships and contracts between organizations and their gov-
erning agents. For example, the corporate law duty of loyalty, which subjects
44Shavell (2005) notes that there is no empirical evidence that parties are able to do so.
Hermalin, Katz, & Craswell Freedom of Contract 51
dealings between corporations and their officers or directors to special scrutiny,
is usefully understood as an application of this basic contractual doctrine.
Unconsionability and public policy. Finally, the unconscionability doc-
trine serves as a sort of all-purpose limitation on contractual freedom applied
ex post in cases where the court deems the parties’ exchange to be sufficiently
unfair in either substantive or procedural terms. Some commentators (e.g., Ep-
stein, 1975) have suggested that the doctrine can be justified in economic terms
to the extent that it operates as a discretionary extension of the other major
affirmative defenses in marginal cases. For instance, the doctrine has been used
to protect consumers or unsophisticated small business people from contractual
terms that imposed large ex post risks and that were buried in fine print or
otherwise insufficiently disclosed, which is in some ways analogous to fraud or
incapacity. (As noted in the earlier discussion of fraud and non-disclosure, it
is not always easy to determine what kinds of statements or omissions should
be treated as fraudulent.) The doctrine may also be partially justifiable on the
economic grounds of externality (e.g., E. Posner, 1995), to the extent that it
prevents contractual creditors from driving their debtors into insolvency, and
thus imposing financial obligations on the debtors’ families or on the public.
Similarly, when viewed in connection with a variety of legal rules that protect
debtors in extreme situations, such as bankruptcy law and other statutory lim-
itations on debt collection, the doctrine can be understood as responding to
failures in the markets for credit and insurance.
These efficiency rationales cannot entirely account for the actual operation
of the doctrine, which sometimes appears merely to reflect the courts’ reluctance
to hold a hapless party to a bad bargain, or a paternalist concern that a party
has undertaken an excessively high risk. The doctrine’s implications for freedom
of contract, however, should not be overstated, despite its prominent treatment
in academic discussions and introductory student texts. Its effect is limited by
the requirement that it can only be applied by a judge as opposed to a jury, and
by most judges’ appreciation that, at least in commercial cases, parties have
good reason to take risks and adequate opportunity to obtain insurance. As
a practical restriction on the parties’ ability to get their bargains enforced in
court, accordingly, it is probably rather less important than either the costs of
litigation or than the more general psychological tendency of both judges and
juries to resolve ambiguous facts in favor of the party with whom they feel the
strongest sympathy.
Similarly, courts sometimes decline to enforce contracts on the grounds of
public policy, although this concept is less a specific doctrine than a label for a
general practice of limiting contractual freedom on a variety of rationales. The
main difference between unconscionability and public policy is that the former
is based on unfairness, while the latter is based on the idea that enforcement
runs counter to the general goals of the legal framework or judicial system,
even though no specific statutory or common law rule contains an explicit ban
on the contract in question. For example, contracts to engage in gambling or
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in ostensibly immoral behavior were traditionally denied enforcement on such
grounds, as were contracts in restraint of trade and contracts thought to promote
litigation. A prominent modern case applying the concept is the Baby M case,
in which the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to recognize a contract which
purported to transfer parental rights in exchange for financial consideration.
Because of the breadth of this category, probably the best way to summarize
it is simply to say that while the principle of freedom of contract is generally
respected by the legal system, it remains subject to a vague and implicit set of
limits that operate at its margins, on analogy to the limits imposed by other
fields such as tort and criminal law. A more extensive discussion of the concept
can be found in Farnsworth (2004).
3 Formation of Contracts
In many standardized or spot market transactions, parties enter into contracts
without any significant amount of bargaining. In more complicated situations,
however, a contract typically follows an extended set of communications that
can include offers, counter-offers, and other exchanges of information. Such
communications are governed by an elaborate framework of legal rules that
determine when, how, and on what terms contractual obligations are created.
Compared to other areas of contract law such as the rules governing remedies
for breach, there has been relatively little discussion of this doctrinal subject
from an economic point of view. In part, this neglect results from the fact that
these doctrines are esoteric and little known outside the legal profession. Addi-
tionally, legal discussions on the topic tend to focus on the narrow problem of
channeling the parties’ communications into conventionally recognizable forms,
rather than on more direct regulatory concerns.
From an economic viewpoint, however, the law of contract formation is rele-
vant because it influences the outcome of exchange. By attaching consequences
to the various acts and omissions that individual bargainers can choose from in
a negotiation, legal rules affect the parties’ incentives to make and to respond
to offers, to exchange information, and to communicate with one another at all.
In this section, accordingly, we survey the various dimensions in which pre-
contractual behavior can affect the efficiency of exchange, and the way in which
the law of contract formation affects incentives along those dimensions.
3.1 Pre-contractual behavior
Even before they meet, potential contracting parties make a number of eco-
nomic decisions that influence the possible gains from future trade. Not all
of these decisions, however, will necessarily be made optimally. Some decisions
create positive or negative externalities, and others entail relational investments
that are vulnerable to holdup. In this subsection, we identify and discuss three
overlapping dimensions of pre-contractual behavior: searching for contractual
Hermalin, Katz, & Craswell Formation of Contracts 53
partners, investigating the value of exchange, and making pre-contractual in-
vestments.
3.1.1 Searching for contractual partners
In order for parties to be in position to enter into exchange, they must undertake
the expense of searching for potential trading partners. Such expenses include
advertising, correspondence, travel, and the parties’ time. From the perspective
of a social planner, one would want the parties to undertake such efforts up
to the point where the marginal costs of additional search just outweigh its
expected marginal value. While search can be modeled in various ways (see,
e.g., Diamond, 1987), under plausible assumptions, the value of an additional
unit of search lessens as the quality of the bargain in hand increases. It follows
that it is, in general, optimal for a party to search up to some cut-off level of
satisfaction, and then stop. This cut-off level will depend on the cost of search,
the distribution of information, the expected bargaining game to be played once
search is completed, and so on.
The level of search that is privately profitable for an individual buyer or
seller, however, is not necessarily the same as the level that would be socially
optimal, for two reasons. First, in markets with bilateral search, each person’s
search efforts provide a positive externality that reduces the search costs of oth-
ers. Second, to the extent that there are economic rents associated with trading
(i.e., if parties buy or sell at prices that diverge from their reservation prices),
some amount of search is motivated by the desire to find a better distributional
outcome. These effects work in opposite directions, so it is difficult to generalize
about what public policies would be optimal in this regard, but it is possible in
principle that enlightened regulation could improve social welfare.
For example, §3.3 below explains how various legal doctrines operate to
promote the early formation of contractual liability. Such doctrines will thereby
affect the level of search, but the direction of the effect is ambiguous. From
the ex post perspective of parties who have already found each other, such rules
should reduce the incentive for additional search, because a party who holds a
binding commitment has less need to search; and a party who is bound faces
reduced value from search because even if she finds a better bargain, she will
still be liable for the first one. But from an ex ante perspective, parties may be
more willing to undertake the cost of search if they are assured that any trading
partners they find will stick with their deal. Which effect is more important
depends on the details of the situation.
3.1.2 Acquiring and disclosing information about the value of ex-
change
In order to conduct exchange, the parties not only must find each other, but
they must also determine whether trade is worthwhile. Both the acquisition
and disclosure of such information can be costly, and the parties’ willingness to
incur these costs will depend on whether they can be recouped in subsequent
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contract bargaining and performance.
As with informational investment more generally, imposing a duty to share
information tends to undercut the incentive to acquire it, so there is a poten-
tial tradeoff between efficient production of information ex ante and efficient
use of information ex post . In this regard, Kronman (1978a) argued that re-
quiring commodity traders to disclose private information about market value
would undercut their incentives to do market analyses and make forecasts; and
Matthews and Postlethwaite (1985) showed how requiring manufacturers to dis-
close product quality could discourage product testing.
Whether information should be produced, of course, depends upon whether
it is socially valuable, as opposed to simply having private redistributive value.
For that reason, if information acquisition is, on balance, socially wasteful, it is
best to impose a disclosure requirement in order to deter rent-seeking (or a tax
on acquisition efforts or windfall profits if that is administratively cheaper).
Whether information is acquired or disclosed before exchange, however, will
depend not just on regulatory requirements, but also on property rights, the
relational nature of the information, and market structure. For example, in
Shavell’s (1994) model of information acquisition, a party with exclusive rights
over a particular item of property has efficient incentives with regard to ac-
quiring information that bears on the common value of that property, because
he internalizes that common value when he sells or uses the property. One
could imagine circumstances, however, in which a party without formal prop-
erty rights had similarly good incentives because he held a monopoly position
in bargaining and because the information increased his private value for the
property, but not the owner’s.
Disclosure may also be compelled by the structure of expectations in bar-
gaining. For example, Grossman (1981) presents an influential model of product
warranties in which buyers rationally assume the worst about any seller who
does not disclose its private information. Sellers with relatively good informa-
tion are thus led to disclose it in order to avoid the effect of buyer skepticism,
and the result is a separating equilibrium in which the private information is
revealed.45 Note that disclosure induced by such game-theoretic incentives can
discourage information acquisition every bit as much as disclosure required by
legal regulation.
Even in cases where mandatory disclosure would not adversely affect the
incentive to acquire information, it is still necessary to compare the benefits
of disclosure against the costs. In many contexts, especially those involving
ordinary consumers, the costs of disclosure will include communication costs—
for example, the time that it takes buyers to read and process the information; or
45To be precise, information unravels to the point where the cost of credible disclosure
equals the difference between the price charged by the pooled low-quality sellers and the price
that the highest-quality member of this pool could obtain through disclosure. Observe the
unraveling result depends on the disclosure being effective to convey information. See, e.g.,
Fishman and Hagerty (2003), who show that if the fraction of customers who can understand
a disclosure is too low, then mandatory disclosure benefits informed customers and harms the
seller.
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the potential cost of being distracted from other, more important information.
These communication costs have rarely been incorporated into formal economic
models, though Bebchuk and Shavell (1991) is an exception. Craswell (in press)
provides an informal discussion of these costs.
Finally, it must be noted that in some instances partial disclosure of in-
formation is worse than no disclosure (Hermalin and Katz, in press). This is
true when partial disclosure facilitates inefficient discrimination. For instance,
disclosure of information correlated with on-the-job performance (e.g., health
status) could depress the wages of those disclosing the correlate in equilibrium,
causing some talented individuals to exit the labor market.
3.1.3 Pre-contractual investment
The previous discussion emphasized that investigation of exchange value can op-
erate as a sunk investment that is vulnerable to rent-seeking in later bargaining.
The same is true of pre-contractual investments generally.
Much of the law of contracts is designed to protect investment incentives,
and §4 and §5 below discuss the effect of interpretation rules and contract reme-
dies on those incentives. But these rules come into play only after a contract has
been formed. Some investments, however, must be undertaken before it is prac-
tical for contractual liability to attach. For example, search efforts inherently
must precede contractual negotiation (else who would one negotiate with?),
and negotiation must precede the formation of a contract. But both search
and negotiation are costly, and their costs are at least in part relation-specific.
Similarly, other investments can be delayed until negotiations are completed,
but their value is reduced in doing so (Katz, 1996c). Suppliers of goods, for
instance, can typically reduce their production costs by buying materials when
prices are low or by doing advance work when business is slow; and buyers can
increase their value from exchange by investing in complementary inputs. But
if they wait until they are finished bargaining to begin preparations, many such
opportunities will be lost.
It is not desirable to provide complete protection for pre-contractual invest-
ments, conversely, because such protection would lead to excessive reliance. As
the parties negotiate, they may discover information that reveals that the in-
tended exchange should not be pursued. If this happens, any relation-specific
investments will be wasted. Optimally, the parties should take the risk of wasted
investment into account before making them. The rules governing contract for-
mation, accordingly, should ideally be designed to promote optimal reliance at
the optimal time, balancing the benefits of productive investment against the
costs of waste.46
46The mechanism for paying compensation for a taking (governmental exercise of its right
of eminent domain) must strike a similar balance (Hermalin, 1995).
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3.1.4 Strategic behavior in bargaining
In §3.1.2 above, we discussed incentives to produce and share information re-
garding the value of exchange. But information exchange is not the only di-
mension of efficiency in bargaining. Negotiating parties can dissipate resources
through various types of rent-seeking: by excessive communications, by haggling
and stalling, and by hard bidding that risks losing the bargain entirely. One way
to deter such behavior is through substantive legal doctrines that limit the kinds
of bargains that can be enforced, and thus lessen the temptation for overreach-
ing; for example, Cooter (1982) justifies the doctrine of duress on such grounds.
But another way is to create contract formation doctrines that impose the cost
of lost bargains on parties who cause them through excessive rent-seeking.
In order to address the problem of excessively hard bargaining, however, it
is necessary to develop a clearer understanding of incentives to engage in it.
As we discussed in §2.2.2 above, in the absence of asymmetric information the
parties should be able to reach an efficient bargaining outcome without outside
intervention.
Symmetric information is likely the exception rather than rule, however.
Complete symmetry assumes symmetry of knowledge about preferences, among
other parameters, which is typically not true (see e.g., Farrell, 1987b). If parties
bargain under asymmetric information it is well-established (e.g., Samuelson,
1985; Farrell, 1987b; Schweizer, 1988) that they will often fail to reach a first-
best outcome. The theory of mechanism design implies that for any asymmetric
information bargaining game, there is, in principle, some mechanism that maxi-
mizes the parties’ expected bargaining surplus subject to their participation and
truth-telling constraints; that is, achieves the second best.47 But any particular
bargaining game may not be the optimal mechanism, so the ultimate efficiency
of the bargain could depend on limitations on bargaining imposed by the law
on contract formation.
3.2 Avoiding miscommunication
Finally, before we move to a discussion of legal doctrine, we consider the impor-
tant role played by formation rules in avoiding miscommunication. Negotiating
parties need to know when bargaining has been completed and whether a bind-
ing obligation has been formed, since if they have inconsistent understandings
in this regard, significant value can be wasted. If a party believes that he
has entered into a binding obligation when in fact he has not, he may waste
resources attempting to perform or may turn down other profitable opportuni-
ties. Conversely, if a party is unaware that a contract has been formed, she may
fail to make adequate preparations or even incur multiple liability, resulting in
breach of contract and associated losses. One of the most important functions
of contract formation law, accordingly—and the function to which legal schol-
47See Laffont and Martimont (2002), Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), or Caillaud and Her-
malin (2000b) for introductions to mechanism design.
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ars have probably devoted the most attention—is to promote clear channels of
communication so that the parties may know where they stand.
The law of contract formation pursues this task in two distinct ways. First,
it establishes authoritative forms and terms of art that the parties can use when
negotiating their agreements. Second, it allocates the risk of miscommunication
so as to encourage parties to take optimal precautions to prevent and insure
against misunderstandings, in the same way that the law of torts allocates lia-
bility for accidents to the least-cost avoider and least-cost insurer. For example,
the doctrines of unilateral and mutual mistake, discussed in §2.5.2 above, illus-
trate how loss allocation rules can strengthen the parties’ incentives to avoid
misunderstandings and to allocate any remaining risk on their own.
This issue of clarity in communication is most usefully understood in terms
of the problem of interpretation, which we discuss at length in §4 below. De-
termining whether a contract has been formed raises most of the same issues
as determining the terms on which it has been formed. For example, one must
identify the meaning of phrases that are used in negotiation, reconcile inter-
pretative differences among the parties or between the parties and the court,
establish default rules that apply when the parties have left their negotiations
open or spoken ambiguously, and so on. We defer consideration of such issues
until the next section. Keep in mind, however, the connection between the legal
doctrines discussed here and their role in interpretation discussed in §4. For
instance, as we discuss in §4.4.2 below, pre-contractual communications often
bear on the interpretation of a contract, especially with regard to issues where
its text is silent or unclear.
3.3 Legal doctrines addressing contract formation
The body of legal doctrine relating to contract formation is particularly elabo-
rate, and we do not attempt to survey it here. Instead we discuss a number of
key doctrines that help address the central economic aspects of pre-contractual
behavior: disclosure, investment, and efficiency in negotiation.
3.3.1 Offer and acceptance
The classic distinction between contract law and other sources of legal obligation
is that contract is grounded in voluntary agreement. The fundamental principle
of contract formation, it follows, is that there must be mutual assent in order
to establish a binding contractual obligation. Assent refers not, however, to the
parties’ private mental states, which clearly cannot form the basis of a public
system of enforcement, but to our inferences regarding those states as drawn
from the parties’ actions and statements.
To simplify this problem of inference, lawyers often say that to form an
agreement there must be an offer (which evidences one party’s assent) and also
an acceptance (which evidences the counterparty’s assent); and thus this body
of doctrine is often referred to as the law of offer and acceptance. It should
be recognized that this way of describing the matter is a formalism that allows
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interpreters to focus on certain stereotypical features of negotiating a contract
and abstract from others. In actual contexts it is often difficult or artificial to
identify a particular communication that counts as an offer or an acceptance,
and some doctrinal systems (such as the law of sales under ucc Article 2)
dispense with the effort. In general, however, the traditional common law has
followed a highly formalistic approach in this regard, with the result that the
treatises and casebooks are filled with a variety of arcane and colorfully named
mechanical rules. Such rules include, among others, the “mailbox rule” (i.e.,
when parties communicate a distance, a contract is formed at the moment an
acceptance is dispatched, not when it is received), the “mirror-image rule” (in
order to constitute an acceptance, a responding communication must mirror the
offer in all relevant respects, else it is deemed a rejection and counter-offer), and
the “last-shot rule” (if parties exchange a series of non-matching offers followed
by one of the parties commencing performance, a contract is deemed to be
formed with the beginning of the performance constituting the acceptance, and
with the terms of the contract supplied by the final offer outstanding prior to
acceptance). Some of the formalistic rules have received substantial economic
attention (see, e.g., Baird and Weisberg, 1982, and Ben-Shahar, in press, on the
last-shot and mirror-image rules), but many others have not.
Over the last half century, such formalistic rules have come under increas-
ing criticism, and more recent developments tend to de-emphasize formality,
making it easier to establish liability without complying with prevailing formal
conventions. This movement away from formality has had its most important
effect on communicative efficiency; and is discussed at greater length in §4.4.1
below. Similarly, and simultaneously, the trend has been for the courts to estab-
lish that liability is incurred earlier in the bargaining process (with the mailbox
rule providing an early precursor in this regard). This trend is probably most
important with regard to incentives for pre-contractual investment, and we take
it up in the subsection immediately following this one.
In addition, however, the particular rules of offer and acceptance also in-
fluence the transactions costs of negotiation in potentially significant ways. As
an illustration, consider the doctrine of silent acceptance (Katz, 1990a, 1993),
under which an offeree must respond affirmatively in order to create a binding
obligation; silence operates as an acceptance only in special circumstances. The
rule can serve to conserve on message costs. Under it, two messages are required
to form a contract, while only one is needed in negotiations that do not result
in exchange. A converse rule under which an offeree must respond in order to
avoid being bound, would require one communication for a contract and two
for a rejection. In the usual context where the majority of offers are rejected
and rejections and acceptances cost the same to transmit, the common-law rule
is efficient. But in settings where acceptance is likely or where acceptances are
costlier to transmit than rejections (for instance, because of a mirror image
requirement), the rule is inefficient.
Additionally, the common law rule reduces the costs of rent-seeking through
opportunistic offers. Under a silent acceptance regime, offerors will have an
incentive to propose inefficient exchanges to offerees with high response costs, in
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the hopes that the offeree will choose to accept a mildly unprofitable contract in
preference to incurring the costs of sending rejections. Such incentives explain
why negative option plans of the sort offered by mail-order book clubs and
telephone companies typically provide buyers with substantial up-front benefits
as an inducement to enter the plan.
Finally, based on an extensive survey of the case law, Craswell (1996b) argues
that offer and acceptance doctrines are widely used by courts to promote efficient
relational investment. In his view, courts are often in position to evaluate ex post
whether reliance has been efficient, and in such cases, they can provide good
incentives by finding a contract when a party relied reasonably in response
to a pre-contractual communication, but finding no contract when the party
relied either excessively or not at all. Whether Craswell’s argument provides a
normative justification for courts practices in this regard, however, as opposed
to an accurate positive account of what they do in fact, is open to dispute. In
the first place, his survey of cases suggest that the fact of reliance is decisive to a
finding of liability only in relatively close cases, not in all cases, so the incentive
effects of this practice may be limited. Additionally, in order for courts to employ
this tool, they must be able to judge the efficiency of reliance in hindsight.
The practical limitations of the legal process, the fact that reliance decisions
frequently entail nonverifiable actions, and the cognitive biases associated with
hindsight (Rachlinski, 1998) may call this assumption into question. Instead,
courts may do better to follow the simpler approach of identifying and holding
liable the party who is the least-cost avoider for wasted reliance. A model based
on this possibility is presented in the following subsection.
3.3.2 Promissory estoppel and analogous doctrines
The general principle of estoppel was developed in the English equity courts as
a corrective device to preclude the operation of legal rules that were thought to
yield an unjust result in specific cases. The more specific doctrine of promissory
estoppel gained influence in the 19th century as a way to soften the formalities
of the consideration doctrine, but in the latter half of the 20th century in the
United States, it became increasingly used to loosen the formal requirements of
offer and acceptance.
The key element necessary to invoke promissory estoppel is relation-specific
investment, which lawyers call reliance. Under it, a promisor is precluded from
asserting a lack of mutual assent if she made a promise that reasonably can
be expected to induce the promisee’s reliance, which actually does induce such
reliance, and which will result in injustice if not enforced. “Injustice” is admit-
tedly subjective, but in effect it serves to protect reliance that most people would
consider reasonable. Excessive or unreasonable reliance is not protected by the
doctrine, although there are obvious difficulties in determining reasonableness in
this setting. For example, in the case of Drennan v. Star Paving, a general con-
tractor used a subcontractor’s offer in calculating his bid on a construction job.
After the general contractor won the construction contract, the subcontractor
attempted to withdraw the original offer on grounds of miscalculation, arguing
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that under prevailing rules of offer and acceptance, the offer was revocable until
the moment of acceptance. The court held that the subcontractor’s bid was
non-retractable, not withstanding that there was never any explicit promise to
hold it open and that the general contractor could have explicitly bargained for
a binding option.
The efficiency of this result, and of the estoppel doctrine generally, depends
on whether such liability is necessary to protect investment incentives. Katz
(1996c) offers a model of pre-contractual investment in which one party makes
an offer and the counterparty chooses to rely; and either of these decisions can be
taken over a period of time leading up to the deadline for ultimate performance.
Excessively early reliance is inefficient in this model because there is too high a
chance that the investment will be wasted; excessively late reliance is inefficient
because the productive surplus from investment cannot be enjoyed. The main
conclusion of the model is that estoppel liability is desirable if the relying party
cannot protect the value of its reliance investment in post-reliance bargaining,
but undesirable if it can. The underlying intuition is that if the offering party
holds the ex post bargaining power, the relying party will refuse to invest unless
protected by liability; while if the relying party holds the ex post bargaining
power, the offering party will refuse to specify its needs for fear of being held
liable in circumstances where it does not pay to complete the contract, and being
vulnerable to rent-seeking through a last-minute counter-offer in circumstances
where it does pay to complete the contract.
Katz’s model focuses on the timing of reliance investment, but its underlying
intuition also applies to situations in which the extent and type of reliance is in
question. As a general matter, reliance investments might be protected through
liability rules or by ex post bargaining; and in cases where bargaining power
is sufficient to provide incentives, legal liability is superfluous and may even
provide excessive protection. How these considerations play out in individual
bargaining contexts, however, depends on the precise nature and sequence of
play. For instance, Bebchuk and Ben-Shahar (2001) consider the possibility of
legal rules under which courts can condition liability on the level of reliance
investment, on its reasonableness, or on the reasonableness of positions taken
in ex post bargaining, and show that such rules can be used to promote efficient
bilateral incentives. They also discuss the effects of liability rules on the parties’
incentives to enter into negotiations initially, and show that prospect of liability
need not deter initial negotiation (although under some conditions, it might).
The informational requirements of such rules are of course significant, which
limits their practical applicability in many situations.
The idea of conditioning liability on the reasonableness of bargaining be-
havior, however, underlies a related legal doctrine: the duty to bargain in good
faith. This doctrine is much less widely used than promissory estoppel; it is
applicable when the parties enter into an agreement that is too indefinite for
a court to enforce as written, but that could be enforced if the parties were
to undertake an additional round of bargaining in which they filled in enough
gaps. For example, in Teachers Insurance & Annuity Co. v. Tribune Co., 670 F.
Supp. 491 (SDNY 1987), the defendant refused to complete a complicated real
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estate deal, following significant negotiations resulting in a commitment letter
that referred to a “binding agreement,” after learning that interest rates had
significantly dropped and that the deal would probably not qualify for favorable
tax treatment. The court held that even though the defendant had reserved a
further right of approval on the part of its board of directors, it was obliged to
continue negotiations in good faith, which in the specific context meant that
it could not condition its approval on a contingency (i.e., favorable tax treat-
ment) that was deliberately not included in the commitment letter, and could
not withdraw from the deal simply because interest rate changes had rendered
it unprofitable.
The precise contours of the duty to bargain in good faith are not entirely
clear. For instance, it is difficult to predict whether a court would hold it bad
faith for a party to insist that all open terms be resolved in its favor or to ask
that some previously settled term be re-opened, on the grounds that the deal
had turned sufficiently sour that a fair distribution of rents justified such an
adjustment. (Cases applying the modern doctrine of modification, which also
turns on a good faith standard, have often held such adjustments to be ac-
ceptable.) The good faith doctrine has been criticized for its uncertainty and
apparent subjectiveness in application. Nonetheless, the bulk of commentators
continue to approve of the doctrine as a means of protecting relational invest-
ments in negotiation. In TIAA v. Tribune, for instance, the parties had already
incurred significant costs and, more importantly, a deal of such complexity could
not have been concluded without sinking such costs. Absent some form of pre-
contractual liability, it would be difficult to enter into complicated contracts
without subjecting reliance investments to the risk of holdup.
Other legal systems have developed analogous rules to deal with this func-
tional problem. For example, the civil law regimes of continental Europe do not
make use of the doctrine of estoppel, but they do include an invigorated version
of the duty to bargain in good faith, known as culpa in contrahendo. Under
this doctrine, parties entering into contract negotiations are held to a mutual
duty of care that is intended to protect the reasonable expectations with which
they enter bargaining. This duty has traditionally been regarded by compara-
tive lawyers as being more demanding than the implicit duties imposed by the
doctrine of promissory estoppel, but one can argue that modern development
in the common law have effectively brought the two systems closer together in
this regard.
3.3.3 Duty to disclose
Finally, the common law also imposes an ill-defined duty to disclose especially
important information when negotiating with contractual partners. The duty
does not extend to all information a counterparty might find relevant; rather, it
is limited to situations in which nondisclosure would be regarded as effectively
equivalent to a representation that the information does not exist. For example,
in the classic case of Laidlaw v. Organ, a trader with advance knowledge of a
peace treaty that would shortly result in the lifting of naval blockade bought
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up tobacco that skyrocketed in value when the news became public. When the
seller sought to avoid the contract on the grounds of fraud, the court suggested
that, under the circumstances, the parties were entitled to hold each other at
arms’ length and to retain the benefits of such information for their private
use. On the other hand, a homeowner who sells a termite-infested house to a
buyer who is known to be unaware of any problem may well be under a duty to
disclose it, especially if the buyer would not be able to discover the infestation
though the exercise of ordinary diligence.
The duty to disclose has received substantial attention in the scholarly liter-
ature; and it was recognized early on that nondisclosure might have effects on
the fairness and efficiency of exchange. In the law and economics literature, it
has been recognized, at least since Kronman (1978b), that imposing a duty to
disclose could deter information acquisition. Though later scholarly efforts (see,
e.g., the discussion in §3.1.2 above) have refined economic understanding of the
issue, doctrinal application of these efforts has been limited. Kronman argued
that, at minimum, there should be a duty to disclose information that was ac-
quired without effort or expenditure, on the grounds that such a duty would not
reduce the availability of information and would improve the ex post efficiency
of exchange, but even this suggestion has not made its way into the case law,
which has tended in this area to focus more on the question of rights than on
efficiency.48 Still, the trend in legal decisions seems to run in the direction of
increased disclosure requirements, especially in settings where the interests of
consumers, workers, or small businesses are involved.
3.3.4 Overall assessment of the law of contract formation
The division between the law of contract formation and other parts of contract
law is not clear-cut. For instance, some of the rules discussed above in §2.5 on
freedom of contract could alternatively be interpreted and analyzed as formation
rules. Take for example the Statute of Frauds (see §2.5.1). From a freedom-of-
contract perspective, the Statute helps to deter boundedly rational parties from
entering into contracts without adequate deliberation, and may help internal-
ize costs that are imposed on the public legal system when parties enter into
agreements without adequate evidentiary backing. But it also serves some of
the purposes discussed above, such as the disclosure of information or the re-
duction of miscommunication. Similarly, the mistake doctrine allows inefficient
contracts to be avoided, but it also encourages parties to share information that
would prevent misunderstandings and the wasteful investments that can result
from them.
Additionally, as elaborated in §5 below, the rules governing contract forma-
tion significantly interact with the rules governing the remedies for breach. For
instance, as we will see, promissory estoppel may substitute for a formal offer
and acceptance in the appropriate case, but the damages theoretically available
48While complete disclosure will generally enhance efficiency, partial disclosure can reduce
welfare (Hermalin and Katz, in press).
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to the disappointed promisee may be rather less than the damages that would be
awarded if the proper formalities have been observed (although there is scholarly
controversy regarding whether courts actually follow this theoretical distinction
in practice). Again, these doctrinal complications are likely to provide fruitful
opportunity for additional economic research in future years, as is the law of
contract formation generally.
4 Interpretation of Contracts: Contractual In-
completeness
Offer and acceptance only begins the process of contractual exchange. In order
for the transaction to be completed, the contract must be performed, and if
performance is not forthcoming, enforced. Probably the most common source
of contractual disputes is differences in interpretation, if only because the parties
have limited incentive to pursue a dispute if they can foresee and agree upon its
likely outcome. The problem of contract interpretation thus provides a central
backdrop for the law of contracts, which contains many rules and principles that
are designed to address it.
The legal issue of interpretation corresponds to the economic issue of con-
tractual incompleteness—a topic that has been a central focus of research in
microeconomic theory in recent years (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart,
1987; Hart and Moore, 1999; Tirole, 1999). Contractual incompleteness cap-
tures the idea that real-life contracting can fail to produce contracts that are as
precise and detailed as traditional—albeit possibly na¨ıve—economic theory pre-
dicts. Economists typically attribute this failure to an informational asymmetry:
the parties to the contract anticipate observing events that they might wish to
be contingencies, but which cannot serve as contingencies because they are not
verifiable (i.e., observable by a third-party adjudicator of any contract dispute);
in other words, the parties will be better informed about payoff-relevant infor-
mation than any third party. For their part, lawyers often attribute the failure
to complete contracts to the inevitable ambiguities in ordinary language or to
some bounded rationality on the part of the parties (perhaps arising from their
decision not to employ lawyers in the drafting of the contract).
In this section, accordingly, we discuss the problem of contractual incom-
pleteness and relate it to the question of interpretation and to associated legal
doctrines. We begin in the next subsection by considering various definitions of
contractual incompleteness. Subsection 4.2 then discusses the sources of con-
tractual incompleteness, including ex ante determinants present at the outset of
contracting, such as bounded rationality and asymmetric information, as well as
ex post factors such as verification costs and dynamic incentives arising from the
prospect of renegotiation. Subsection 4.3 addresses the consequences of contrac-
tual incompleteness for the efficiency of exchange; and subsection 4.4 outlines
and analyzes the main legal doctrines that govern in this area.
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4.1 Modeling incomplete contracts
From a theoretical perspective, it is useful to model a contract as a mapping
from verifiable events to outcomes. For instance, an insurance contract could
contain a provision that related damage to one’s car (a verifiable event) to a
payment to the insured (an outcome).
In this context, “verifiable” means an event is observable not only by the
parties to the contract, but also by any third party (e.g., a judge) who might be
called upon to adjudicate a dispute. The focus on verifiable events is motivated
as follows. Were an outcome contingent on an unverifiable event (i.e., one not
observable to the third party), then there would be no way for the third party to
judge the extent of breach of contract (if any) or even who breached (if anyone
did). Hence, a contractual obligation that is contingent on an unverifiable event
cannot be effectively enforced by a third party.
In the incomplete-contracts literature, it is standard to assume that the
parties to a contract can observe events that cannot be verified by any judge.
In the parlance of the literature, such events are described as observable, but not
verifiable. As we will see, the parties could ideally wish to base their contract
on such observable, but unverifiable events.
Enforcement would also be difficult if one of the parties to the contract
couldn’t observe an event on which an outcome was contingent (for example,
as in the case of a consumer who cannot tell whether a mechanic has properly
repaired an automobile). That party would not know the extent to which the
other party was out of compliance with the contract (if he was). Such igno-
rance would, thus, make a contract impossible to enforce even through private
sanctions of the sort discussed in §5.4.2 and §5.4.3 below. For this reason ob-
servability is considered a minimal informational requirement for an event to
define a contractual contingency.
To be more formal, if we take Ω to be the set of verifiable events (with ω a
representative element) and A to be the set of outcomes, then a contract can be
seen as a mapping, C : ΩC → A, where ΩC ⊆ Ω. Contractual incompleteness
can, then, be seen as situation in which the parties to the contract would or
should ideally wish to base their contract on some set other than ΩC (for ex-
ample, Ω if ΩC ⊂ Ω; or the set O of observable events).
Within the economics literature, the terms verifiable and observable are typ-
ically employed without any explicit consideration of the costs associated with
investigation, measurement, documentation, or monitoring; that is, activities
necessary to make information useful contractually. To an extent, one implicit
set of assumptions typically employed is that observable events are observable
at no cost, similarly for verifiable events, while unverifiable events would be
verifiable only at a prohibitive cost (possibly infinite). As Hermalin and Katz
(1991) point out, events can be “partially” verifiable in the sense that although
a third party cannot observe them with the precision of the parties to the con-
tract, a third party can still observe some information about the event that
causes him or her to update his or her beliefs about what happened in a way
useful for adjudication (see discussion below in §4.1.3 and §4.3.1). In any case,
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whatever the costs of observation and verification, they are almost always taken
to be exogenous to the model. Endogenizing these costs through the design of
measurement or monitoring systems remains, for the most part, an important
area for future research.
4.1.1 Literal incompleteness and unmapped contingencies
Following Hermalin and Katz (1993), we make a distinction between literal
incompleteness, which we consider now, and economic incompleteness, which
we address in §4.1.3.49
A contract is literally incomplete if an event or contingency can arise that
is not anticipated by the contract; hence, the contract is silent with respect
to what should happen given this event or contingency. Literal incompleteness
corresponds to a situation in which there are elements of Ω not in ΩC . Ayres
and Gertner (1989) refer to such as elements as “gaps.” Other scholars have
referred to them as unforeseen contingencies. Let Ω¯C denote the set of gaps or
unforeseen contingencies (i.e., Ω¯C = Ω− ΩC).
The assumption of literally incomplete contracts has played an important
role in law & economics (both implicitly, as in Shavell, 1980, and Rogerson,
1984, and explicitly, as in Goetz and Scott, 1981, Ayres and Gertner, 1989,
and Hadfield, 1994). Nonetheless, as Hermalin and Katz (1993) observe, it is a
potentially problematic assumption, because it is so easy to complete contracts
by adding a stereotypical residual (“none-of-the-above”) clause to a contract.
That is, literal completeness can be achieved simply by adding a clause that
states, “if an event (contingency) other than those listed above occurs, then the
outcome shall be . . . ”
In order to explain literally incomplete contracts, consequently, it is not
enough to assume that the parties fail to foresee some contingencies. It would
seem necessary to assume also that the parties fail to foresee that they could
fail to have foreseen some contingencies.
Alternatively, one might assume the gap is rational, insofar as there is some
affirmative reason why the parties deliberately left contingencies unmapped.
One reason could be that the parties are content to let the courts apply a
particular outcome, and this outcome is no worse than what the parties might
have provided on their own. Under traditional common law, for instance, courts
often responded to contractual gaps by treating the contract as a nullity, on the
grounds that there had been no “meeting of the minds.” The result would
be that the parties would be left where they lay when the contingency arose
(although parties who had partially or fully performed might be entitled to a
refund or to restitution of any value conferred on the counterparty). Modern-
day courts, in contrast, are more likely to react to a gap by trying to fill it with
either an objectively reasonable term, or with their best guess as to what the
parties would have wished had they negotiated over the contingency in question.
49Ayres and Gertner (1992) refer to the first type of incompleteness as “obligational” and
second as “insufficiently state contingent.”
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(Although if the gaps are too significant or the parties’ hypothetical wishes too
unclear, the traditional approach of declaring the contract to be at an end is
still a real possibility.)
To the extent that courts apply a predictable default rule in such situations
(or even an unpredictable one), one could say that there is no such thing as
a literally incomplete contract—rather, the implicit residual clause is just that
the parties agree to go to court—or follow existing legal requirements that they
pursue private arbitration or other method of dispute resolution—and abide by
any result that is reached there. At a semantic level, such logic is unassailable,
if perhaps unappealing to those worried about truly na¨ıve parties who indeed
failed to foresee that might have failed to have foreseen a contingency.
4.1.2 Linguistic under- and overdetermination
In many situations in which a contract does not point to a clear outcome, the
problem is not that the parties have said nothing; rather, it is that they have
said too little or too much. For example, the parties might provide multiple and
inconsistent provisions dealing with the same event. Alternatively, the parties
might use terms that admit multiple meanings or that depend on other terms
of the contract.
One could treat such cases as equivalent to contractual gaps, arguing that,
if the parties have not settled a term definitively, they have not settled it at
all, but this interpretation does not appear to comport with the behavior of ei-
ther legal institutions or actual bargainers. An alternate approach, accordingly,
would be to model contracts not as single-valued functions, but as multi-valued
correspondences. Formally, instead of representing a contract as a mapping
of the form C : ΩC → A, we could represent it as a mapping of the form
C : ΩC → P (A) where P (A) denotes the power set of A.50 Under this inter-
pretation, incompleteness would arise whenever the contract mapped an event
to a set with more than one outcome, so that the person applying the contract
would have to choose among those outcomes based on extra-contractual factors.
This type of incompleteness has received less attention in the literature, but
some recent work has begun to explore its implications. For instance, a recent
paper by Hart and Moore (2004) models a contract as a list of outcomes to
which the parties are restricted. The determination of which outcome from
that list is implemented occurs through ex post bargaining. Through this ap-
proach, they show that a relatively loose contract (i.e., a relatively long list)
preserves flexibility, allowing the parties to make use of new information that
arises, but at the expense of distorting ex ante investments due to the increased
danger of holdup. Similarly, Ben-Shahar (2004) has argued that courts should
respond to such incompleteness by granting both parties the option to enforce
the agreement on whatever terms are most favorable to the counterparty; such
a response would preserve the benefits of whatever bargain the parties had al-
ready reached, while allowing them to enjoy further gains from trade through
50A sigma field should A be non-denumerable.
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further negotiation.
A criticism of Hart and Moore (2004) is that relies heavily on some strong
assumptions. First, they rely heavily on the observable but unverifiable distinc-
tion. As Hermalin and Katz (1991) and Maskin and Tirole (1999) note, there
are reasons to doubt this distinction in many contexts. More critically, they also
rely on the ability of parties to carry out what would normally be seen as in-
credible threats. Hart and Moore justify these by appealing to the psychological
tendency of people to sacrifice resources in order to get revenge against those
who have, in their eyes, mistreated them (see Rabin, 1993, for a discussion of
such psychological effects in economic contexts). While such tendencies might
exist among individuals, one is hesitant to assume that sophisticated parties
(e.g., firms) would be prey to such base emotions.
4.1.3 Economic incompleteness and coarse mappings
Much of the economic literature on incomplete contracts has focused on a dif-
ferent standard of incompleteness: A contract is incomplete when the set of
verifiable events is not the same as the set of observable events.51 That is, even
if the contract is literally complete (i.e., Ω¯C = ∅) it would be judged econom-
ically incomplete if Ω = O, where O is the set of observable events. In this
case, the parties would benefit from being able to condition their contractual
obligations more finely (for instance, by allowing an excuse when performance is
commercially impractical), but they cannot do so because the condition cannot
be effectively enforced (for instance, because the court cannot tell the difference
between commercial impracticability and mere seller recalcitrance).
As noted earlier, it is natural to assume O is “larger” than Ω. In the liter-
ature, there are essentially two ways this assumption is modeled.52 One is to
define Υ as the set of observable, but unverifiable events (with representative
element υ) and take
O = Υ×Ω .
In other words, an observable event is a vector consisting of events that the
parties can observe, but not verify, and events that the parties can both observe
and verify.53 Under this formulation, a verifiable event ω reveals not only that
51Obviously, both sets must be defined in some way over relevant events; that is, we don’t
want to say the sets differ if the observable, but unverifiable events are irrelevant to the con-
tracting situation. Defining relevance is, however, difficult insofar as one strain of the literature
(e.g., Hermalin and Katz, 1991; Maskin and Tirole, 1999; Edlin and Hermalin, 2001) has been
devoted to showing when the observable, but unverifiable distinction is unimportant; that is,
situations in which the parties can achieve the same outcomes with incomplete contracts as
they could with complete contracts. In such situations, it would be misleading to say that the
observable and verifiable sets are the same over relevant events, because equilibrium play, but
not outcomes, would be different were it feasible to base contracts on the set of observable
events. A definition of relevant events must, therefore, account for potential differences in the
ensuing game, as well as outcomes.
52An example of the first way is Grossman and Hart (1986). An example of the second way
is Anderlini and Felli (1994).
53It is worth noting that both Υ and Ω could, themselves, be vector spaces.
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ω has occurred, but also that
υ ∈ Oω ≡ {υ|(υ, ω) ∈ O}
(the set Oω is called the section of O at ω). Because, absent additional as-
sumptions, Oω = Υ for all ω ∈ Ω, it might at first seem that knowing that υ is
in Oω is not useful information. But if some (υ, ω) pairs are impossible, then
some sections satisfy Oω ⊂ Υ and, therefore, learning ω can lead to inferences
about which υ occurred.
In such situations, a so-called “forcing” contract (as in Harris and Raviv,
1978) could be useful. Suppose the parties wish to induce one party, “the
actor,” to choose a specific υˆ. If there are ω such that υˆ /∈ Oω, then those
ω constitute proof that the actor has not chosen the desired action and the
contract can, therefore, threaten the actor with sufficient punishment should
such ω occur that he would never choose an υ ∈ Oω. Hence, some undesirable
actions can be avoided. Ideally, if there is a subset Ω0 ⊂ Ω such that, for all
υ = υˆ, υ ∈ Oω for some ω ∈ Ω0, but υˆ /∈ Oω for any ω ∈ Ω0, then υˆ can be
achieved by a contract that sufficiently punishes the actor for any ω ∈ Ω0 and
rewards him only for ω ∈ Ω\Ω0.54
Even if all (υ, ω) pairs are possible—so Oω = Υ—the conditional distribution
of υ given υ ∈ Oω may differ from the distribution given υ ∈ Oω′ , ω = ω′. Such
differences in distributions can be very powerful, often allowing contractual
solutions that replicate the outcomes that would have occurred were the parties
able to contract on O directly (see discussion in §4.3.1; also Hermalin and Katz,
1991).
The second way economic incompleteness can be understood is to take Ω to
be a partition of O; that is, each ω is a subset of O, any given element of O can
be in only one ω, and the ωs, as a class, contain all the elements in O.55 Of
course, to make this interesting, there must be at least one ω with two or more
elements of O in it; that is, for this ω at least, learning ω does not perfectly
reveal the observable information. Conversely, economic completeness would
correspond to a situation in which each ω contained a single element of O.
The standard interpretation of this second representation of economic incom-
pleteness is that there is inherently no difference between what is observable and
what is verifiable, except that it is impossible or prohibitively expensive to de-
scribe the observable events with sufficient precision in a contract.56 Instead,
the observable events can only be described coarsely; so that different observable
54The notation S\T denotes the set whose elements are in S but not T (i.e., S\T = S∩T c).
55Formally, the ωs satisfy
ω ∩ ω′ = ∅, ∀ω = ω′ ; and

ω∈Ω
ω = O .
This second way of representing economic incompleteness can be seen as a special case of the
first in which O ⊂ Υ× Ω such that Oω ∩ Oω′ = ∅ for any two ω, ω′ and

ω∈ΩOω = Υ.
56Typically these costs are taken to be “writing costs.” They could also, as Rasmusen
(2001) notes, be due to “reading” costs.
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events get lumped together in a single ω. For example, consider the “contract”
between us, the authors of this chapter, and the editors of this volume. Without
effectively writing the chapter themselves, it is impossible for the editors to stip-
ulate fully what the chapter should look like; the best they can do is stipulate
the topics to be covered and the overall length of the chapter.
4.1.4 Discussion
Each of these models of contractual incompleteness has some appeal, though
none is entirely satisfactory as a complete account of the phenomenon. To
illustrate, consider the case of Spaulding v. Morse, in which a divorcing couple
entered into a maintenance agreement under which the husband agreed to pay
child support of $1200 per year until the couple’s son entered some “college,
university, or higher institution of learning . . . ,” and $2200 per year for four
years thereafter. The dispute arose when the son completed high school and
was immediately drafted into the us Army, and the husband took the position
that his contractual obligation was suspended while the son remained in military
service. One can view this dispute as arising from literal incompleteness if we
say that the contract simply did not provide for the case in which the son was
drafted into the army. In order to take this view, however, we must read the
term in question in a non-literal way, since a literal reading makes it appear to
be a residual clause. (That is, it appears to say that so long as the son never
started college—e.g., if he chose to pursue a military career or even if he were
killed in combat—the husband would be required to make yearly payments in
perpetuity.)57
One can alternatively view the dispute as arising from linguistic underde-
termination if we focus on the phrase “child support.” Does the phrase simply
refer to any payments made for the benefit of the son, or is it instead limited
to payments that are objectively necessary for the son’s adequate maintenance?
Ordinary language is probably not precise enough to provide a definitive answer
to this question, and the best response may be to say that the phrase can mean
either or both.
Finally, we could view this dispute as a case of economic incompleteness if we
assume that what the parties actually wished to do was to condition payment on
the son’s need for maintenance (an observable but perhaps not verifiable event)
but that they instead conditioned on the son’s not yet having completed four
years of college (a coarser but perhaps more easily verifiable proxy). Had the
parties been able to describe the former condition at reasonable cost in their
divorce settlement, the whole dispute could have been avoided. On the other
hand, it is not clear that the couple had such a clear purpose in arriving at the
clause in question. Another possibility is that the husband simply wished to
57Nobody in the case made this argument, however, not even the wife. Instead, the court
found in favor of the husband, on the grounds that the unstated purpose of the clause was
to provide financial support for the son in his minor years, and once the Army had taken
responsibility in this regard, the purpose had been served.
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pay as little as possible, the wife wished to receive as much as possible, and the
clause was a rough compromise.
As the example indicates, modeling contracts as a formal mapping from
events to outcomes is useful, but it could fail to capture two important real-
world features of the situation—namely, that parties do not always possess a
well-specified understanding of the domain of possible events, either ex ante or ex
post and that they write contracts in ordinary language with all its ambiguities,
rather than in the formal but restricted language of mathematics. This is not
to say, however, that such failures necessarily invalidate or diminish the insights
of formal modeling. Nor is it to say that formal modeling can’t deal with these
features should they be important. Certainly, the first could be readily modeled
by incorporating some uncertainty over what the domain of events might be.
The second is potentially trickier, but techniques such as assuming asymmetric
information with regard to the meaning of the terms, uncertainty over their
interpretation, or even suspension of the usual common-priors assumption could
be useful. With all that in mind, the next subsection discusses possible economic
causes of contractual incompleteness.
4.2 The sources of contractual incompleteness
4.2.1 Bounded rationality
A common explanation for incomplete contracts, especially literally incomplete
contracts, is bounded rationality.
The simplest “model” of bounded rationality is that people make mistakes.
They fail to foresee all possible contingencies and, thus, their contracts suffer
from unforeseen contingencies. However, as noted above (§4.1.1), failure to
foresee certain contingencies need not generate incomplete contracts unless the
parties also fail to foresee that they may fail to foresee certain contingencies.
If the parties recognize their imperfect foresight, then they can complete any
contract with a residual (“none-of-the-above”) clause.
Of course, the fact that the parties could complete any contract with a none-
of-the-above clause does not mean that they would wish to do so. After all, they
may fear that the ideal response to different unforeseen contingencies varies with
those contingencies. By its nature, a none-of-the-above clause is a one-size-fits-
all solution. Hence, the parties may wish for flexibility should an unforeseen
contingency occur; legal proceedings can provide such flexibility insofar as the
court’s ruling will typically depend on the contingencies that have occurred.
How the courts should respond to these “intentional” gaps has become an issue
in the literature (see, e.g., Ayres and Gertner, 1989, 1992). We discuss this
literature in §4.4 below.
To an extent, deciding how the courts should respond depends on the reason
for unforeseen contingencies in the first place. As, however, E. Posner (2003a)
points out, economic theory does not offer particularly good or widely accepted
means of modeling unforeseen contingencies (or bounded rationality more gen-
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erally).58 To the extent models of unforeseen contingencies exist, they are too
abstract to be readily utilized in the study of contracts. Admittedly, one could
simply appeal to the existence of gaps in actual contracts to justify assuming
literal incompleteness. Such an atheoretic rationale, however, makes it difficult
to analyze important issues such as how the courts would know whether gaps
are truly mistakes or have arisen because one side or the other is being strate-
gic. This, in turn, affects how the courts should respond to gaps (see Ayres and
Gertner, 1989, 1992, and Shavell, in press).
Although some parts of the literature appeal to unforeseen contingencies as
a possible motivation for economic incompleteness (see, e.g., Maskin and Tirole,
1999), it is difficult to reconcile such bounded rationality with the “dynamic-
programming” rationality (to use Maskin and Tirole’s term) that the incomplete-
contracts literature typically assumes. Other, more rational, explanations for
economic incompleteness strike us as more plausible. We explore some of these
explanations in the next few sections.
4.2.2 Describability and contracting costs
As we observed, a complete contract between us and the book’s editors about
what this chapter should be is rather impractical. If the editors spelled out in
great detail what they wanted, they would, in effect, be writing the chapter
themselves. Their costs of doing presumably outweigh whatever benefits such
detailed contracting would generate. More generally, there is a cost to writing
fine-tuned contracts. In some instances, such as our chapter example, it is
simply impractical to describe the relevant contingencies finely enough.
Describability. Because describing something can be viewed as an algorithm,
it follows from the mathematics of computability (see, e.g., Boolos et al., 2002)
that it is conceivable that some events or contingencies cannot be described, in
the sense that no algorithm for describing them would ever finish. This point
is made by Anderlini and Felli (1994). An intuitive sense of this idea can be
had by recalling the well-known math fact that the constant π cannot be given
a decimal representation; no algorithm could ever complete the task of fully
describing π as a decimal number.
Indescribability per se, however, seems a doubtful explanation for economi-
cally incomplete contracts for at least two reasons. First, the parties might be
able to approximate their desired description arbitrarily well (e.g., 3.1415 might
be a good enough approximation of π); therefore, they suffer arbitrarily little
from the indescribability of a contingency. In fact, Anderlini and Felli prove
just such an approximation theorem. Second, the parties to the contract need
to have internal descriptions of the relevant events or contingencies to know if
they have occurred; hence, if they cannot write descriptions, it is hard to under-
58For a general survey of recent modeling on bounded rationality see Rubinstein (1998).
For a more specific survey on unforeseen contingencies see Dekel et al. (1998) (also see Dekel
et al., 2001).
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stand how they know the relevant descriptions. In other words, if we take the
feasible contractual contingencies to be subsets of some partition of the relevant
state space, then why isn’t the set of observable contingencies this same par-
tition?59 And, if it is, then there is no practical difference between observable
and verifiable; that is, the contract is not economically incomplete.
Description costs. A better way to proceed is to assume that the relevant
states can be described (or described arbitrarily finely), but to recognize that
the costs of doing so can sometimes be so large as to render detailed descriptions
impractical (see, e.g., Dye, 1985). The chapter-writing example given earlier is
an example of such a situation.
Having recognized that contract costs are increasing in the details of the
contract,60 the next question is how to balance the marginal gain from more
details against these marginal costs? As it turns out, however, in many settings
the marginal benefit of adding details is zero; as Hermalin and Katz (1991) and
Maskin and Tirole (1999) show, even rough descriptions can be sufficient for
the parties to do as well as they could were it practical to write very detailed
contracts. We return to this point later.
Another reason the marginal benefits to the parties could be small is that
the courts will fill in or interpret the missing or vague terms (see, e.g., Ayres
and Gertner, 1989, 1992, or Shavell, in press). Hence a model of how the courts
enforce incomplete contracts is essential to an analysis of the effort that parties
should make to make their contracts more precise.
Evaluation and expertise. It is possible that even if a judge, or other
adjudicator of contractual dispute, can observe a relevant variable, he or she
may not properly evaluate it. His or her evaluation could differ from that of the
parties to the contract, perhaps because of a lack of expertise in the relevant
field. This idea can be captured by assuming that, when the parties observe x,
the judge observes (concludes) x+ ε, where ε is the judge’s error in evaluation.
The error, ε, could also be introduced because the judge reads or interprets the
contract differently than the parties intended. (The model, which we consider
in §4.4.1 infra, on form versus substance also touches on this point.)
While such errors might, at first, seem to render the relevant variable essen-
tially unverifiable, the parties can, in some circumstances, do as well as they
would were the judge to observe the relevant variable without error (Hermalin
and Katz, 1991). We return to this point later in §4.3.1.
59Let Σ be the state space. What can be described, the verifiable events, are subsets of Σ
(i.e., ω ⊂ Σ for all ω ∈ Ω, where ω = Σ and ω ∩ ω′ = ∅). But if, as seems reasonable, what
the parties can describe in writing is the same as what they can describe to themselves, then
each ω is, then, an element of O and O = Ω. [In a sense, this is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s
(1922) Proposition 7 that what we can’t think about, we can’t verbalize.]
60One can model contracts being more detailed by assuming that there is an order, 
, on
partitions of O, such that Ωi 
 Ωj (i.e., a contract based on Ωi is more detailed than one
based on Ωj) if for each ωi ∈ Ωi there exists an ωj ∈ Ωj such that ωi ⊆ ωj and for at least
one ωj ∈ Ωj there exist ωi and ω′i in Ωi such that ωi ∪ ω′i ⊆ ωj .
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4.2.3 Complex environments
Segal (1999a) suggests that economically incomplete contracts can arise when
the contracting environment is complicated. In his model, the parties wish to
trade one “widget” from a set of different widgets. As the number of potential
contingencies (i.e., widgets in the set) rises, the optimal second-best contract
does increasingly worse. In the limit, the optimal second-best contract does
no better than the simple incomplete contract (equivalently, in his model, no
contract). The reason for this worsening performance is that, as the number
of contingencies rises, the number of incentive constraints increases. As in all
optimization problems, as the number of constraints increases, the optimality of
the solution decreases (at least weakly). Given that writing complex contracts
is costly, there is a cutoff point at which the environment is so complex that the
simple, less costly contract is superior to a complex contract.
Segal’s model, while elegant, rests on a number of strong assumptions.
Among these is the assumption that almost no variable of interest is verifiable,
despite many of them being observable (his Assumption 2, page 60). If either
the optimal widget to trade is known ex ante or which is the optimal widget
to trade can be verified ex post , the model collapses. As we have observed, the
assumption of observable but unverifiable can be a questionable one, especially
in many of the contexts to which this model is intended to apply.
4.2.4 Asymmetric information
As noted in §2.3.2, informational asymmetry at contracting can lead to dis-
tortions in the contract that is written. Spier (1992) builds on this idea by
suggesting that one consequent distortion could be contractual incompleteness.
A simple model can serve to illustrate her idea. Suppose a manufacturer
needs a part for one of its manufacturing machines. The manufacturer can have
the part sent by a default carrier, in which case the part will certainly arrive
in two days. Normalize the default carrier’s price to be 0. Alternatively, the
manufacturer can contract with an express carrier. If the express carrier makes
no special efforts, the part will arrive in one day with probability 1− q ∈ (0, 1);
with probability q it arrives the day after that. For simplicity, take the express
carrier’s cost when it makes no special efforts to be 0.61 Alternatively, by
spending c > 0, the express carrier can ensure the part arrives in one day. Let
L > 0 be the amount per day that the manufacturer loses from the idle machine.
If the manufacturer selects the default carrier, its payoff is −L. If it selects the
express carrier, but no special efforts are made, its expected gross payoff is −qL.
If it selects the express carrier and special efforts are made, its expected gross
payoff is 0; but, in this case, the express carrier’s gross payoff is −c. Assume
that there are two types of manufacturer, 0 and 1, with
qL1 > c > qL0 .
61Making it a positive amount does not alter the analysis materially, while setting it to zero
simplifies the notation.
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Observe that it would be welfare maximizing to have the express carrier make
special efforts for a high-value manufacturer (type 1), but not for a low-value
manufacturer (type 0). Let θ ∈ (0, 1) be the probability that the manufacturer
is type 1. Hence,
EL = θL1 + (1− θ)L0 .
Assume that the manufacturer’s type is its private information.
To close the model, we need to make some assumptions about bargaining
between the manufacturer and the express carrier. Assume that if the express
carrier can’t infer the manufacturer’s type, then the express carrier and manu-
facturer set the price through Nash (1950) bargaining over the expected surplus,
EL− qEL. In that case, the price is
pu =
1
2
(1− q)EL .
Assume the parameters are such that
−qL0 − pu > −L0
(this clearly holds for low values of θ). Because it is welfare reducing for a
low-value manufacturer to request special efforts, we can assume that the ex-
press carrier interprets any request for special efforts to be from a high-value
manufacturer. In this case, total surplus is L1 − c. If bargaining is again Nash
bargaining, then the resulting price is
pi =
L1 + c
2
.
Finally, consider a high-value manufacturer who is deciding between asking
for special efforts—and thus revealing its identity—or pooling with low-value
manufacturers and not asking. Its expected net surplus in the first case is −pi.
Its expected net surplus in the second case is −qL1−pu. It is readily shown that
there exist parameter values such that latter exceeds the former (e.g., c = 2,
L1 = 5, L0 = 3, q = 1/2, and θ = 1/4 would work). Hence, it is possible
that asymmetric information leads to a form of contractual incompleteness:
Although it would be welfare improving for a high-value manufacturer and the
express carrier to have a contingency in their contract requiring the carrier to
make special efforts, they don’t have such a contingency in equilibrium.
4.2.5 Verification costs
In much of the contracting literature, it is assumed that, if information is ver-
ifiable, it can be verified costlessly. In real life, however, information is made
verifiable at a cost (e.g., surveillance monitoring, auditing, and record keeping).
If such costs are large relative to the benefits that complete contracting affords,
the consequence will be incomplete contracts.
There is a strand of the literature on “costly state verification,” starting with
Townsend’s (1979) seminal article, that considers, in part, the consequences of
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an inability to verify payoff-relevant variables due to the cost of verification. The
principal concern of this literature has been on financial contracting; particularly
the decision to use debt rather than equity.62
4.2.6 Dynamic inconsistency with respect to renegotiation
A common, although not universal, view in the economics literature is that
parties never “leave money on the table” even on out-of-equilibrium paths. More
precisely, should the parties ever reach a point at which it is common knowledge
that the allocation dictated by the contract is Pareto inferior, the parties will
renegotiate the contract. This ability to renegotiate undermines the value of
contracts that rely on Pareto-inferior allocations as threats should one or both
parties deviate from their contractual obligations. In the lingo of the literature,
such contracts fail to be renegotiation proof. That contracts be renegotiation
proof is, therefore, often a requirement imposed in the literature.
To illustrate the concept of renegotiation-proofness and how it can lead to
incomplete contracts, we briefly review the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model
of renegotiation in agency. In a standard agency model, to induce the agent to
work hard, the principal and agent agree to a contract that makes the agent’s
compensation contingent on the outcome (e.g., salespeople’s compensation is
frequently tied to their sales). Such a contract is, however, generally not first-
best optimal because it causes a risk-averse agent to bear risk. Fudenberg and
Tirole consider what happens in the standard model if there is a period after
the agent has committed his effort but before its outcome is known (e.g., after
he is back from his sales calls, but before the orders arrive) during which the
principal and agent can renegotiate. Observe that if, as is typically assumed,
the principal is risk neutral, then it is common knowledge that leaving the agent
with risky compensation is inefficient; the parties should renegotiate to a fixed,
non-contingent wage for the agent. However, a rational agent would forecast
such renegotiation and, thus, that his compensation will ultimately be unrelated
to his effort. But if it is unrelated to his effort, then he has no incentives to work
hard. While Fudenberg and Tirole show that there are ways to restore some
incentives, the potential for renegotiation limits their effectiveness. Moreover,
a consequence could well be that the parties forgo using an incentive contract
even though they would use one were renegotiation not possible.
This last point shows how the threat of renegotiation can lead the parties to
use less complete contracts than they would were renegotiation infeasible. That
is, while they might wish to write a contract contingent on the outcome, they
can’t. Schwartz and Watson (2003) consider the relation between contractual
complexity and the feasibility of renegotiation in greater depth, with a particular
emphasis on law & economics issues.
62See, for instance, Webb (1992) or Hart and Moore (1998).
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4.3 Consequences of contractual incompleteness
4.3.1 Does incompleteness matter?
A debate has emerged in economics as to whether incomplete contracts matter.
Specifically, even if it is accepted that contracts are incomplete, are there ways
for the parties to effectively contract around the incompleteness?
Hermalin and Katz (1991) offer one model in which incompleteness doesn’t
matter. Let Υ denote the set of observable, but unverifiable variables. Assume
that Υ is finite. Let Ω denote the set of verifiable variables. Take it to be finite
as well, with N elements indexed by n. Let there be two parties to the contract:
the agent and the principal.
The agent chooses υ ∈ Υ. The principal has preferences over the υs. Suppose
that the agent is willing to sign a contract with the principal if his equilibrium
(expected) utility is at least some reservation level, which we can normalize to
be zero. Let w denote the agent’s gross utility and let w − d(υ) denote his net
utility (d : Υ → R+). Assume it costs the principal c(w) if the agent receives
gross utility w, where c(·) is increasing and strictly convex.63 Finally, assume
that the conditional distribution of the verifiable variable, ω, depends on the υ
chosen; specifically, let πn(υ) = Pr{ωn|υ} and let
π(υ) ≡ (π1(υ), . . . , πN (υ))
be the density over Ω induced by υ.
Suppose that the principal wants the agent to choose a specific υ∗. If we
assume that the principal has all the bargaining power, her ideal would be a
contract in which the agent agrees to choose υ∗ in exchange for a net utility
of 0, which costs the principal c
(
d(υ∗)
)
. Except in the special case where v∗
minimizes d(v), this ideal contract is infeasible because υ is not verifiable and
the agent prefers an υ other than υ∗.
A feasible alternative is a contingent-compensation contract; the principal
agrees to provide utility level wn should verifiable outcome ωn occur. Let w =
(w1, . . . , wN ). Such a contingent contract will be agreeable to the agent and
induce him to select υ∗ if
π(υ∗) ·w − d(υ∗) ≥ 0 and (7)
π(υ∗) ·w − d(υ∗) ≥ π(υ) ·w − d(υ) for all υ ∈ Υ\{υ∗} . (8)
Condition (7), the individual rationality constraint, is the condition that the
agent agree to the contract. Condition (8), the set of incentive compatibility
constraints, is the condition that the agent prefer choosing υ∗ to any other υ.
Suppose the principal has all the bargaining power. It is a well-known result
(see, e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1983) that if a contract (a vector w) exists
satisfying expressions (7–8), then there exists one such that (7) holds as an
equality. Because that contract minimizes the principal’s expected cost, she
63A natural interpretation is that the agent is risk averse, while the principal is risk neutral,
in which case c(·) is the inverse function of the agent’s utility function.
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will offer that contract. Under general conditions (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart,
1983), Var(w|υ∗) > 0. Hence, by Jensen’s inequality, E{c(w)|υ∗} > c(d(υ∗));
that is, even if the principal can devise a contract to implement υ∗, it will
cost her more than the ideal contract would were υ verifiable. It would seem,
therefore, that there is an adverse consequence to υ not being verifiable.
This last conclusion, however, need not follow if the parties have time be-
tween the realizations of υ and ω to renegotiate the contract. Suppose that the
principal retains all the bargaining power in renegotiation.64 Because, here, the
principal observes υ, the problem identified by Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) is
not triggered by renegotiation (see discussion in §4.2.6). Because the principal’s
cost increases with the variability of w, the principal would offer, in renegotia-
tion, a non-contingent w, w¯. Because the agent’s cost from selecting υ is sunk
at the point of renegotiation, he will accept w¯ if and only if w¯ ≥ π(υ) ·w. As
she has all the bargaining power, the principal will choose the lowest such w¯,
namely the one that just equals π(υ) ·w. Hence w¯ is a function of υ, which we
indicate by writing w¯(υ). By Jensen’s inequality, c
(
w¯(υ)
) ≤ E{c(w)|υ}; that is,
renegotiation lowers the principal’s cost. Moreover, because w¯(υ) = π(υ) · w,
it is readily seen that anticipation of such renegotiation does not change the
individual rationality nor incentive compatibility constraints (7–8). Moreover,
from (7), we see that w¯(υ∗) = d(υ∗). We therefore have
Proposition 6 Suppose that renegotiation is possible. If a contract w exists
that satisfies individual rationality and incentive compatibility (i.e., expressions
7 & 8), then even though υ is unverifiable, the principal can achieve the same
outcome as she could if it were verifiable.
In other words, in this context, the distinction between observable and verifiable
is not relevant to the outcome.
Proposition 6 rests on the existence of a w satisfying expressions (7–8).
Fortunately, the conditions for such a w to exist are rather minimal. Somewhat
loosely, it is sufficient that the distribution over ω induced by υ∗ be distinct
from the distributions induced by the other υ.65
Proposition 6 also rests on the supposition that renegotiation is possible;
that is, that there be a lag between when υ is chosen and when ω is realized.
Renegotiation would seem possible in many contexts of interest. For instance,
if ω is a judge’s observation and, thus, a ruling as to the value of υ, then the
parties presumably have time to renegotiate prior to the judge’s verdict.
A provocative way to summarize this is as follows: Even when critical vari-
ables are not verifiable, parties can often present some relevant evidence that
64Edlin and Hermalin (2001) extend the analysis to a broader set of bargaining games in
renegotiation.
65Formally, it is sufficient that π(υ∗) not be an element of the convex hull of

π(υ)|υ ∈
Υ\{υ∗}. As Hermalin and Katz (1991) discuss, this condition is readily met in most situa-
tions of interest. As Edlin and Hermalin (2001) show, for more general bargaining games in
renegotiation, a slightly stronger condition could be required: there exist a subset Ω∗ of Ω
such that Pr{ω ∈ Ω∗|υ∗} > Pr{ω ∈ Ω∗|υ} for all υ ∈ Υ\{υ∗}.
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is informative, in a noisy way, about the critical variables. If renegotiation is
feasible, then, by contracting on this relevant evidence, the parties can typically
write contracts as if the critical variables were verifiable.
Renegotiation a` la Hermalin and Katz is a particular type of game or mech-
anism. If a larger set of mechanisms is considered, one would find that the
observability-verifiability distinction is irrelevant under an even wider set of cir-
cumstances. In a series of articles, Maskin and Tirole do just that, considering
mechanisms more generally (see, e.g., Maskin and Tirole, 1999; see, also, Tirole,
1999, for an overview).
In a mechanism, the parties send messages to the mechanism arbitrator
(possibly the judge or other dispute adjudicator) about the variables they can
observe. As Farrell (1987b) notes, perhaps the earliest recorded use of a “mech-
anism” is the one King Solomon used to determine which of two women claiming
to be the mother of a child was the true mother.
A review of mechanism design is beyond the scope of this chapter. We can,
however, give a sense of its application in this context. Suppose that there is
some task that either of two parties, 1 or 2, could do. After contracting, the
parties observe their costs (c1, c2) = υ of doing the task, but cannot verify them.
Suppose that ci ∈ {L,H}, where L (low) is smaller than H (high).
Efficiency requires that the party with the lower cost do the task. The
parties might further wish to have the one who doesn’t do the task partially
compensate the other (i.e., pay some portion of the cost). But, by assumption,
the parties cannot write such a contract directly because it would be contingent
on the realizations of their costs. Fortunately, however, a mechanism can be
constructed that replicates the desired outcome: Both parties simultaneously
announce their individual costs (i.e., 1 announces c1 and 2 announces c2). The
following rules govern what happens next:
• If they announce the same cost, then a coin is flipped. The loser of the
coin flip has to do the task, but is paid cˆ/2 by the winner, where cˆ is the
commonly announced cost.
• If they announce different costs, then the lower-cost party must do the
task, but she is paid H/2 by the high-cost party.
If the parties announce truthfully, then the allocation of the task will be
efficient. It remains, however, to check that the parties will announce truthfully
in equilibrium (i.e., that the mechanism is incentive compatible). There are
three cases to consider. In each, we are assessing whether truth telling is a best
response to truth telling; and, therefore, does a truth-telling equilibrium exist.
1. υ = (L,L). If a party announces truthfully, she expects to get
1
2
(
L
2
− L
)
+
1
2
(
−L
2
)
= −L
2
.
If she lies, she expect to get −H/2; hence, she does better to tell the truth
than to lie.
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2. υ = (H,H). If a party announces truthfully, she expects to get −H/2
(see calculation above). If she lies, she must do the task, but is paid H/2;
hence, her net is −H/2. She does least as well to tell the truth; that is,
truth telling is a best response.
3. υ = (L,H) or (H,L). Consider the higher-cost party. If she tells the
truth, she expects to get −H/2. If she lies, she expects to get
1
2
(
L
2
−H
)
+
1
2
(
−L
2
)
= −H
2
;
so truth telling is a best response. Consider the lower-cost party. If she
tells the truth, she expects to get H/2− L. If she lies, she can expect
1
2
(
H
2
− L
)
+
1
2
(
−H
2
)
= −L
2
.
Because
H
2
− L > L
2
− L = −L
2
,
she does better to tell the truth.
Although such mechanisms have an artificial feel to them, they can often
be converted into more realistic looking contracts. For instance, the above
mechanism can be converted into an option contract : Party 1 is obligated to do
the task and Party 2 is obligated to pay Party 1 H/2. However, Party 2 has the
right (the option) to assume responsibility for the task if he wishes and, if he
assumes responsibility, then Party 1 is obligated to pay him L/2. It is readily
verified that Party 2 never gains from exercising his option if c2 = H and always
gains if c2 = L. Hence, Party 2 assumes responsibility only if he is low cost,
which ensures that the task is always undertaken by the lower-cost party.
The above mechanisms are balanced, in the sense that any payment made by
one of the parties is received by the other. The literature generally restricts itself
to balanced mechanisms; in part, this is done because unbalanced mechanisms
seem at odds with what we observe in real life and, in part, because unbal-
anced mechanisms are too strong. The entire observable but unverifiable notion
could be rendered completely meaningless, for instance, by using an unbalanced
“shoot-them-both” mechanism: The judge asks the parties to simultaneously
state what the observable variables are. If their reports agree, then the contract
is enforced as required given the commonly reported realization of the variables.
If their reports differ, then they are both shot (punished severely enough that
neither side would willingly make a report that he or she knew differed from the
other side’s). Truth telling is an equilibrium of such a mechanism and, among
the many equilibria, is arguably focal.66
66Although truth telling is a focal equilibrium given no pre-mechanism communication, it is
not clear that this mechanism would work if pre-mechanism communication were permitted.
That is, if you hear the other party say on the way up the court steps, “I will announce X,”
then you would also have to announce X even if that is neither the truth nor an advantageous
statement.
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4.3.2 The holdup problem and renegotiation
As discussed in 2.5.2 above, the possibility of holdup helps explain duress and
related limitations on contractual freedom. The holdup problem has also been
the subject of intense research in the area of incomplete contracts.67 This
recent work has focused on the extent to which contract design can provide
an alternative mechanism for addressing policing holdup in situations where
judicial intervention is unavailable or impractical. As such, this research can
be seen as a particular application of the question, considered in the previous
section, “does incompleteness matter?”
An example illustrates the problem. One firm, A, is to develop a product
that a second firm, B, will market (A, e.g., is a studio and B is a film distri-
bution company). Because of its expertise, B can observe the quality of the
product A has produced; yet quality could be sufficiently amorphous that it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to describe in a contract or verify in court
unambiguously. Setting incentives correctly would, thus, seem problematic. If
B commits to buy the product at a fixed price, then A, acting opportunistically,
has no incentive to invest enough in producing a quality product. If the contract
is a revenue-sharing contract, then A and B’s incentives could be too weak be-
cause of the teams problem (Holmstrom, 1982). Finally, if no contract is signed
in advance, but the parties bargain after A has developed the product, then
B could holdup A—that is, capture some of the value A creates by bargaining
opportunistically—thereby adversely affecting A’s incentives.
Demski and Sappington (1991) propose option contracts as a solution to this
problem. Specifically, let I ∈ I ⊂ R+ be A’s investment (in dollars, say) and
β(I) be B’s value of the product as a function of A’s investment.68 Assume
for I and I ′ in I that if I ′ > I, then β(I ′) ≥ β(I). Suppose that I∗ is the
optimal investment for A to make. Demski and Sappington’s solution is for
the parties to sign an option contract whereby B has the right to acquire the
product at a strike price of β(I∗). If A underinvests, then B won’t exercise the
option, so A loses. It is a waste for A to overinvest. Hence, A should invest
the appropriate amount exactly and B, being indifferent between exercising or
letting the option lapse, can be assumed to exercise in equilibrium. Any desired
sharing of expected surplus can be achieved through non-contingent transfers.
The Demski and Sappington solution is, unfortunately, vulnerable to rene-
gotiation (Edlin and Hermalin, 2000). Recall that B is indifferent between
exercising its option and letting it lapse, but exercises in equilibrium. Recog-
nizing that, at the exercise date, its payoff is thus independent of its decision, B
should pursue the following strategy: Let its option lapse, but then approach A
67A partial list of articles in this area is Bernheim and Whinston (1998), Che and Hausch
(1999), Chung (1991), Demski and Sappington (1991), Edlin and Hermalin (2000), Edlin and
Reichelstein (1996), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hermalin and Katz (1993), MacLeod and
Malcolmson (1993), No¨ldeke and Schmidt (1995, 1998), and Rogerson (1992).
68β(I) could be an expected value and it subsumes B having made the optimal marketing
decisions conditional on I.
Hermalin, Katz, & Craswell Interpretation 81
about renegotiating a deal at a lower price.69 Because there would otherwise be
no rationale for trade, it must be that the product is worth less than β(I∗) to A.
Hence, there is a gain to the parties from negotiating a new price and, by the
logic of the Coase theorem (see §2.2.2), they presumably will. Because the new
price will be less than β(I∗), this strategy of B’s dominates a strategy of simply
exercising the original option.70 As a rational player, A will anticipate this; that
is, that it will ultimately be held up despite the option contract. Anticipation
of holdup will adversely affect A’s incentives.
Some authors (e.g., Bernheim and Whinston, 1998; No¨ldeke and Schmidt,
1998), have sought to restore the capacity of option contracts to solve the holdup
problem. Their approach has been primarily to allow the parties to structure
the option contracts in such a manner that the contracts are robust to the sort
of renegotiation described above.
Edlin and Hermalin (2000) are less sanguine than these other authors about
the parties’ ability to make their contracts robust to renegotiation. Accordingly,
they ask whether option contracts could still work, even given the threat of
renegotiation, if the strike price is lowered from β(I∗) to a more appropriate
level? If the derivative at I∗ of the product’s value should it remain in A’s
hands is greater than dβ(I∗)/dI, then it is possible to achieve the efficient
outcome using an option contract (with a strike price below β(I∗)). If, however,
dβ(I∗)/dI is greater, then Edlin and Hermalin prove that no contract (option
or otherwise) can achieve the efficient outcome. To summarize: Recognizing
the possibility of renegotiation, if any contract can achieve an efficient outcome,
then an option contract can; but there are circumstances in which no contract
achieves an efficient outcome.71
The literature on holdup problems yields, therefore, a mixed message with
regard to the importance of the distinction between observable and verifiable.
Under a variety of conditions, the distinction is ultimately meaningless, but
there are circumstances in which the distinction is important. It is worth not-
ing that, in terms of information, this literature has considered a rather stark
world—if a variable is unverifiable, then it is (often implicitly) assumed that
there is no correlated signal that is verifiable. As discussed in the previous
69In a technical sense, this is not renegotiation insofar as the original contract has been
honored—B had the right not to exercise the option. B is, in a technical sense, engaging in
new negotiations following the expiration of the original contract.
70This argument doesn’t hold if the bargaining game in renegotiation gives all the bargaining
power to A; see Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and Edlin and Hermalin (2000) for differing
views on the feasibility of (essentially) assigning the bargaining power to A ex ante. In
addition, it could be welfare improving for the law to adopt rules that prevent renegotiation
(Shavell, 2005); although, as noted in footnote 69 supra, technically this bargaining between
A and B is not renegotiation, but new negotiations following the expiration of the original
contract.
71When first-best efficiency is not attainable, Edlin and Hermalin (2000) show that a simple
sales contract is the second-best efficient contract. Because a simple sales contract can be
replicated by an option contract with a very high strike price, there is a sense in which the
optimal contract is always an option contract.
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subsection, were such signals to exist, then the circumstances in which this
distinction mattered would be even further circumscribed.
4.4 Legal doctrines addressing contractual incompleteness
Given the complexity of the foregoing theoretical discussion, it should not be
surprising that a significant portion of the law of contracts deals in one respect
or another with problems of interpretation. Such problems include: how to
determine whether the parties have entered into a contract, how to determine
the terms of any contract that is formed, and what to do if the contract does
not explicitly or implicitly cover the situation that has arisen ex post . It is not
feasible to review this entire body of doctrine here (for such reviews, see the
sources listed in §1.3.2), but we can survey the main regulatory strategies that
the law uses to deal with the economic problem of incomplete contracts. We
begin by discussing three major themes that pervade the law in this area—the
role of default terms, the dichotomy of form and substance, and the tension
between objective and subjective modes of interpretation—and then move to a
series of specific doctrinal rules that illustrate these themes in operation.
4.4.1 Contract interpretation generally
The function of default rules. In §2.1 above, we discussed the role played
by contractual default rules in regulating market failures. The primary function
of such rules, however, is to provide guidance for those interpreting contract
terms on which the parties do not otherwise clearly agree. For example, in an
ordinary sale of goods, the default rule is that the buyer must pay in cash at the
time of delivery; if the parties wish to provide for credit or some other medium
of payment, they must specify so in their agreement. Such default rules extend
to virtually all aspects of contractual agreements, including remedial terms such
as damages; and no legal system could operate without them.
The law and economics literature has taken three main approaches to the
question of how default terms should be set. These approaches should be un-
derstood as reflecting different means towards achieving the goal of an efficient
system for completing incomplete contracts, each of which is premised on a dif-
ferent assumption regarding what types of transaction costs are most empirically
common.
One approach, following the work of Goetz and Scott (1985), argues that
default rules should be chosen to provide terms that would minimize the cu-
mulative transaction costs incurred by parties contracting around them.72 In
the special case where all parties face similar contracting costs and it is equally
costly to contract around all terms, for instance, this implies terms that would
be favored by a majority. If, conversely, some terms are costlier to contract out
72This argument is typically presented in intuitive form, but it could easily be formalized
along the lines of §2.2.2 supra.
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of or into than others (for example, if it is harder for the parties to specify multi-
factor standards than simple rules), then other things being equal the default
should be set to the terms that are easiest for the parties to escape (Schwartz
and Scott, 2004). One might call this the transaction-cost-reducing approach to
default rules, with the caveat that the underlying concept of transaction costs
may be ambiguously defined.
A second approach recognizes that contracting costs will lead many parties
to stick with a default rule even if it is not the one they would have chosen.
Hence, this approach advocates choosing default terms for their substantive
efficiency. Such an approach is most appealing in settings where there are
substantial network externalities, adverse selection, or bounded rationality in
contracting, so that individual parties are reluctant to depart from familiar and
widely-used terms. For instance, Korobkin (1998a,b) presents evidence sug-
gesting that cognitive and social-psychological factors lead parties to retain de-
fault (or standardized) contract terms that they would be better off contracting
around; and Kahan and Klausner (1997) have argued that the network exter-
nalities are widespread in the corporate and business area due to the regular
use of standardized forms, the value of which depends on a population of users
who have invested in expertise in its application. This second approach might
be called the central-command approach to default rules.
A third approach, following Ayres and Gertner (1989, 1992), argues that
default rules should be used to encourage informationally advantaged parties
to reveal their types before contracting, even if this means choosing terms that
in equilibrium no one wants to use. They offer as an example the doctrine
of contra proferentem, under which ambiguous contract terms are interpreted
against the interest of the drafting party. Such an interpretation is unlikely
to be what the drafter intended, they argue, but it serves as an incentive for
the drafter to choose clear language that will convey to the counterparty the
meaning of relevant terms. Ayres and Gertner, and much of the literature that
follows, refer to such rules as penalty defaults, because they choose terms that
operate as penalty for nondisclosure; an alternative and perhaps more precise
terminology is to call this the information-forcing approach.
The concept of penalty default has been influential in the literature for its
lucid illustration of the value of screening and signaling models in the analysis of
contract law. Its general applicability in practice, however, is unclear from both
positive and normative perspectives. From a normative standpoint, information
forcing is only desirable under some circumstances; as we discuss in §3.3.3 and
§5.2.7, it may be necessary to allow parties to keep the fruits of their informa-
tional advantage in order to induce them to acquire information initially. And
even when it would be desirable to promote information revelation, a penalty
default rule will fail to provide sufficient incentives in this regard if the value
of the rents associated with informational advantage exceed the penalty. This
can be the case if the informed party lacks bargaining power in a situation of
bilateral monopoly (Johnston, 1990), if the information would reveal trade se-
crets valuable beyond the instant contract (Ben-Shahar and Bernstein, 2000),
or if the asymmetric information is multidimensional and revelation along one
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dimension would allow the recipient to draw inferences about another (Adler,
1999). From a positive standpoint, conversely, E. Posner (2005) has recently
argued that most actual legal rules do not fit the penalty default model, basing
his argument both on a survey of Ayres and Gertner’s original examples, and
on case law generally.
Form versus substance in contract interpretation. The key policy
question underlying contract interpretation is how thorough the interpretive
process should be; and this question is commonly articulated in terms of the di-
chotomy of form and substance. Specifically, many legal rules law have the effect
of privileging certain interpretive materials and discounting others. Such rules
are often termed formal or formalistic in that they confine attention to a subset
of materials that may or may not give rise to the same inferences as would the
universe of materials as a whole. A more substantive approach to contract inter-
pretation, in contrast, would attempt to come to a more all-things-considered
understanding, based on all of the materials reasonably available. For example,
under the common law, the parol evidence rule (though subject to many excep-
tions) provides that a written document that integrates the parties’ agreement
may not be contradicted or varied by evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral
understandings (E. Posner, 1998). In the absence of a writing, however, a party
may introduce and a court can consider any information it wishes in order to
determine the content of a contractual agreement.
From the economic viewpoint (Katz, 2004), the question of form versus sub-
stance can be assimilated to the problem of optimal information acquisition.
A fuller or broader context can always be purchased, but at a cost of time,
trouble, and interference with incentives, so it pays to stop at some optimal
point. The problem can be formalized as follows: let the decision rule D(·)
denote a function that maps from a set of facts to a legal outcome, for example,
an award of damages. A court’s ex post interpretation of the facts will depend
upon the information available to it, which we can denote by information set
I. (For example, a court that is aware of commercial trade usage will interpret
the words of a contract differently from one that is not.) This information set
depends on three potential sources: the information embedded by the parties in
the contract itself (denoted as I0), the information presented by the parties ex
post at trial (denoted as I1), and the information available to the court based
on its general knowledge and experience (Ia). The information introduced by
the parties in the contract or at trial is a variable that is either chosen in a
cooperative game to maximize their returns from contracting or litigation, or
the equilibrium outcome of a non-cooperative game in which they individually
decide what information to introduce. Introducing information is costly, but
the costs of ex post and ex ante information can interact, and more information
can help the court reach a more efficient decision.
Within this framework, a legal interpretation regime consists of a function
R(I0, I1, Ia) that specifies how the interpreting agent combines the three possi-
ble sources of information (for example, the most anti-formalist would be that
Hermalin, Katz, & Craswell Interpretation 85
the agent can consider all information available, in which case R would be the
union function). A more formal regime would restrict R by limiting the influ-
ence of certain categories of information; for example, under the parol evidence
rule, all information in I1 that was inconsistent with I0 would be thrown out.
Conversely, a regime that disfavored standardized contracts on the theory that
no one reads them would throw out any information in I0 that was inconsistent
with I1. The framework is quite general and can incorporate many types of
evidentiary systems; for instance, in a pure adversarial system, taking to an
extreme the practices of common-law regimes, the agent could not take account
of any information in Ia that was not confirmed by information introduced by
the parties in I1. (Of course, the rule will affect the content of the information
presented; if extrinsic information contradicting the written contract is ignored,
no one will want to incur resources to present it.)
Given this framework, the expected legal outcome aggregating over all in-
terpreting agents will be V = Ea
{
D
(
R(I0, I1, Ia)
)}
. The parties will choose
what information to embed in the contract, and to introduce at the time of
a dispute, in order to maximize their individual returns in this outcome, and
the lawmaker (who could be the parties themselves specifying in the contract
what interpretation rule they wish to be followed) will choose the function R
in order to maximize expected contractual surplus. From the standpoint of
the lawmaker, this is just a constrained principal-agent problem, the solution
of which depends on the particular costs associated with I0 and I1, and the
incentive properties of the decision rule D with regard to the primary behavior
governed by the contract (here suppressed in the notation, and assumed to oc-
cur at an intermediate stage between the writing of a contract and the potential
emergence of a dispute).
The considerations that determine the optimal approach to contract inter-
pretation are thus quite broad-ranging. The regime of contract interpretation
will influence contracting parties’ behavior in many respects: with regard to de-
cisions to breach, to take advance precautions, to mitigate damages, to gather
and communicate information, to allocate risk, to make reliance investments,
to behave opportunistically, and to spend resources in litigation, and so on.
Accordingly, it is difficult to draw strong general conclusions regarding how
interpretation should proceed.
If one is willing to make restrictive assumptions about the costs and benefits
of information acquisition, however, it is possible to reach more specific conclu-
sions. For instance, Schwartz and Scott (2004) develop a model in which parties
benefit when their contract terms are interpreted correctly on average, but are
relatively indifferent (due to risk-neutrality) to interpretive variance around the
mean. In this case it would be optimal for courts to make interpretations on a
minimum evidentiary base, because additional interpretative efforts are costly
but provide no incentive benefits from an ex ante perspective. Conversely,
Shavell (in press) assumes that ex ante contract-writing costs are positive and
that it is possible to write at least some interpretative rules so that they can be
applied costlessly (or more realistically, that the marginal cost of applying the
rule is zero given that the parties are going to court anyway). In this case, it
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will be optimal for the parties to leave at least some open contract terms to be
filled in ex post by courts, and if contract-writing costs are sufficiently high, for
courts actually to override the written terms in favor of another interpretation.
Obviously, such assumptions are special; in their absence, perhaps the best
that can be said is that private parties should be allowed the leeway to choose
their favored interpretative regime—a leeway not always recognized by the legal
system. For public lawmakers, who likely lack detailed contextual knowledge
about the costs and benefits of information, however, it is possible to offer some
general rules of thumb. For example, formal interpretation is more efficient,
other things being equal, when (1) ex ante negotiation costs are low relative to
renegotiation costs; (2) either the parties or the tribunal are likely to be biased
in interpreting the contract; (3) the chance of a dispute (or the ex post stakes
in the event of a dispute) are relatively high; (4) legal outcomes are relatively
sensitive to litigation expenditure; (5) specific investments must be undertaken
by persons distant from the transaction, or have value that is relatively context-
independent; (6) the parties have relatively good control over their contract-
drafting agents relative to their negotiating agents; and (7) the parties have
relatively good access to non-legal sanctions. In all these situations, the expected
costs of filling contractual gaps ex post are low relative to the costs of filling them
in ex ante so that it pays to undertake more effort in doing so gaps up front.
Conversely, when renegotiation costs are high, the extent of bias is significant,
and so on, the expected costs of ex post gap-filling are relatively low and it pays
to defer more of this effort until an interpretative dispute arises. The logic here
is analogous to Kaplow’s analyses of the choice between rules and standards
(1992) and the optimal complexity of rules (1995).
It follows from these heuristic principles that substantive interpretation is
relatively more valuable to small and infrequent traders, who are less well-placed
to undertake the fixed cost of detailed ex ante negotiation; who have relatively
poor access to reputational networks ex post ; who are likely to do their own
contract negotiating but to contract out when acquiring legal services; who are
less likely to be able to recover specific investments in substitute exchanges; and
who possibly are less likely to face bias in ex post judicial tribunals. Conversely,
large and experienced traders should prefer their contracts to be governed by
relatively formalistic rules of interpretation. This distinction is consistent with
casual empiricism—in general, it is experienced traders whom we observe con-
tracting into relatively formal enforcement regimes through devices such as ar-
bitration and forum selection clauses—and is also generally accepted in the case
law and commentary.
Objective versus subjective interpretation. The default rule concept
and the form-substance dichotomy both reflect the underlying problem of infor-
mation acquisition and transmission, but focus on different dimensions of this
problem. Specifically, the doctrines relating to form and substance are primarily
concerned with the relationship between the contracting parties and the ex post
interpreting tribunal; they govern the extent to which the burden of information
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acquisition is allocated between the parties and the tribunal, and they affect the
parties’ incentives to transmit information about contractual meaning to the tri-
bunal. Doctrines relating to default rules also implicate the relationship between
parties and tribunal (especially when viewed from the transaction-cost-reducing
approach of Goetz and Scott, 1985), but they additionally concern the contract-
ing parties’ informational relationship with each other (as emphasized by the
penalty-default approach of Ayres and Gertner). These two dimensions of infor-
mational incentives interact in a third major theme of the law of interpretative
doctrine: the tension between objective and subjective perspectives.
In this context, objective interpretation refers to the meaning that would
be recognized by a reasonable outside observer, while subjective interpretation
refers to the meaning as actually understood by the parties. For example, the
case of Lucy v. Zehmer involved a dispute over whether the parties had agreed
to the sale of the defendant’s farm when, after a night of drinking, they signed
a napkin that contained words of sale, referred to the farm, and stated a price.
The defendant claimed that he was joking when he signed the napkin, and
that the plaintiff either knew or should have known this. The plaintiff for his
part insisted that the deal was a serious one. In the end, the court sided with
the plaintiff, but rather than emphasizing the plaintiff’s state of mind as its
justification, it referred to publicly observable factors such as the duration of
the negotiations, the existence of previous negotiations between the parties, and
the reasonableness of the contract price.
In general, however, official doctrine does not give clear indication of when
objective meaning controls and when subjective meaning controls. The Second
Restatement of Contracts (1981), generally recognized as the most influential
modern summary of American doctrine in the area, states that subjective mean-
ing controls if the parties attach the same meaning to an agreement, or if the
parties attach different meanings to the agreement and one (and only one) of
them is or should be aware of the other’s understanding. (For instance, if the
drafter of a form knows that the form contains an unusual term and also knows
that the counterparty is unaware of the presence of the term, and the coun-
terparty is not otherwise charged with knowledge of the term, then the term is
not part of the contract.) On the other hand, more traditional authorities reject
these principles and insist that unreasonable meanings will not be enforced; and
the Restatement itself elsewhere provides that when the parties attach differ-
ent meanings to the agreement and there is no asymmetric information between
them, various objective factors will be used to determine the contract’s meaning.
The practical complexity of the doctrine arises from the fact that it is being
used to regulate information transmission both between the parties (i.e., the
problem of observability), and between the parties and the court (i.e., the prob-
lem of verifiability). For example, the Restatement’s rule that contracts are to
be interpreted according to the meaning of the asymmetrically uninformed party
plainly operates as a penalty default rule, and can be justified either as forc-
ing disclosure or as protecting the distributional interests of the uninformed.
And conversely, the rule that charges parties with knowledge of meanings of
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which they should be aware operates as an incentive for investigation.73 But
the objective-subjective distinction can also be understood in terms of the di-
chotomy of form and substance, in that an objective standard of interpretation
directs the interpreter to limit its attention to factors that would be accessible
to an objective observer, while a subjective interpretive standard directs the in-
terpreter also to consider factors that might be accessible only to the parties to
the contract. Thus, all the factors that bear on the optimal choice between for-
mal and substantive interpretation (for example, the difficulty of litigating the
parties’ states of mind ex post as opposed to a counterparty’s contrary meaning
ex ante or the likely variance of error when making such assessments also bear
on the choice between objective and subjective interpretation.
4.4.2 Specific interpretative doctrines
Parol evidence. In many cases, especially when substantial value is at stake,
parties will memorialize their agreement in the form of a final written document.
When they do, the intended effect with regard to pre-contractual communica-
tions can be ambiguous. For instance, suppose that, in oral negotiations, the
buyer requests a clarification with respect to some technical feature of the goods
and the seller provides clarification, but the final written document makes no
mention of the issue. Should we regard the clarified term as implicitly incor-
porated into the final writing, or should we instead regard it as a rejected offer
that the parties meant to exclude?
In common law systems, this question is addressed by a network of doctrines
that are collectively referred to as the parol evidence rule. Under this rule,
if the parties adopt a particular document as an authoritative statement of
their contract—or in doctrinal language, as an integrated agreement—then the
presumption is that they meant to reject all prior inconsistent communications.
As a procedural matter, furthermore, the rule operates to exclude all evidence
of antecedent understandings or negotiations that would vary or contradict the
words of the document.
The parol evidence rule is subject to a number of exceptions and counter-
doctrines (so much so that some commentators have suggested that it is mislead-
ing to refer to it as a rule); and the overall trend during the twentieth century
has been toward decreased stringency in its application (typically, by finding,
based on extrinsic evidence, that an apparently complete document was, despite
superficial appearances, not intended by the parties to be authoritative). More
recently, however, a number of commentators writing from an economically in-
fluenced perspective (e.g., Scott, 2000; Schwartz and Scott, 2004) have argued
for its re-invigoration.
Formal economic analysis of the rule, however, has been limited. Eric Posner
73Although, from a neoclassical economic perspective, it is unclear why it should be nec-
essary to provide (strengthen) such an incentive. Presumably, private incentives should be
sufficient (or even socially excessive) in this regard.
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(1998) models the rule as posing a trade-off between Type 1 error (enforcing
a term that is not part of the contract) and Type 2 error (failing to enforce
a term that is part of the contract), as well as between transaction costs ex
ante (e.g., contract-writing costs) and ex post (e.g., litigation costs). Posner’s
model should be understood as a special and more doctrinally detailed case of
the general analysis of form and substance discussed supra. On his analysis,
the rule makes little sense when courts process ex post information accurately
and cheaply; it is justified when courts have poor ability to process ex post
information and contract-writing costs are low. The implications for the more
problematic situation where both contracting and litigation costs are high, how-
ever, are unclear and must presumably await future empirical investigation.
It is worth noting that the parol evidence rule does not apply to post-
contractual communications, even though their use raises many of the same
costs and benefits as pre-contractual communications do. Instead, such com-
munications are analyzed using more flexible interpretative standards, and can
operate as modifications or as waivers of contractual duty even when made in-
formally.74 It is possible that timing issues relating to renegotiation, holdup,
and the increased value of ex post could justify this disparate treatment, but at
present this doctrinal distinction remains undertheorized from both legal and
economic viewpoints.
Trade usage and course of dealing. In contrast to the disfavored category
of parol evidence, other categories of material are given specially privileged
status when interpreting individual contracts. The most important of these is
trade usage, which refers to any practice of dealing that is sufficiently regular
and widespread in the relevant area or line of trade as to justify an expectation
that it will be observed in the particular case.75 For example, a contract for the
sale of two-by-four wooden planks will ordinarily be read to refer not to planks
that are literally two inches by four inches, but to the smaller 1 34 × 3 12 planks
that generally pass under that description in the lumber business; a buyer who
wants planks that are literally two by four must state so explicitly.
This doctrine can be justified in terms of both transaction cost reduction
and information forcing. From the viewpoint of transaction cost reduction, if
most contracting parties wish to follow a trade usage, it saves transactional re-
sources for interpreters to read it into all contracts, so that only those who wish
to disclaim it need undertake the extra costs of negotiating explicitly. From
the viewpoint of information forcing, to the extent that one party subjectively
intends to contract with regard to trade usage and the other does not, these
differing understandings may lead them to enter into an inefficient exchange.
Given that the trade usage is well evidenced and other usages are less so, re-
74In some settings (e.g., in sales contracts governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code) it is possible for the parties to exclude oral modifications by using an appropriate clause
in their original written contract, but it is not possible for them to exclude all possibility of
ex post waiver.
75Restatement (Second) of Contract §222, Uniform Commercial Code §1-205.
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quiring everyone to learn it offers a cheaper way of putting the parties on a
similar informational footing.76
Such justifications are only persuasive, however, if trade usages can be iden-
tified cheaply and reliably, and if parties who wish to opt out of standard usage
can do so at low cost. A number of recent commentators, however, have called
both these assumptions into question. With regard to the first of these assump-
tions, Bernstein (1996, 1999) suggests that in many instances trade usages—in
the sense of unwritten terms that are understood by the parties to impose actual
legal obligations—do not actually exist, and that in any event, courts cannot tell
the difference between behavior that evidences the existence of unwritten legal
entitlements and behavior that instead represents settlement in the shadow of
such entitlements. Also, Craswell (2000) has argued that courts often identify
(or purport to identify) the actual content of any contested custom by con-
sulting their own judgment, or the judgment of outside witnesses, about what
custom would be most efficient. With regard to the second assumption, various
commentators (e.g., Scott, 2002) have argued that although contracting around
trade usage is permissible under official doctrine, courts in practice imply so
heavy a presumption against it so as to make trade usage (or more properly,
what courts consider as trade usage) effectively mandatory.
The related doctrine of course of dealing, which refers to a sequence of con-
duct between the parties to an individual contract, raises similar problems.
Whether a pattern of bilateral behavior amounts to a legal understanding, how-
ever, is even more difficult to determine than with group behavior because such
patterns tend to be less well evidenced and because the participants may wish to
recharacterize their past behavior with an eye toward influencing the outcome
of a current dispute. In addition, as Ben-Shahar (1999) has argued, allowing
course of dealing to influence the interpretation of future contracts can lead par-
ties to be excessively rigid when demanding contractual performance, for fear
that greater flexibility will prejudice their future rights.
Such functional problems can be understood as stemming from the basic
problem of contractual incompleteness, with the extra twist that it is not just
the individual contract terms that are unverifiable, but also the alleged trade
usage or course of dealing. Accordingly, whether courts should read trade usage
and course of dealing into contracts as a default rule, or whether parties should
make greater efforts to disclaim such a reading, remain open questions.
Change of circumstance. The doctrines of trade usage and course of deal-
ing are used to fill out incomplete contracts in routine circumstances. In con-
trast, another set of doctrines are used to imply missing terms in unusual
circumstances—specifically, when unforeseen events intervene to reduce sub-
stantially one or both parties’ gains from trade under the original contract. For
example, in Taylor v. Caldwell, a landlord whose building was destroyed in a
fire was excused from liability to a promoter who had leased the premises for
76See Hermalin (2001) for a brief survey of research on the efficiency gains to be had from
terminological conventions.
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a theatrical event, even though the lease contract contained no explicit excuse
of this sort; and in Krell v. Henry, a royalist socialite who had leased, at in-
flated short-term rates, a flat overlooking a public square in which the incoming
British king was to be crowned was excused from the obligation to pay rent
after the coronation was postponed due to the king’s emergency appendectomy.
When this principle is used to excuse a producer or seller, it is often referred
to as the doctrine of impossibility, although this term is a misnomer in that
(1) the doctrine is often applied to situations in which it is highly burdensome
but not impossible for the seller to perform, and (2) even if performance is not
physically possible, the payment of damages is. Other labels include impracti-
cability, commercial impracticability, and (especially when the buyer is excused,
as in Krell v. Henry) frustration of purpose.
An analogous principle is sometimes used to excuse parties from complying
with conditions that turn out to be unexpectedly burdensome, so long as the ex-
cuse does not unduly disadvantage the counterparty. (For example, a condition
in an insurance contract requiring all claims to be made within two weeks of
the occurrence of a casualty would typically be excused if the delay was caused
by the insured party’s being incapacitated in the underlying accident.) Finally,
as indicated in §1.3.2 above, parties are sometimes excused from liability under
the doctrine of mistake when they contract without the benefit of information
that, once revealed, substantially alters the contract’s efficiency or distribution
of surplus. As observed above, from an information-theoretic perspective this
situation is functionally equivalent to the case of ex post changed circumstances.
Economically influenced commentators have most commonly justified such
doctrines on transaction-cost-reduction grounds. Specifically, Posner and Rosen-
field (1977) suggest that, insofar as the doctrines apply only to excuse a party
who neither has hidden information nor takes a hidden action with regard to
the excusing event, they mimic the risk allocation terms that would most likely
be provided in a complete contingent contract. (For instance, in Taylor v. Cald-
well, given that the theater owner had already suffered the loss of a building,
he was unlikely to be the least-cost insurer of the promoter’s losses, at least in
the absence of any specific facts evidencing moral hazard or adverse selection.)
The changed-circumstances doctrines can also be understood as special ap-
plications of the penalty-default and form-versus-substance frameworks outlined
above. From a penalty default perspective, a contingency that could reasonably
have been anticipated ex ante by one of the parties should not count as an
excuse, because denying the excuse will encourage the informed party to bring
the issue into the contractual negotiation. Conversely, from a form-substance
perspective, contingencies that are easier to specify and ascertain ex post either
because information is better after the fact or because their probability is too
low to warrant up-front attention, are appropriately left off to be dealt with by
a court in the unlikely event that they arise.
It should be noted that the changed-circumstance doctrines can also be
understood as special applications of the theory of optimal contract remedies
along the lines of the discussion in §5 below. For instance, White (1988) points
out that excusing a party for changed circumstances has consequences not just
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for risk allocation, but also for various countervailing considerations such as
incentives for precaution and relational investment. She argues that it is only
in rare cases that zero damages are second best, and accordingly that changed-
circumstance cases should be treated like any other contractual breach. On the
other hand, once the costs of legal enforcement are taken into account, excuse
from liability may be warranted as a litigation-saving device to be applied in
extreme situations where it is sufficiently clear that the contract should not be
performed and that breach is not due to any failure of precaution or disclosure
(in the same way that negligence liability in tort saves administrative costs by
requiring litigation only in case of a breach of duty).
Standardized contracts. Most contracting parties do not negotiate indi-
vidual contracts for each occasion on which they enter into exchange; instead
they use standardized forms that incorporate customary or boilerplate terms,
and negotiate only over those few terms (such as price and quantity) that are
essential for their transactional purposes. From an economic viewpoint, such
behavior is a straightforward response to scale economies in the production of
contractual terms. In legal circles, however, standardized contracts are regarded
with more ambivalence. While most legal commentators accept that such con-
tracts are a practical necessity, many continue to regard them as problematic
on grounds of autonomy (because most people do not read or understand other
parties’ standard forms and hence cannot knowingly assent to their terms) or
distributive justice (because the party who drafts the form is deemed to hold
an inequitable degree of bargaining power).
At an abstract level, standardized contracts are interpreted using the same
methods as contracts more generally. For instance, if the drafting party knows
that a particular term in the contract is unusual, that the non-drafting party
is unaware of the term, and that the non-drafting party would not enter into
the contract if aware of the term, then the term is not part of the contract; as
observed in the discussion of objective versus subjective interpretation above,
this result follows from ordinary principles regarding subjective interpretation.
At a practical level, however, most lawyers understand form contracts to consti-
tute a special category subject to specialized rules of interpretation, such as the
doctrine that contracts are to be construed against the interests of the drafter.
Conventional legal wisdom holds that form-contract terms are less likely to be
enforced than individually negotiated terms, especially when they are unusual
or thought to be especially burdensome to the non-drafting party.
There is relatively less reason to be concerned about standard terms on
market power grounds, notwithstanding many legal commentators focus on this
issue. Because standardization lowers the per-unit cost of contracting, both
competitive firms and those with market power will find it of value. While firms
with market power might distort non-price terms from the efficient level, the
direction of distortion is a priori ambiguous (Spence, 1975). If all consumers
have the same willingness to pay for contractual terms, a monopolist will do
best to provide optimal terms and to extract available profits through a high
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price; and if consumers differ in their willingness to pay for contractual terms,
super-optimal terms are as likely as suboptimal ones. While oligopolists could
use standard forms to collude on non-price terms, it is similarly unclear in
which direction their incentives cut. Accordingly, to the extent standard form
contracts raise competition concerns, these are best policed by antitrust law,
rather than by common-law courts applying the law of contract.
Standard form contracts do raise informational concerns, however, since they
can vary substantially in their terms and the drafting party knows much more
about the terms than does the non-drafting party. If contract reading is costly,
parties may rationally assume that a particular contract contains the average
terms available on the market, with the result being adverse selection along
the lines of Akerlof’s market for lemons (see also the discussion in §2.3.4). In
addition, as Katz (1990b) has shown, if contract reading is a relation-specific in-
vestment (as it will be if different drafters offer different terms), drafters will be
tempted to expropriate this investment by choosing terms that are just favorable
enough for the non-drafter to accept after having read them, thus undermining
any incentive to read. Interpretative rules that make it harder for drafters to
enforce unusual standard terms without calling them to the other party’s atten-
tion, such as the doctrine of contra proferentem or the rules requiring warranty
disclaimers to be conspicuous, help to address this informational asymmetry,
by putting the burden of communication on the party who can undertake it
most cheaply. Such rules provide perhaps the clearest illustration of the penalty
default approach discussed above.
Implied duty of good faith. Finally, most modern-day courts will require
the parties to a contract to exercise good faith in the performance and enforce-
ment of their contractual duties. Commentators disagree on exactly what this
obligation requires, but as a general matter it prohibits opportunistic actions
that, while complying with the bare letter of the contract, depart from it in
spirit by operating to deprive a counterparty of the reasonably expected ben-
efit of its bargain. For example, it has been held a breach of good faith for
a buyer of goods to seize on an otherwise trivial defect in delivery in order to
escape an unfavorable contract in a falling market, for an employer to exercise
its termination rights on an at-will labor contract just before the employee’s
accumulated sales commissions were due to be paid, or for a realty purchaser to
prevent his seller-broker from acquiring the property to be delivered under the
contract (and thus forcing the seller into breach) by showing up at an initial
land auction and outbidding him.
In theory, the parties could guard against opportunistic exercises of discre-
tion by providing specific limits in their original contract. For all the reasons
discussed above in §4.2, however, they often do not do so, leaving courts with a
disagreeable choice between imposing additional ex post limits on an ad hoc ba-
sis, and countenancing an unanticipated and perhaps unfair result. Traditional
common-law courts often responded to this dilemma by refusing to enforce such
agreements entirely, on the theory that such agreements were so one-sided as to
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lack formal consideration. Modern courts, in contrast, are more willing to treat
such contracts as genuine bargains, and to police party opportunism directly
and substantively after the fact. As our earlier discussion of form versus sub-
stance indicated, such an approach could serve the parties’ economic interest if
the courts’ costs and error rate in filling contractual gaps ex post are sufficiently
low, or if the parties’ costs of dealing with them ex ante are sufficiently high.
Whether the duty of good faith is best viewed as a rule of interpretation, or
alternatively as a limitation on contractual freedom, has not always been clear
from the case law or commentary. The fact that the scope of the duty depends
on other terms of the agreement, as well as on the overall commercial context,
suggest that it is an interpretative rule; but the fact that the parties are not
permitted to disclaim it (though they are permitted to stipulate its content so
long as they do not do so in a “manifestly unreasonable” way) suggests that
it is a regulatory intervention. The uncertainty is reinforced by the murky
boundaries of the duty, which in limiting cases appears to shade into other
mandatory doctrines such as unconscionability and public policy.
What counts as opportunistic behavior, however, typically lies in the eye of
the beholder, and critics of the modern duty of good faith (e.g., Schwartz, 1992;
Bernstein, 1999; Scott, 2000) argue that the behavior that it seeks to induce
is typically unverifiable, and thus not effectively subject to judicial oversight.
Courts’ attempts to enforce good faith, accordingly, are as likely to depart from
contractual expectations as to enforce them, in the end just resulting in an
increase in the cost of litigation and in the variance of judicial outcomes. On
this view, enforcement of such “soft” contractual expectations should be left to
private enforcement mechanisms such as reputation and repeat dealing. For the
most part, however, the courts have not yet accepted this critique.
4.5 Overall assessment of the law of contract interpreta-
tion
In general, the economics of contract interpretation is a relatively unmined field
compared to the economic analysis of contract law generally. While the general
contours of legal understanding in this area are more or less consonant with the
main insights of the economic theory of contract, the rapid and recent develop-
ment of the economic literature has not yet been matched by a corresponding
growth in legal scholarship. It is likely, accordingly, that this set of topics will
draw increasing attention from law and economics scholars in upcoming years.
5 Enforcement of contracts
As we observed at the outset of this chapter, the rationale for contracting is
to lock in a commitment ex ante that one or both parties would otherwise not
wish to honor ex post . The use of a contract to establish such commitment is
undermined, of course, if the contract will not be enforced in the way the parties
anticipate.
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The enforcement of contracts is often the province of courts, who impose
sanctions on parties who violate or breach a contractual obligation. As we
discuss below, contracts can also be enforced by the parties themselves, through
the use of various self-help remedies. We begin, however, with a discussion
of judicial enforcement, partly because this has been the focus of most of the
existing literature, and partly because an understanding of judicial enforcement
is useful in order to understand when and why private enforcement might be
more attractive.
5.1 General issues in enforcement
5.1.1 Remedies and contractual incompleteness
In one sense, every legal dispute is about remedies. Even when a court rules
that no contract was ever formed, that ruling can be seen as saying that the
complaining party is not entitled to any remedy for breach of contract. More-
over, such a ruling might still entitle the parties to some other legal remedy—for
example, in some circumstances, one or both might be required to return any
advance payments that had been made. From an economic standpoint, what
ultimately matters is not the doctrinal question, “was a valid contract formed?”
but rather the remedial question, “how much money can I now collect?” (or
“how much money will I now be required to pay?”)
In another sense, though, the identification of certain actions as a breach of
contract, and the identification of certain payments as remedies, is an artifact
of contractual incompleteness. After all, in a hypothetical complete contract,
the contract itself would specify the payments and other actions that would be
required in every possible state of the world. With such a contract in place,
there would be no reason to label some actions in some states of the world as
complying with the contract, while labeling other actions in other states as non-
complying or breaching. There would also be no reason to label some (but not
all) of the associated payoffs as “remedies for breach.”
As discussed in §4.2 above, however, complete contingent contracts are rarely
observed in the real world. In particular, real contracts are often incomplete
in two ways that are relevant here. First, rather than specifying every possible
action that a party might take, they may specify only those actions by each party
that will suffice to comply with the contract—for example, “seller to deliver fifty
widgets by July 1; buyer to pay $1,000 by July 10.” Second, they may fail to
specify the steps that should be taken if either party fails to take a complying
action—for example, if the seller delivers only forty widgets, or delivers them
on July 15; or if the buyer refuses to pay.
Parties sometimes do provide explicit terms that specify the remedy for some
forms of noncompliance; these terms are known as “liquidated damage clauses”
and they will be discussed in §5.3.4. In other cases, however, where the parties’
contract fails to specify the consequences of noncompliance, the legal system will
supply a default remedy, just as it supplies default rules for other questions that
a contract might not address (see §4.4). As most of the literature has focused
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on these default legal remedies, that is where we begin.
5.1.2 Overview of default remedies
In some cases, parties who fail to comply with their contracts may be ordered
by courts to perform—in legal terms, specific performance (see §5.3.3 below),
with the order backed up by threats of more severe sanctions for contempt of
court. In most cases, though, the default remedy for breach has the breaching
party pay money to the aggrieved party.
Following Fuller and Perdue (1936, 1937), it has become customary to iden-
tify the most common remedies as expectation damages, reliance damages, or
restitution damages. Expectation damages attempt to put the injured party in
as good a position as he would have been in if the contract had been performed.
For example, if a buyer contracts to pay a price p for a good that has a gross
value of v to him, but whose value can be realized only if the buyer spends r to
make use of the good, full performance of the contract would leave the buyer
with a net value of v− r− p. If the seller then breaches the contract, by failing
to deliver the good, expectation damages would require the seller to pay enough
to leave the buyer in that same net position: v−r−p. For example, if the buyer
had already spent both p and r, expectation damages would require a payment
of v.
By contrast, reliance damages require the seller to pay only enough to leave
the buyer with the level of utility he would have enjoyed if the contract had not
been signed. For example, if the buyer in this case would have had a net gain of
zero had he not signed this contract, reliance damages would require the seller
to pay enough to bring the buyer back to that position. So, for example, if the
buyer had already spent both p and r, reliance damages would then equal p+ r,
enough to bring the buyer back to zero.
Another standard remedy, restitution, allows both parties to recover the
reasonable value of whatever they gave to the other party. In this example,
restitution would allow the buyer to recover damages of p.
As this example shows, these three remedies can often be ranked by size,
with expectation damages usually providing the largest remedy and restitution
giving the smallest. (We may assume v > p + r because otherwise the buyer
would not sign the contract.) Similarly, reliance usually exceeds restitution,
because the buyer’s reliance typically provides little benefit to the seller. Of
these three remedies, expectation damages are conventionally regarded as the
predominant measure in both theory and practice, with reliance and restitution
reserved for cases in which there is some defect in the bargain or in the plaintiff’s
ability to prove it, or when equitable considerations justify a departure from the
ordinary rule. In practice, however, this generality does not always hold, due
to measurement difficulties and to other aspects of the legal rules governing the
availability of each remedy.
For example, expectation damages entitle a plaintiff to compensation for
profits that would have been earned on the breached contract, but calculating
hypothetical revenues and expenses on a cancelled project is often a speculative
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endeavor. Accordingly, courts often presume that the future profits to be earned
on the contract approximate the costs so far incurred, thus using reliance dam-
ages as a proxy for expectation damages. Conversely, reliance damages should
in principle compensate a plaintiff for the loss of forgone alternatives, but such
opportunity costs are often difficult to verify ex post . As a result, courts often
presume that the forgone opportunity would have yielded the same profits as
the breached contract—in which case expectation serves as a proxy for reliance.
Similarly, it is often difficult to verify the value of restitution, especially when
it takes the form of services not traded on any market. Thus, courts sometimes
measure restitution in terms of the reliance costs incurred by the non-breacher,
though their willingness to do so may depend on their perceptions of relative
fault. There are even situations in which the non-breacher is permitted to
choose among expectation and restitution, or among expectation and reliance;
obviously, in those cases the more generous remedy will be chosen.
In addition, as we discuss below, each of these remedies can be modified or
adjusted in various ways: for example, if the victim could have prevented some
or all of the losses by appropriate mitigating behavior. As we also discuss below,
there are a few additional remedies that are occasionally imposed following a
contract breach, including punitive damages in rare cases.
In part for these reasons, it is often more helpful to think of a monetary
damage remedy as a continuous choice variable d, whose value can in principle
be set by the legal system to any level. In some cases, the damages awarded may
more appropriately be written d(x), where x is a vector representing any number
of actions taken by one or both of the parties. Put less formally, remedies for
breach can affect the parties’ incentives both indirectly, just by threatening a
party with having to pay some amount d in certain states of the world; and more
directly, by conditioning the size of d on some particular behavior x that the law
seeks to influence. In general, though, damage awards that are conditioned on
particular actions will often be more difficult for courts to implement, depending
on the ease with which those actions can be verified by courts.
5.2 Monetary damages for breach of contract
We now turn to the effects of monetary remedies of various sizes and descrip-
tions. Obviously, larger monetary remedies increase the non-breacher’s payoff
(and reduce the breacher’s payoff) in the event of a breach, while smaller reme-
dies produce the opposite effect. However, this effect by itself is merely distrib-
utional, and will not by itself change the transaction’s expected value. As long
as both parties correctly estimate the probability of a breach, the prospect of
liability for higher (or lower) damages can be offset by charging a higher (or
lower) price, leaving both parties with the same expected return.
Instead, changes in the expected value of the transaction must come from
some other cause. For example, if one or both parties are risk averse, there
can be welfare gains from shifting more of the variance in payoffs to the less
risk-averse party. We discuss this possibility in §5.2.9 below.
More important, in most cases the expected value of the transaction depends
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in part on various actions the parties might take to increase (or reduce) that
value. Moreover, the remedy for breach will usually affect the parties’ incentive
to take these actions—for example, their incentive to perform the contract rather
than breaching, or to take precautions against contingencies that might lead
them to breach, or to make transaction-specific investments whose value will be
lost if there is a breach. Each of these incentive effects is discussed below.
5.2.1 The breacher’s decision to perform or breach
Suppose that a seller must decide whether to perform a contract, at a cost c,
when performance will confer on the buyer a value v. Total welfare is maximized
if the seller performs when and only when v ≥ c. Otherwise, it would be more
efficient for the seller not to perform, an outcome often referred to as “efficient
breach.”77
To be sure, if v and c are known at the time of contracting, the parties would
have no reason to contract unless v exceeded c. In many situations, however,
c or v (or both) are stochastic variables whose values will not be realized until
just before performance is to take place, long after the contract was signed.
Accordingly, one problem of interest is to design remedial rules that will give
the seller an incentive to perform the contract if and only if v ≥ c.
As the earliest contributions to this literature recognized, a remedy of ex-
pectation damages creates exactly this incentive, as long as those damages are
accurately measured.78 As defined above, expectation damages force the seller
to internalize whatever losses the buyer suffers from the seller’s breach. Con-
sequently, the seller has an incentive to breach only if her gains from breach
exceed both parties’ losses. (A symmetric analysis, which we omit here for the
sake of brevity, could be applied to the buyer’s incentives to perform or breach.)
Before turning to other relevant incentives, four points should be made con-
cerning even this simple result. First, while the expectation remedy forces the
seller to internalize the buyer’s losses from breach, it does not necessarily give
the seller any incentive to consider effects that her performance or breach might
have on third parties. As with most of the literature, we restrict attention to
cases where third-party effects are absent (but see §2.3.1 and §5.3.4).
Second, like any other remedy, expectation damages will affect the seller’s
incentives only to the extent that the seller actually expects to pay those dam-
ages. If, instead, there is a significant chance that the seller could escape having
to pay, the seller’s incentives would be correspondingly reduced. As we discuss
77The term “efficient breach,” though widespread in the literature, is somewhat of a mis-
nomer, and has had the unfortunate effect of leading legal scholars untrained in economics
to suppose that there is a tradeoff in this regard between efficiency and the deontological
value of promise-keeping. From the perspective of a hypothetical complete contract, calling
off performance when v < c (possibly combined with some side payment) is precisely what
the parties would have wished to specify, so a legal default rule that results in that outcome
is better understood as promoting the parties’ promissory intentions than subverting them.
The term “efficient implied cancellation option” would be more accurate, if less arresting.
78See Birmingham (1970) and Barton (1972). The first formal model is Shavell (1980).
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below (§5.4), the costs and other difficulties of pursuing a lawsuit may sometimes
make this legal remedy less effective.
Third, if courts instead award some higher or lower measure of damages—
or, equivalently, if they attempt to award expectation damages but predictably
err in measuring those damages—the seller’s incentives to breach will be al-
tered. If courts tend to award damages that are higher than the true measure
of expectation damages, the seller will have an even stronger incentive to avoid
breaching: too strong an incentive, relative to the “efficient breach” condition
described above. If courts instead tend to award lower damage measures, as is
widely believed to be the case, the seller will have a weaker incentive to avoid
breaching. The possibility of judicial error is particularly likely if some or all of
the buyer’s benefits from performance are either unobservable or nonverifiable
(see §4.2 above).
Indeed, if courts instead could observe every relevant variable without error,
it would be trivial to create efficient performance incentives simply by having
the courts evaluate the efficiency of every breach ex post . If the court decided
that a breach was efficient, the breacher could be excused from any remedy (or
even rewarded with a bonus), while if the court decided a breach was inefficient,
the breacher could be hit with huge sanctions. Viewed from this standpoint, the
potential benefit of using expectation damages to create efficient incentives for
performance or breach is that this remedy does not require courts to be able to
evaluate the efficiency of any particular breach. The expectation remedy does,
however, require courts to be able to calculate the amount the buyer would have
gained from performance. How often courts are able to make such calculations
is a matter of some dispute.
Fourth, and most important, the incentives to perform or breach may not
even matter as long as the parties can renegotiate after the values of v and c
have been realized. If this ex post renegotiation is possible, then—regardless
of the legal remedy for breach—there should always be an agreement that will
maximize both parties’ gains by performing the contract if but only if perfor-
mance is efficient (Shavell, 1980). To be sure, renegotiation may entail positive
transaction costs, but most legal remedies (including expectation damages) also
entail positive transaction costs. While some of the early literature attempted to
identify the legal remedy that would satisfy the “efficient breach” condition with
the lowest possible transaction costs,79 empirical evidence on actual transaction
costs is largely nonexistent, and that literature is best described as inconclusive.
As discussed earlier, the possibility of ex post renegotiation also plays an
important role in the literature on incomplete contracts (see §4.2.6 supra). This
similarity should not be surprising—for as noted earlier—remedies for breach
are really just one aspect of contractual incompleteness. As we discuss below,
the possibility of ex post renegotiation also complicates the economic analysis
of other incentives created by legal remedies.
79See, e.g., Schwartz (1979), Macneil (1982), and Bishop (1985).
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5.2.2 The breacher’s decision to take precautions
When the seller’s costs c are stochastic, the distribution from which c is drawn
might be given by nature, entirely independent of any action by the seller. More
commonly, though, that distribution is itself a function of the seller’s investment
in the transaction. For example, a seller’s costs might depend in part on how
often her assembly line malfunctions; and the probability of such a malfunction
might depend on how much the seller spent on maintenance. Typically, the seller
must choose her expenditure on maintenance at one point in time; only then,
after that expenditure has been made, the actual value of c will be realized.
Expenditures such as these are often referred to as “precautions” (see gen-
erally Cooter, 1985). The optimal expenditure on precautions can be defined
straightforwardly in terms of (a) the cost of each possible precaution, and (b)
its marginal effect on the distribution from which c is drawn, together with the
welfare associated with each possible realization of c, taking account of the fact
that some of those realizations will result in the contract being performed, while
other realizations will result in the contract being breached. Given the usual
assumption of diminishing marginal returns, there will be a unique expenditure
on precautions that maximizes the total expected value of the transaction.
Interestingly, expectation damages (if measured accurately) can give sellers
an incentive to choose this optimal expenditure on precautions (Kornhauser,
1983). As discussed above, expectation damages force the seller to internalize
all of the buyer’s losses from any realizations of c that result in a breach. As a
consequence, expectation damages can in principle optimize both of the incen-
tives discussed so far: (a) by giving the seller an incentive to choose the optimal
expenditure on precautions; and (b) once the actual value of c is realized, by
giving the seller an incentive to choose between performing and breaking the
contract. Again, any remedies that are systematically less than expectation
damages—whether by design, or because of measurement error—should reduce
both of these incentives, while any remedies that systematically exceed expec-
tation damages should increase both incentives.
To be sure, if courts could observe the seller’s actual expenditures on pre-
cautions, and if they could also observe all the factors necessary to calculate the
optimal expenditure, there would then be other ways to give sellers an incentive
to choose the optimal level. For example, courts could excuse from liability any
seller whose precautions were optimal, in much the same way that negligence
standards in tort law excuse defendants whose precautions were optimal. Al-
ternatively, if the contracting parties could specify in their contract the optimal
expenditure on precautions, that requirement could itself be enforced by a court,
as long as the court could verify the seller’s actual expenditure. Thus, just as
in the case of incentives for performance (§5.2.1), the case for using expectation
damages to optimize a seller’s incentives to take precautions rests in part on the
assumption that it is easier for courts to observe only those factors necessary for
the calculation of expectation damages (i.e., only those factors that go to the
value that the buyer would have received if the contract had been performed)
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than it is for courts to observe any of these other factors.80
Alternatively, if buyers can observe a seller’s precautions (before contract-
ing), competition among sellers could give them a market incentive to choose
the optimal expenditure on precautions (Kornhauser, 1983). Even if sellers do
not choose their precautions until after contracting, optimal market incentives
could be possible if buyers can observe sellers’ reputation for taking precaution.
In §5.4 below, we consider reputations and competitive markets in connection
with enforcement by means other than legal remedies.
5.2.3 The non-breacher’s reliance decision
The value the buyer places on performance by the seller is often a function
of the buyer’s investment in the transaction. For example, a business that is
buying a new machine may get more value from that machine if it spends money
training its employees to use it. Expenditures such as these are often referred
to as reliance on the contract.
By definition, reliance expenditures are at least partially transaction-speci-
fic—for example, training designed for one particular machine may be worth-
less if that machine is not delivered. Although there can often be varying de-
grees of performance, for concreteness assume that there are only two discrete
possibilities—either the contract is performed, or it is breached. Let v(r) rep-
resent the value that the buyer will receive from performance conditional on
his reliance investment r, while w(r) represents his value if the contract is not
performed. If performance of the contract is certain, the optimal reliance ex-
penditure is simply the value that maximizes v(r)− r. In the more usual case,
where the contract should be performed in some states of the world only, the
optimal reliance expenditure is the value that maximizes
qv(r) + (1− q)w(r)− r , (9)
where q is the probability that contract should be performed (here taken to
be independent of r; e.g., with probability 1 − q some “act of God” makes
performance prohibitively expensive for the seller).
The remedy of expectation damages (d = v(r) − w(r) − p, in this exam-
ple) will generally not give the buyer the right incentive to choose the optimal
value of r. Expectation damages are a “full insurance” remedy that gives the
buyer the same net return in every state of the world; that is, the buyer’s
net return is v(r) − p under performance and d + w(r) = v(r) − p under non-
performance. Unless v′(r∗) = w′(r∗), where r∗ maximizes expression (9), the
buyer will choose a non-optimal level of reliance. If one assumes, as is often
true, that the marginal return from reliance investment is greater given perfor-
mance than non-performance (i.e., v′(r) > w′(r)), then buyers have excessive
incentives to rely under expectation damages.
Reliance damages (d = r − w(r), in this example) also will fail to provide
the buyer the proper incentives. If v′(r) > w′(r), then w′(r∗) < 1; in this case,
80For a discussion of this aspect of expectation damages, see Cooter (1985).
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reliance damages will encourage the buyer to rely excessively because increased
expenditures on r will increase the damages they can collect.
More generally, the probability q is endogenous insofar as the level of dam-
ages (either expectation or reliance) affects the probability that the contract will
in fact be performed (see §5.2.1 and §5.2.2). Even with an endogenous q, how-
ever, neither reliance nor expectation damages will generally provide the proper
incentives. To see this, observe that the first-best solution requires performance
whenever v(r)− c ≥ w(r) and, therefore, that investments maximize
∫ v(r)−w(r)
0
(
v(r)− c)f(c|s)dc + ∫ ∞
v(r)−w(r)
w(r)f(c|s)dc− r − s , (10)
where s is the seller’s investment in precaution and f(c|s) is the density of
cost given such investment. To replicate the first-best solution with regard
to whether the seller performs, it must be that p − c ≥ −d if and only if
v(r) − c ≥ w(r); hence, d = v(r) − w(r) − p, which accords with expectation
damages, but not reliance damages. However, as we saw above, expectation
damages causes the buyer to face the maximization problem v(r)−r with respect
to his choice of reliance. As discussed, the r that solves the buyer’s problem
will differ from the r that maximizes social surplus (i.e., expression (10)).81
If and only if ex post renegotiation is impossible, a remedy of no damages at
all—i.e., a regime of no liability for breach—can optimize the buyer’s reliance
incentives in a second-best sense (given the probability of performance), because
such a regime forces the buyer to bear all of the downside as well as all of
the upside of any reliance expenditure (Shavell, 1980). To be sure, such a
remedy does little to optimize the seller’s incentives, as discussed earlier in
§5.2.1 and §5.2.2. But if the breach probability (i.e., q above) is exogenous or
the seller’s incentives can be optimized independently (e.g., through market-
reputation effects), a zero-damage remedy could be optimal. This is not wholly
surprising, as this forces the buyer to face the social planner’s problem as given
by (9) above.
Mathematically, zero is just a constant and, more generally, any constant-
damage measure—that is, any measure whose value does not change with the
buyer’s level of reliance—will also optimize the buyer’s reliance incentives (for
any given probability of performance), as long as ex post renegotiation is still
impossible.82 Under a constant-damage measure, the buyer will still capture all
of the marginal benefits, and bear all of the marginal costs, of higher or lower re-
liance expenditures. Moreover, a constant-damage measure could also optimize
the seller’s incentives, if the constant is set equal to the value that performance
would have to a buyer who in fact relied optimally: d = v(r∗) − w(r∗) − p, in
this example. In addition to optimizing the buyer’s reliance expenditures, this
81See Shavell (1980) for greater details. Consider also Shavell (1984), Kornhauser (1983),
and Rogerson (1984).
82Shavell (1980) considers a model in which restitution is a constant-damage measure.
Hermalin, Katz, & Craswell Enforcement 103
will also give the seller optimal incentives, both to perform or breach and to
choose an optimal level of precautions.83
However, as noted, this result holds only when ex post renegotiation is im-
possible. When renegotiation is possible, reliance by the buyer can have the
additional effect of altering the terms likely to be reached in any renegotiation,
thus further distorting the buyer’s reliance incentives (recall the discussion of
holdup above in §4.3.2). Under certain conditions, holdup concerns may bias
the buyer’s incentives toward choosing too little reliance (Rogerson, 1984).
Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) show that, in some circumstances, the parties
may be able to choose contract terms that balance the risk of holdup against
the risk of moral hazard, thus implementing a first-best solution (recall, too, the
discussion in §4.3.2). For example, suppose the parties enter into a fixed-price
contract in which they can freely adjust the quantity term, and again, suppose
that the buyer must rely before he knows whether the seller will perform. If
the contract quantity is set at zero (i.e., if there is no enforceable contract at
all), the buyer will under-rely because part of the value created by reliance will
be expropriated through ex post holdup. On the other hand, if the contract
quantity is set at the level Q∗ that the buyer wishes to purchase, he will be
fully insured against non-performance, and will over-rely. By continuity, there
exists some contract quantity Qˆ ∈ (0, Q∗) that will provide optimal reliance
incentives. In the event that the seller can perform, the parties can then make
up the difference between Qˆ and Q∗ ex post , entering into a spot transaction
for an additional amount Q∗ − Qˆ.
Alternatively, buyers’ reliance incentives can always be optimized if courts
are capable of evaluating directly the efficiency of any reliance expenditure.
If courts can evaluate reliance expenditures directly, then it is easy to create
optimal incentives simply by rewarding any buyer that relies optimally or by
penalizing any buyer who fails to rely optimally. Indeed, there are various
legal doctrines that might be interpreted as having this effect by, for exam-
ple, awarding damages only for “reasonable” reliance expenditures (Goetz and
Scott, 1980), or by calculating recovery based on the reliance that would have
been “reasonably foreseeable” (Cooter, 1985). Obviously, the effect of any such
mechanisms depends on how courts define a “reasonable” (or “reasonably fore-
seeable”) level of reliance. This, in turn, depends heavily on the verifiability of
the factors that define the optimal level of reliance (the v(·) and w(·) functions,
in the model sketched here).
Of course, if the parties themselves can write a complete contract, reasonable
expenditures on reliance could be spelled out in the contract itself. As noted
earlier, though, this much contractual completeness is sometimes difficult or
impossible. Alternatively, if parties can acquire reputations for relying optimally
(or for relying excessively), then the competitive advantages of such a reputation
could also induce the parties to make optimal reliance investments. We defer
discussion of these possibilities to the section on non-legal enforcement (§5.4).
83See Cooter (1985) and Cooter and Eisenberg (1985).
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5.2.4 The non-breacher’s precautions
A closely-related issue concerns precautions that the buyer may be able to take
to reduce the loss he will suffer if the seller breaches. For example, if there is
a significant chance that the seller may not deliver the machines she promised,
it might be efficient for the buyer to keep his old machines as back-ups rather
than getting rid of them as soon as the contract is signed, even if keeping the old
machines around is costly. If the seller does perform the contract, the expenses
involved in keeping the old machines will have been unnecessary—but if the
seller fails to perform, those expenses will have been well spent. Conceptually,
then, failing to take such a precaution can be thought of as another form of
reliance on the promise of performance (Cooter, 1985).
As a consequence, the legal remedy for breach can also affect buyer’s incen-
tives to take these sort of precautions. As discussed above, simple expectation
or reliance remedies create a moral hazard problem that can leave buyers with
incentives to rely too heavily—or, in this context, to take too few precautions.
There are, however, legal doctrines that might correct that problem by limit-
ing buyers’ ability to recover for losses that could or should have been avoided
by appropriate pre-breach precautions. The doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale,
for example, may sometimes be used to deny recovery of losses that the buyer
could have prevented, by ruling that such losses were not “reasonably foresee-
able” to the seller (e.g., R. Posner, 2003b, p. 127). Similarly, the implied ex-
cuse doctrines—impracticability, frustration, and mistake—could in principle be
used to optimize buyer’s incentives by releasing the seller from liability entirely,
thereby making the buyer bear all losses suffered from the seller’s nonperfor-
mance in just those cases where the buyer should have taken more precautions
than he did (Posner and Rosenfield, 1977). If courts release sellers from liability
only when buyers have behaved suboptimally, in a manner similar to a contrib-
utory negligence rule in tort law, that could give buyers an incentive to optimize
their own behavior. And as long as buyers optimize their own behavior, courts
could then return to holding sellers fully liable, thereby (in principle) optimizing
both parties’ incentives.
However, these doctrines can have this effect only if courts are able to evalu-
ate fully the precautions available to buyers ex ante, in order to recognize cases
when the buyer should indeed have taken additional precautions. The extent
of courts’ ability to do this—and to do it reliably enough so that buyers will
know when they will be held liable if they do not take precautions—is a matter
of some dispute.84
5.2.5 The non-breacher’s mitigation of losses
Another common form of precaution involves steps the buyer takes after the
seller’s breach becomes final. For example, if the buyer has bought special
equipment to use with a machine that is never delivered, that equipment can
84For a skeptical view, see Kull (1991).
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sometimes be salvaged or re-used, though perhaps not for its full original value.
In the notation used in the preceding section, this salvage value was implicit
in the w(r) function, but that notation suppresses the fact that the buyer (the
non-breacher) may have to take various steps in order to realize that salvage
value. Moreover, some such steps are likely to be efficient while others are not—
for example, in some cases the cost that must be incurred to salvage unused
equipment may exceed the equipment’s salvage value.
Courts are rather more willing to consider such ex post opportunities for
mitigation of losses and to require buyers to take advantage of them than they
are to consider the precautions that buyers might have taken before breach. In
part this is because the value of mitigation is especially salient after the fact
of breach (or from an incomplete contracts perspective, more easily verifiable).
As a matter of law, this issue is most explicitly addressed by the mitigation
doctrine, which limits buyers’ remedies by denying compensation for any losses
that could have been avoided by reasonable mitigation.
As with many legal concepts, what counts as “reasonable” mitigation is a
matter of some dispute. To the extent that courts’ definition of reasonable
mitigation corresponds with efficient mitigation, this limit on remedies can give
buyers efficient incentives on this dimension.85 Obviously, though, the efficacy
of this mechanism depends on courts’ ability to verify the costs and benefits of
various mitigation activities.
5.2.6 The decision to terminate a project
In many cases, performance of a contract requires a sequence of many choices
or events. For example, the construction of a building involves hundreds of
separate steps whose performance can extend over weeks or months. Moreover,
sometimes the earliest steps in the sequence must be taken at a time when it
is still uncertain whether it will be worthwhile to perform all of the later steps.
For example, if future construction costs are uncertain, it might (or might not)
prove uneconomic to finish the building, but the early stages of construction
may have to start before anyone can be certain what the eventual costs will be.
In such cases, each step in the sequence can be thought of as involving
a choice between (a) continuing to perform, or (b) giving up the attempt to
perform by terminating the project. Terminating the project early can allow
the parties to take steps to reduce their losses, as discussed in the previous
section on mitigation. On the other hand, continuing to perform preserves the
option value of the project, by deferring to each later stage the decision to
continue or terminate. The optimal decision, therefore, is to terminate early
only when the savings from doing so exceed the project’s option value (Triantis
and Triantis, 1998).
The doctrine of anticipatory repudiation allows the potential breacher—the
seller, in the examples above—to terminate a contract early simply by repudi-
85For discussions of this possibility, see Wittman (1981) and Goetz and Scott (1983).
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ating it.86 While this renders the seller liable for damages for breach, it also
triggers the mitigation doctrine discussed above, thus requiring the buyer to
begin taking any available steps to reduce those damages. As a result, if the
seller faces a high probability of being unable to perform, she may be able to
reduce her eventual liability by terminating the contract early. Viewed from
this perspective, a termination decision by the seller can be thought of as just
another form of breach, which will be efficient (or not) depending on whether
early termination is optimal.
Indeed, if the seller can be held fully liable for all the losses from breach—
either all the current losses, if the contract is terminated early, or all the sub-
sequent losses if the contract is not terminated early—then she will have an
incentive to make the optimal choice between continuing or terminating early,
for much the same reasons discussed in the section on efficient breach (§5.2.1).
However, holding the repudiating party liable for all losses may be difficult. The
losses from an early termination include the loss of the option value of the con-
tract, which may be difficult for courts to measure; omitting this loss from the
measure of damages will bias the seller’s incentives toward terminating too early
(Triantis and Triantis, 1998). At the same time, the losses from any eventual
non-performance may also be difficult to measure; or they may be difficult to
collect, if the seller is by then insolvent. Omitting these losses from the damage
measure will bias the seller toward terminating too late (Craswell, 1990).
Perhaps because of these difficulties, various legal doctrines also allow the
non-breaching party—the buyer, in the example used here—to force an early
termination (while still holding the other party liable for damages) subject to ex
post judicial review. From the buyer’s standpoint, a decision to terminate early
can be thought of as another form of precaution (albeit an extreme one), which
reduces the losses that will be suffered in the event of a breach. Equivalently, a
decision not to terminate early can be thought of as another form of reliance by
the buyer, since such a decision increases the gains if the project is eventually
successful, but also increases the losses if the project eventually fails. In keeping
with the earlier analysis of reliance and precautions (§5.2.3 and §5.2.4), the buyer
will not have an incentive to make this decision optimally if he is fully insured
by being guaranteed full compensation for his losses.
Perhaps for this reason, the law does not give the buyer the unrestrained
power to elect an early termination of the contract, but (using various legal
doctrines) subjects that decision to judicial review. For example, if the seller
has already breached the contract during early stages of performance, the buyer
can elect to force an early termination as long as those breaches are judged by
a court to be “material” or “total.” Alternatively, even if the seller has not
yet violated any contractual requirement, the buyer may still elect to force an
early termination if he has “reasonable grounds for insecurity” about the seller’s
performance, and if the seller is unable to provide “adequate assurances” that
she will be able to perform.
86for discussions of the measurement of damages in cases involving anticipatory repudiation,
see Jackson (1978) and Goetz and Scott (1983).
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Of course, the exact effects of these doctrines depend on how courts interpret
such vague standards as “material,” “reasonable,” or “adequate.” (If courts
could observe all the factors necessary to determine whether early termination
was optimal, they could allow termination in exactly those cases; but their
ability to do this is doubtful.) The issue is further complicated by the fact
that courts do not usually issue advance opinions on pending disputes, but
instead render their judgments in hindsight. An insecure buyer must thus decide
whether to force an early termination before he is certain whether a court will
agree that the other party’s earlier breach was “material,” or that the other
party’s assurances were not “adequate.” If the buyer tries to terminate early,
and a court later rules that grounds for early termination were lacking, the buyer
may himself be held liable for breaching the contract prematurely. Given the
substantial uncertainty associated with such vague legal standards, a risk-averse
buyer may prefer not to force the issue (and a less risk-averse seller may take
advantage of the situation to force a modification or a release of its obligation
to perform).
Finally, as with other perform-or-breach decisions, the decision to terminate
early should be made optimally whenever ex post renegotiation is possible, as
there should always be some combination of side-payments that makes it in
both parties’ interests to terminate early whenever early termination is optimal.
However, the legal doctrines discussed above will affect each party’s share of any
surplus, depending (for instance) on whether the buyer has a unilateral right
to force an early termination without the seller’s consent. As usual, though,
such renegotiation may itself be costly; and the prospect of higher or lower
side-payments (in the event of renegotiation) can also alter many of the other
incentives discussed above, such as the incentive to rely or the incentive to take
precautions.87
5.2.7 Decisions to gather and disclose information
Much of the literature described in the preceding subsections presupposes that
both parties already know all of the relevant parameters, such as the distrib-
ution from which the seller’s cost, c, will be drawn, or the extent of a buyer’s
reliance investments, r. In many cases, though, this (and other) information
cannot be discovered without costly investments in information-gathering. To
be sure, a number of legal doctrines affect the incentives to gather or disclose
information, including some that are not normally classified as “remedies” doc-
trines (for example, see the discussions of fraud and mistake earlier in §2.5.2
and duty to disclose in §3.3.3). However, the remedies for breach can also affect
various information-related incentives. While there are many different kinds of
information that might be gathered or disclosed, and the effects of remedies on
these incentives have not been studied as extensively as have the other incentives
discussed earlier, we discuss some representative examples.
87For further discussion of all of these issues, see Goetz and Scott (1983), Craswell (1990),
and Triantis and Triantis (1998).
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Deciding whether to enter into contracts. The greater the penalties
for breach, the greater will be sellers’ incentive to gather information about
potential risks that might leave them unable to perform. If a seller who fails
to perform is held fully liable for all of a buyer’s losses, that will make her
internalize the full costs of any failure on her part to gather sufficient infor-
mation. However, this will not be sufficient to make sellers’ incentives optimal
unless sellers can also internalize the full benefits of any additional investments
in information-gathering. A perfect price-discriminating monopolist may be
able to internalize all of those benefits, by charging higher prices; and in per-
fectly competitive markets, competitive pressures may force sellers to account
for those benefits as well. In markets that fall between these extremes, however,
it is more difficult to design a remedy that gives sellers the optimal incentive to
gather this information (Craswell, 1988).
Searching for contractual partners. In many markets sellers (and buy-
ers) may have a choice as to how much effort they devote to finding potential
trading partners. Here, too, the parties’ incentives depend partly on other legal
doctrines—in this case, the rules governing initial contract formation (see §3
above). However, the parties’ incentives on this point, too, will also depend
on the general remedies for breach. For example, the steeper the penalties for
breach, the harder it will be to get out of any contract once a contract has
been formed, and so the more it will pay parties to invest in searching longer
and harder to make sure they have found the best deal. Here, too, some of the
benefits of increased search may be felt by the party who is found, rather than
by the party who is doing the searching, so efficient search incentives can be cre-
ated only if the searching party is able to internalize these benefits. For formal
models incorporating these effects, see Diamond and Maskin (1979, 1981).
Optimal precaution and reliance. Even after one party has gathered
information, in some cases the other party is the one who needs to be given
that information in order to make an optimal decision. For example, if the
efficient level of seller precautions depends on how much the buyer would gain
from performance, and if the buyer already knows that information, the seller’s
precaution incentives can more easily be optimized if the buyer can communicate
his information to the seller (Bebchuk and Shavell, 1991). Similarly, if the
optimal level of reliance by the buyer depends in part on the probability that
the seller will fail to perform, and if the seller already knows that probability, the
buyer may be better able to choose an optimal level of reliance if the seller tells
him what that probability is (Craswell, 1989b). While most of the conventional
remedies for breach do not create any incentives for a buyer to convey this
information to the seller, some remedies affect this incentive by conditioning
the measure of damages on the information that has been disclosed. Under the
rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, for example, a buyer facing large losses from breach
is more likely to be allowed to recover those losses if she has told the seller about
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them in advance.88
5.2.8 The effects of party heterogeneity
Information also matters if sellers (or buyers) must deal with a heterogeneous
population of trading partners. In many settings, for example, sellers may differ
in the probability that they will be able to perform, or buyers may differ in the
amount they would lose if the contract were breached. If each party’s type is
fully known to the other party, those differences can be fully reflected in each
side’s prices and other behavior, allowing each interaction to be analyzed as if
it involved entirely homogeneous parties. When differences in characteristics
cannot be fully observed, however, much of the analysis described above must
be altered in some way.
For example, if buyers differ in the amount they will lose from a breach—
and if the law’s damage measure reflects these differences, by holding sellers
liable for different damages depending on the buyer’s type—sellers’ expected
liability costs will be lower when dealing with low-damage buyers than when
dealing with high-damage buyers. If sellers can recognize the high-risk buyers,
they can adjust their prices or their level of precautions or both to reflect those
greater risks. However, this gives high-damage buyers an incentive to conceal
their greater riskiness, if they can. In that case, the equilibrium will depend on
the ability of the low-damage buyer to signal his type or the seller’s ability to
screen buyer types. As discussed in §2.3.2, signaling and screening can result in
a loss of welfare. If screening or signaling are ineffective at separating the types,
then a pooling equilibrium could result in which low-damage buyers effectively
subsidize high-damage buyers. Alternatively, to avoid this subsidy, low-damage
buyers could exit; that is, an adverse selection (“lemons”) problem ensues. Lim-
its on the recovery of unusually high damages—including the doctrine of Hadley
v. Baxendale, discussed in the preceding subsection—could conceivably be used
as a screen to prevent subsidization or drop out(see Quillen, 1988).
Buyer heterogeneity is also important if a seller has market power, insofar
as it introduces the possibility of price discrimination. To be sure, if the seller
can fully observe each buyer’s type, she can engage in first-degree price discrim-
ination, a practice that general contract law does not restrict. But if the seller
cannot observe each buyer’s type directly, she may be able to use some of the
terms of her contract (including the remedies for breach) to separate different
classes of buyers—screen—thereby increasing her profits through second-degree
price discrimination (see, e.g., Matthews and Moore, 1987). This possibility
could also be relevant to the analysis of liquidated damage clauses, discussed
later in §5.3.4. As discussed in §2.3.3, especially footnote 29, the welfare conse-
quences of such price discrimination are a priori ambiguous.
88For economic analyses of this aspect of the Hadley doctrine see, e.g., Ayres and Gertner
(1989), Wolcher (1989), Johnston (1990), Bebchuk and Shavell (1991), Adler (1999), and Ben-
Shahar and Bernstein (2000). Because of possible adverse price discrimination vis-a`-vis the
shipping price, however, a buyer may be reluctant to reveal that she faces large losses (see
§4.2.4 and §5.2.8).
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5.2.9 Risk allocation and insurance
Finally, in addition to all of the incentive effects discussed above, remedies for
breach also have the effect of allocating various risks between the two parties.
For example, the expectation remedy defined in §5.1.2 will, if it is measured per-
fectly, leave the buyer (the non-breaching party) fully insured. Thus, if buyers
are risk averse, while sellers are risk neutral, this remedy will be efficient in terms
of its affects on the parties’ attitudes toward risk. For other combinations of
attitudes toward risk, remedies other than expectation damages will be superior
(see generally Polinsky, 1983). Unless one of the parties is actually risk loving,
however, remedies that exceed the non-breacher’s actual losses (e.g., punitive
damages) will almost always be undesirable as far as risk sharing is concerned
(Craswell, 1996a).89
One case of interest concerns breaches that inflict non-pecuniary losses that
do not increase the buyer’s marginal utility of money (see Cook and Graham,
1977). For example, a photographer’s failure to take wedding pictures might
reduce the welfare of the marrying couple, but that does not mean they would
prefer to buy an insurance policy that would pay them additional money if
their wedding pictures were lost.90 Viewed purely from the standpoint of the
parties’ taste for insurance, then, it might be better if contract remedies did
not compensate for this sort of loss (as, indeed, they generally do not). At the
same time, though, excluding these losses from contract remedies could also
distort some of the other incentives discussed above, such as the photographer’s
incentive to take adequate precautions. For an analysis incorporating both of
these effects, see Rea (1982).
5.3 Complications in determining monetary damages
In the discussion so far, we have dealt with the incentive and insurance effects
induced by monetary remedies for breach. To be sure, much of the literature
on this topic developed by analyzing particular legal remedies: either particular
measures of monetary recovery, or non-monetary remedies such as specific per-
formance. Reflecting that literature, §5.3.1 considers various legal and practical
limits on contract damages; and section §5.3.2 considers some alternative dam-
age measures that are imposed in certain cases. Then, §5.3.3 and §5.3.4 discuss
specific performance (injunctive relief) and liquidated damage clauses (remedies
stipulated in the contract itself).
89Risk aversion also plays a role in why limits on damages could be Pareto improving
when the damage terms signal information about the potential breacher. See §2.3.2 and the
discussion of Aghion and Hermalin (1990).
90Such preferences are, admittedly, inconsistent with neoclassical economic theory unless
the couple exhibits lexicographic preferences in photos-money (other goods) space.
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5.3.1 Limits on the measure of damages
In theory, expectation damages leaves the non-breacher just as well off in every
state of the world (see §5.1.2); but in practice, a number of legal doctrines
limit the losses that expectation damages will compensate. For instance, the
non-breacher must prove the amount of his loss with “reasonable certainty”;
often this will exclude the recovery of “speculative” losses whose amount was
uncertain. Also, as noted earlier, contract law only rarely allows compensation
for emotional losses (see §5.2.9). Perhaps more significant in this regard than any
rule of contract law, however, is the general default rule of us legal procedure
that requires each party to bear his own costs in litigation. In most other
Western legal systems, in contrast, prevailing litigants are entitled to recover
attorneys’ fees as well as other out-of-pocket litigation costs. As a result, they
come closer to being made whole than do winning litigants in the us.
By reducing the effective amount of the remedy, doctrines such as these
weaken many of the seller’s incentives discussed earlier (for example, the seller’s
incentive to take precautions, see §5.2.2). Of course, by shifting more of the
loss to the buyer, the same doctrines may also strengthen the buyer’s incentive
to take various precautions (see, e.g., §5.2.4). Also, when these exclusions are
conditioned on particular behavior by the buyer—e.g., if recovery for certain
losses is excluded unless the possibility of such losses is disclosed in advance,
under the doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale—that could strengthen the buyer’s
incentives in more focused ways (see §5.2.7). Finally, if buyers differ in the
extent to which they suffer non-recoverable losses, excluding those losses from
the damage measure may reduce the cross-subsidization that could otherwise
result (see §5.2.8).
5.3.2 Other measures of monetary damages
The damage measures identified above in section §5.1.2 above have received the
most attention in the law and economics literature, but other measures are also
sometimes used. As we show, though, most of the economic effects of these
alternate measures can be decomposed into one or more of the effects already
considered above.
Cost of completion. One recurring issue involves sellers who breach by
leaving work unfinished, or by performing work work incorrectly, when it would
be extremely costly to finish or correct the work. For example, suppose that
the buyer would have realized net gains of v from complete performance, while
leaving the work in its current state would leave the buyer with net gains of
u, and it would now cost f > v − u to finish the work as it should have been
performed. If v and u have been measured correctly, this implies that it would
be inefficient to finish the work. However, courts vary in their treatment of this
case, sometimes allowing the buyer to recover the completion cost f in damages,
while sometimes limiting the buyer to recovery of v − u.
Awarding f in damages would be inefficient if it led to the work actually
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being completed. If, however, completion would in fact be inefficient, then the
buyer will pocket the damage payment rather than use it to finish the work. The
principal effects of awarding f , rather than awarding v − u, will, thus, be those
discussed previously. The larger remedy will (in general) strengthen sellers’
incentives to avoid committing this sort of breach; perhaps strengthening them
excessively, if the actual losses caused by the breach are only v−u. On the other
hand, if v− u actually understates the buyer’s losses—say, because some of the
benefits from performance are hard to measure, and have therefore been omitted
from the court’s measure of v—then increasing the remedy to f could improve
the seller’s incentives in some respects (see Muris, 1983, for a discussion of both
effects). Even then, much would depend on the exact nature of the benefits that
were excluded, as was also discussed in preceding subsections. For example, if
buyers differ in the extent to which they would realize certain benefits, excluding
those benefits from the damage measure could reduce any cross-subsidization
that might otherwise result (see §5.2.8).
Disgorgement. Similarly, courts occasionally require a breaching party to
disgorge any profits he may have earned as a result of the breach, even if those
profits exceed the non-breacher’s expectation loss, often citing a general prin-
ciple that no one should profit from his own wrong. This result is not the
norm in contract cases, but is reserved for situations in which the breacher is
thought to have engaged in bad faith or “willful” breach (an ill-defined notion
in the case law) or when the non-breacher is considered to have a property or
quasi-property interest in the subject of the contract and is thus entitled to the
proceeds of resale, even if he could not have earned such proceeds on his own
(see Farnsworth, 1985, for a general discussion).
Disgorgement damages, if assessed with certainty, leave the breaching party
indifferent between performance and breach. As such, they entirely eliminate
any incentive to breach, which from the viewpoint of efficient breach, is an
excessive deterrent. In turn, the absence of efficient breach could also generate
excessive reliance by the promisee.
A rationale sometimes articulated in favor of disgorgement damages is that,
by removing any incentive for unilateral breach, they encourage a party who
would like to escape performance to approach the counterparty and negotiate a
modification or release (see, e.g., Friedmann, 1989). Such negotiation may be
desirable if the potential breacher would otherwise be uninformed about the size
of the counterparty’s expectation loss (thus leading him mistakenly to breach),
or if the transaction costs of renegotiation are less than the costs that would
be occasioned by a lawsuit. The frequent association of disgorgement with the
elements of bad faith or willfulness, however, suggests an underlying punitive
component to this remedy, which raises the topic of punitive damages generally.
Punitive damages. In general, explicitly punitive damages are rarely imposed
in contracts cases. This is in part because breach of contract, though a legal
wrong, is typically judged more leniently than would breaches of duty in a tort
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or property setting, for a number of related reasons. First, because liability is
based on a voluntary exchange relationship, the expected costs of breach and of
paying damages are likely to be reflected in the contract price, so that efficient
breaches work to the ex ante advantage of both parties. Second, to the extent
that punitive damages are justified by negative externalities imposed on the
general community, the concern is less pressing in the ordinary contract. Third,
to the extent that punitive damages are justified by a high likelihood of non-
detection, this concern is lessened when the parties know each other and are
likely to be watchful of proper performance.
Punitive damages are very occasionally imposed, however, in response to
breaches of contract that also involve a tort, gross unfairness, or a violation of
some public policy. For example, punitive damages have regularly been imposed
on insurance companies that refuse without justification to pay valid claims.
This result is often defended in terms of the imbalance in the parties’ economic
power, the particularly difficult circumstances in which such refusal places the
insured, and the likelihood that most victims of such opportunism are likely
never to seek redress in court—all factors that go to the general case for punitive
damages, as laid out in succeeding chapters of this handbook.
5.3.3 Specific performance
In some cases courts order specific performance rather than awarding monetary
damages for breach. In effect, this remedy requires the seller (or other breaching
party) to perform the contract in full, backed by the threat of fines or even
imprisonment if she fails to do so.
If ex post renegotiation is impossible, such an order would lead to inefficient
performance of the contract in any case where breach was more efficient. As
long as the parties can renegotiate, however, they should always be able to avoid
this loss by agreeing not to perform, with the gains from non-performance being
shared between the parties in accordance with their bargaining strength. But if
the buyer has the threat of a remedy of specific performance, thereby requiring
the seller to incur the costs of performance, that should allow the buyer to
capture more of the gains than he could if his only legal threat were to hold the
seller responsible for some smaller monetary remedy.
As a result, when ex post renegotiation is possible, the effects of specific per-
formance will be felt in all of the ways discussed above. When renegotiation is
costly, specific performance could, in principle, add to those negotiation costs,
though it is unclear whether the negotiations required under specific perfor-
mance will be any more or less costly than those required under any alternative
remedy.91
91For analyses of this issue see, e.g., Kronman (1978b), Schwartz (1979), Ulen (1984),
and Bishop (1985). Most recently, Shavell (2006) has argued that negotiation costs will be
relatively large where the reason for breach is a production cost increase (because in order to
negotiate a release, the parties must agree on how to distribute the quasi-rents arising from
the cost increase), and resulting ), and relatively small where the reason for breach is to sell
to an third party (because the buyer can also resell to the third party, and so the quasi-rents
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In any event, if specific performance results in the buyer being able to ne-
gotiate for a larger payment, this will have the same effect as an increase in the
expected size of any monetary remedy. For example, the threat of having to
make such a payment will strengthen the seller’s incentives to take precautions
against events that might expose it to such a remedy (Muris, 1982). Moreover,
this threat will also increase the buyer’s incentives to make reliance investments
(Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996). An increase in the expected payment will also
alter the risks born by each party, as discussed earlier in §5.2.9. In general,
specific performance makes it more likely that the buyer will end up at least as
well off as if the contract had been performed (otherwise, he would not consent
to any renegotiation), whereas the award of smaller monetary remedies might
not leave the buyer this well off. But whether this increase in compensation is
desirable, all things considered, depends on all of the effects discussed earlier,
as compared to the effects produced by whatever monetary measure of damages
the court would award if it did not require specific performance. In this regard,
the choice between specific performance and monetary damages has much in
common with the choice between injunctive relief and monetary remedies in
many other areas of law.92
Under common law, specific performance has traditionally been more diffi-
cult to obtain than monetary damages, with injunctive relief treated as matter of
the court’s discretion, and usually being reserved for cases in which damages are
deemed insufficient to protect the non-breacher’s expectation interest or in other
special circumstances (for example, when the goods being traded are unique,
when the breacher is insolvent, or when the non-breacher has made relational
investments that would be difficult to replace). The most widely cited policy
reason for these restrictions is that specific performance is thought to impose
greater administrative costs on the legal system, especially in situations where
the quality of a coerced performance is costly to verify. But this concern has not
prevented civil law systems from making specific performance their remedy of
default, even though in many circumstances their courts will still award money
damages in substitution for performance (Lando and Rose, 2004).
5.3.4 Remedies expressly stipulated in the contract
As noted earlier (see §5.1.2), the remedies discussed above are usually supplied
by the legal system as default remedies to be applied in cases where the contract
is silent as to the consequences of breach. In some cases, though, the parties’
contract may itself stipulate the remedy that will be required in certain states
of the world. Usually this remedy will consist of a monetary payment, but in
some cases, the parties may provide for particular actions to be taken, as when
a sales contract provides that in the event of a defect in the goods, the seller
are limited to the difference between the buyer’s and seller’s cost of resale).
92There is a much more extensive literature analyzing the analogous issue in property and
tort law. See, e.g., Calabresi and Melamed (1972), Kaplow and Shavell (1996), Bebchuk
(2001), and Ayres and Goldbart (2003).
Hermalin, Katz, & Craswell Enforcement 115
will be obliged to provide repair or replacement. When such stipulations take a
monetary form, they are usually referred to as “stipulated damages” or, at least
when they are enforceable, “liquidated damage clauses.”93
Depending on the amount chosen by the parties to serve as the measure
of damages, liquidated damage clauses can produce any and all of the effects
described above.94 For example, clauses that specify a large payment can give
sellers a strong incentive to avoid committing a breach, while clauses that specify
smaller payments will give buyers less insurance against breaches. The amount
of the clause can also affect each side’s incentives to rely on the contract, or to
take precautions against various risks, as the preceding sections also discussed.
Indeed, while the literature summarized in the preceding sections was mostly
written to provide guidance to courts or other lawmakers, that literature can
just as easily be read as providing guidance to private parties who wish to select
an efficient liquidated damage remedy (see Katz, 1996b).
Moreover, in some respects liquidated damage clauses (drafted by the par-
ties) are likely to be superior to general default rules (selected by courts or legis-
latures). As the preceding sections make clear, most remedies involve trade-offs
among various important incentives, and in many cases the contracting parties
are better suited than courts to choose the particular trade-off that is best for
their own transaction. In markets where parties are heterogeneous (see §5.2.8),
liquidated damage clauses can be tailored to particular contracting pairs. More
broadly, all of the reasons that support the enforcement of contracts generally
(see §2.2) will usually argue for the enforcement of liquidated damage clauses
in particular.
It is therefore striking that common-law courts refuse to enforce clauses that
set damage amounts that the courts consider excessive (these are typically re-
ferred to as “penalty clauses”). This reluctance may be due partly to historical
factors, and in particular to the belief (on non-economic grounds) that “penal-
ties” or “enforcement” should be the exclusive province of the legal system,
rather than being subject to private control. In addition, though, there may
also be economic reasons that—in particular situations—might counsel against
enforcement.
For example, in cases where the actual damages from breach turn out to dif-
fer significantly from what the parties expected, it is possible—though far from
automatic—that a remedy specified by the liquidated damage clause might no
longer be welfare maximizing.95 In effect, denying enforcement in these cases
would be similar to denying enforcement of the contract itself, under the “im-
93Very occasionally, parties will provide for specific performance in their contracts, but
courts do not regard themselves as bound by such provisions (although they will take them
into account as a factor bearing on their exercise of discretion).
94For discussions of these effects in connection with liquidated damage clauses, see Goetz
and Scott (1977), Clarkson et al. (1978), Rea (1984), Schwartz (1990), and Edlin and Schwartz
(2003).
95Observe, however, that if the remedy is a monetary transfer, then welfare is typically
assumed to be unaffected by transfers.
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plied excuse” doctrines of mistake or impracticability, in cases where unforeseen
events have significantly altered the contracting parties’ situation. It is, how-
ever, a matter of debate whether courts have the ability to make such ex post
adjustments in ways that will in fact improve the parties’ ex ante welfare. These
doctrines are discussed above in §4.4; for discussions focusing specifically on liq-
uidated damage clauses, see Rea (1984) and Schwartz (1990).
In addition, some liquidated damage clauses can affect the welfare of others
who are not parties to the contract. In particular, if a seller with market power is
concerned with defending its market against entrants, liquidated damage clauses
can serve as a commitment to deter competitors from entering (Aghion and
Bolton, 1987; Chung, 1991; Spier and Whinston, 1995). Even in competitive
markets, if some or all buyers are unaware of seller’s liquidated damage clauses,
this imperfect information could create incentives for socially undesirable clauses
(just as they could in the case of any contractual clause, see generally §2.3.2).
It is worth noting that there are some situations in which common-law courts
are more likely to enforce privately stipulated remedies. In particular, courts
are more deferential to liquidated damage clauses that turn out to be undercom-
pensatory ex post , as compared to those that turn out to be over-compensatory
(perhaps because the latter raise third-party effects where the former do not).
They are quite deferential to clauses that disclaim liability for consequential
damages and that limit the remedy for breach of warranty to repair or replace-
ment (because such clauses supplement the doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale, of
which the courts approve). They are also likelier to enforce liquidated damages
that have actually been paid over as an advance deposit, although even in those
cases, the breacher may be entitled to restitution of part or all of the deposit to
the extent it plainly exceeds the non-breacher’s expectation loss.
5.4 Private enforcement of contracts
As noted, legal enforcement or its threat are not the only means by which parties
are induced to honor their commitments. In this subsection, we briefly consider
some of these other means. In §5.4.1, we briefly consider how the costs of using
legal enforcement can either distort contracts or cause the parties to dispose of
them altogether. In §5.4.2, we take up how repeated interactions or reputational
concerns can deter breach. Finally, §5.4.3 discusses various legal doctrines that
bear on, and in some cases support, these private alternatives to traditional
legal enforcement.
5.4.1 Enforcement costs
One reason contracts could fail to be enforced as written is that enforcement
requires expenditures by the parties that are either ex post incredible or can
be anticipated to be so large ex ante that no contract is written. A partial
list of examples is: (1) the agreement is illegal or exceeds the parties’ power to
contract under the applicable legal system (see §2.5 above); (2) courts cannot
verify critical aspects of contractual performance or whether relevant contingen-
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cies have arisen (see §4.2 above); (3) litigation is costly in terms of time, risk,
or material resources; (4) the defendant may be insolvent or otherwise lack the
ability to comply with a judgment; and (5) the dispute arises in the course of an
otherwise successful relationship that the parties do not wish to jeopardize. In
addition, as a large literature makes clear, two additional reasons are also im-
portant in developing countries:96 (6) the court system operates corruptly; and
(7) courts are incapable of enforcing their verdicts, because police are corrupt
or unavailable.
A simple model illustrates some of these issues. Suppose that party B em-
ploys party A and promises to pay A w upon completion of A’s task. Suppose
it costs A kA > 0 to have the contract enforced or fight litigation and it costs B
kB > 0 for the same. If A cannot recover its enforcement costs from B should
she prevail at trial, then B knows he can underpay A by up to kA without A
seeking to enforce the contract (assuming A acts in a coldly rational way).97 If,
however, the parties anticipate this, then they could agree to a nominal wage of
w + kA, recognizing that B will underpay by kA. Somewhat more problematic
is non-performance by A. If it is feasible for A to overperform by an amount
kB , then the parties can simply set the performance standard in the contract kB
above what they truly intend. But such overperformance could be infeasible, in
which case this trick won’t work. Now it could be necessary to add a clause to
the contract that A pay B kB should A be found to have underperformed. To
the extent the court refuses to honor that clause, citing the unenforceability of
penalty clauses (see §5.3.4), or its inability to verify A’s performance adequately,
this solution could also fail. If it is impossible to enforce a contract contingent
on A’s performance, then the parties will either have to forgo contracting or they
will have to contract around the problem (e.g., use a revenue-sharing contract
to give A better incentives).
More generally, whenever judicial enforcement is likely to occur in less than
100% of the cases, it might in principle be possible to make up for that defi-
ciency by increasing the size of the damage award in those cases that do reach
the courts. To take a simple example, if only one out of ten breaches is ever
sanctioned by courts, many of the incentive effects could be restored if the dam-
age award that would otherwise be optimal were multiplied by ten in every
case.98 However, courts are usually reluctant to make this adjustment in con-
tract cases, where punitive damages are only rarely awarded. This solution will
also be unattractive if either party is risk averse, as it increases the variance of
both parties’ returns (see §5.2.9). And in more extreme settings, where litigation
is infinitely costly (e.g., performance is completely unverifiable or in countries
96See, for instance, Anderson and Young (2002), Cungu and Swinnen (2003), or, for a more
historical perspective, Greif and Kandel (1995).
97It is known from research on ultimatum games (e.g., Gu¨th et al., 1982) that players do
not always act in a coldly rational way, preferring sometimes to punish others even if the act
of punishing is costly to them. See Rabin (1993) for a discussion and analysis.
98This effect is often suggested as an economic rationale for punitive damages. See, e.g.,
Polinsky and Shavell (1998) and Craswell (1999).
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where a reliable court system is unavailable), reliance on court-ordered remedies
is bound to fail.
Unfortunately, the issue of credible enforcement is typically ignored in most
of the contract design literature.99 Accordingly, we now turn briefly to enforce-
ment methods that do not requires the participation of courts.
5.4.2 Self-enforcing contracts
It has long been understood from the repeated games literature that some agree-
ments are self enforcing in the context of an ongoing relationship.100 The most
prominent example of such “agreements” is tacit collusion among competing
firms. That is, recognizing their repeated interaction, firms avoid undercutting
each other on price. This “agreement” to keep prices high is enforced by the
threat of a price war should any firm undercut.101
Within the realm of contracts, there is wide scope for such self-enforcing
agreements. Moreover, self-enforcement can substitute for legal enforcement.
For instance, in a one-shot game, an employer might choose to renege on a
promised wage payment to an employee (recall the discussion in the previous
subsection). But in a repeated context, the employee could retaliate by quitting
(or possibly engaging in sabotage), which could be sufficiently costly to the
employer that he chooses to pay the employee.102 Of course, the employee
could also take the employer to court for nonpayment, but, as we saw above,
legal enforcement might not always be credible.
Self enforcement can also complement legal enforcement. For instance, while
it might not be credible for a party to enforce a contract legally in a one-shot
game, the party might wish to develop a reputation for enforcement in a repeated
context—just as in some models of entry deterrence whereby an incumbent firm
punishes entrants to establish a reputation for toughness (see, e.g., Tirole, 1988,
Chapter 8), a party may want to develop a reputation as someone who can’t
be cheated (e.g., become known as litigious). Of course, if repetition is what is
making legal enforcement of contracts credible, then one should model repetition
explicitly in the analysis of the underlying contracting problem if that problem is
itself repeated (i.e., the game between an employer and a long-term employee).
In other words, an appeal to reputation for enforcement in a static analysis of
a contracting problem is most acceptable when the problem is short term (i.e.,
a given pair meet only once to contract), while the players are long lived (i.e.,
will play again with others).
Within the literature, self-enforcing contracts are often known as relational
contracts. Applications have included quality assurance for experience goods
99Some notable exceptions are Spier (1994) and Krasa and Villamil (2000).
100For a review of repeated games see Chapter 2 of Gibbons (1992) or Chapter 5 of Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991).
101See Chapter 6 of Tirole (1988) for details.
102See, also, Thomas and Worrall (1988).
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(i.e., goods the quality of which can only be assessed via consumption);103
incentive schemes;104 and social contracts within firms.105 However, explicit
models of reputation in the legal literature on contacts are still relatively rare.106
In addition, while reputations can, in many markets, provide powerful in-
centives to perform, in some markets they are less likely to be effective. For
example, if performance involves a credence good (the quality of which cannot
be observed even after consumption, at least not without expert diagnosis),
many breaches may go undetected, with little harm to the breaching party’s
reputation.107 In addition, the enforcement of reputations may be privately
costly to those who enforce them, thus leading to free-rider problems in enforce-
ment.108 In other markets, where sellers’ histories are not easily discoverable
by buyers (or vice versa), the incentive effects of reputations may be weakened,
though the involvement of kin or ethnic groups or other reputational interme-
diaries may help in overcoming that difficulty.109 Finally, for sellers who are
on the verge of bankruptcy (or are otherwise reaching their “last period”), the
prospect of losing future business may be a very weak constraint at best.
5.4.3 Legal doctrines affecting self-enforcement
As the preceding subsection discussed, reputations are most effective in the con-
text of a repeated game, so that a party who cheats suffers the consequence by
losing the benefit of future interactions. In some contractual settings, however,
the party who cheats can be made to suffer an extra-legal sanction in connec-
tion with the very contract has that been breached, as long as the other party
has not yet fully performed his own end of the contract. In such a case, the
other party may respond not by filing a lawsuit, but by withholding his own
performance. For example, if a seller agrees to deliver goods on credit, but if the
buyer discovers (before paying) that the goods are defective, the buyer might
respond to this breach by refusing to accept or to pay for the goods.
To be sure, the significance of a threat to suspend performance depends
partly on the value that performance has to the other party, but it also depends
on how the parties have structured their transaction. To take an extreme case,
103Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983) are two examples.
104Bull (1987) and Levin (2003) are two examples.
105See Hermalin (2001) for a survey.
106For a qualitative discussion, see Charny (1990). Bernstein (1992, 1996, 2001) has pre-
sented several case studies illustrating the operation of reputational enforcement in specialized
markets.
107See Darby and Karni (1973). Although see Fong (2005) for a more nuanced analysis.
108For example, Klein and Leffler (1981) model a market in which buyers, if they even once
receive a defective product, follow a flat rule of never purchasing from that seller again. While
such a rule does produce desirable incentive effects, it may or may not be rational for individual
buyers.
109See Landa (1981) and Bernstein (1992) for discussion of kin and ethnic networks. See
Mann (1999) on other reputational intermediaries.
Hermalin, Katz, & Craswell Enforcement 120
if the contract calls for the seller to make all her deliveries before the buyer pays
any of the price, that gives the buyer a good deal of leverage by threatening
to withhold payment. On the other hand, if the contract instead calls for the
buyer to pay the entire price in advance, before any of the goods have been
shipped, this gives the buyer very little leverage, while putting the seller in the
happy position of being able to threaten to suspend all of her shipments. As
a consequence, parties often negotiate extensively over the exact timing of the
various payment and delivery requirements.110
In addition, a party’s right to suspend his or her own performance may also
be regulated by various legal doctrines, as we now discuss.
Rescission. Once one party has committed a breach, the other party may
sometimes be able to choose between monetary remedies (typically expectation
damages, as discussed earlier in section §5.1.2) and simply walking away from
the contract, without collecting any remedy at all. This latter option is usually
referred to as termination or rescission. To be sure, if the contract would have
been a profitable one for the non-breaching party, that party will usually prefer
expectation damages over rescission, for expectation damages should give the
non-breacher all of the benefits she would have received from performance (if
all of those benefits can be adequately measured, see section §5.2.1 above). But
if the contract in question would have been a losing one for the non-breaching
party, rescission may be a more valuable remedy, as it allows that party to walk
away from what might otherwise be a significant loss.
To complicate matters further, in some cases the non-breaching party may
elect to rescind a contract even if she has already performed some part of her own
services under the contract. By rescinding the contract, the non-breaching party
would give up her right to recover the payment specified in the contract, but
she could then sue for restitution to recover a judicially-determined “reasonable
value” for her services.111 As the court’s determination of reasonable value need
not be limited by the contract price for those services, this remedy could leave
the non-breacher with more than she could get under any alternative remedy.
Indeed, precisely because rescission is elective for the non-breacher, a rational
non-breacher will not choose it unless it is more favorable to her.
However, several legal doctrines limit the use of rescission as a response
to the other party’s breach. At common law, breach of a service contract al-
lows the non-breaching party to elect rescission only if the breach is “material”
or “substantial,” a vague test that leaves much to the courts’ discretion. By
contrast, breach of a contract for the sale of goods is said to allow rescission
for any breach whatsoever (the so-called “perfect tender” rule). The Uniform
Commercial Code has altered this latter rule, though, by limiting the buyer’s
110See Scott and Triantis (2006). In addition to the sources cited earlier in §5.2.6, brief
discussions can also be found in Goetz and Scott (1983), Kull (1991), and Kraus (1994).
Note, also, the connection between this and the discussion of option contracts and holdup in
§4.3.2.
111For other uses of restitution as a remedy, see section §5.1.2 supra.
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right to rescind in cases involving the sale of goods. Under the ucc, defective
goods in a single shipment of a multi-shipment (or installment) contract do not
allow the buyer to rescind the entire contract unless the defect “substantially
impairs” the value of the entire contract. Even in contracts calling for only a
single installment, the buyer may lose the right to rescind if he fails to reject
the installment within a “reasonable” time for inspection. The buyer’s right to
rescind may also be limited by the seller’s right to take a “reasonable” amount
of time to “cure” the defect (see the discussion of “cure” below).
While the remedy of rescission has not been analyzed as extensively as other
remedies have, many of the effects are similar to those of any other remedy
that is more generous to the non-breacher.112 That is, as noted, the non-
breacher will elect rescission only when it is more favorable to her than the other
available remedies. Consequently, the availability of rescission should increase
the breacher’s incentive to perform—just as would any other increase in the
size of the likely remedy. Of course, the parties may be able to renegotiate ex
post to avoid inefficient breach or inefficient performance—but, as with other
remedies, the payments that parties must make in ex post renegotiations will
still affect their ex ante investment incentives. Also, if either party is risk averse,
the availability of rescission will also affect their risk-bearing costs, again in the
same manner as any other increase in the expected size of the remedy.
Cure. As noted in the preceding paragraphs, the buyer’s right to rescind a
contract for the sale of goods may be limited (under the ucc) by the seller’s
right to cure any defects in the goods that she delivered. As long as the time
specified for delivery of the goods has not yet expired, the seller has complete
freedom to try to cure the defects and deliver conforming goods. However,
even after the time for delivery has expired, the seller may still have some
right to attempt a cure, although this right is subject to various legal limits
(many of which are vague). For example, the seller may not take more than
a “reasonable” time to effect such a cure; and may only do so when she had
“reasonable grounds” to believe that her original, non-conforming delivery would
have been acceptable “with or without a monetary allowance” for the defect. In
installment contracts, where only the goods in a single shipment were defective,
the seller must be able to provide “adequate assurances” that its cure will be
successful. And in all cases, it is ultimately up to a court to determine whether
the seller’s efforts have in fact cured the defect.
In cases where it is clear that the seller can fix the defect, the right to cure
serves to limit the effect of the remedy of rescission. For example, if the market
price of goods fell significantly after the contract was signed, the buyer might
otherwise use a trivial defect—one that could be cured at a de minimis cost—to
rescind the contract, thus forcing the seller to bear the loss from the market’s
fall. The economic effects of this use of rescission were discussed above. Clearly,
giving the seller a right to cure eliminates those effects.
112The earliest economic discussion is Goetz and Scott (1983). Other discussions include
Kull (1991) and Kraus (1994).
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In other cases, though, it may not be clear (at least initially) whether the
seller will ever be successful in curing the defect. For example, many litigated
cases involve the sale of cars or houses that seem to be “lemons,” whose seller
makes repeated but unsuccessful attempts to find and fix the problem.113 In
these cases, a court’s interpretation of the right to cure has the effect of de-
termining the point at which the contractual endeavor should be terminated in
order to cut the parties’ losses. The economic implications of this decision were
discussed earlier in §5.2.6.
Conditions and termination clauses. Parties can also use the contract
itself to specify (within limits) the conditions under which either or both par-
ties will be released from their obligation to perform. Employment contracts,
for example, may allow either the employer or the employee to terminate the
relationship at any time, and for any reason. (Indeed, this is the common-law
default rule for employment contracts.) Similarly, franchise contracts may spec-
ify that the franchise relationship will continue indefinitely unless one or the
other party exercises its right to terminate the relationship, often with some
advance notice required (e.g., 30 days’ notice of termination).
Other contracts may permit one part to terminate the relationship if cer-
tain terms of the contract are violated. Technically, contractual clauses whose
violation will release one party from part or all of the contract are referred to
in law as conditions. By contrast, covenants or promises are clauses whose vi-
olation normally leads to some other default remedy. Violation of a covenant
will release the other party from the contract only if the breach is found to be
“material” (see the preceding discussion of rescission).
To be sure, just as courts sometimes refuse to enforce liquidated damage
clauses (see §5.3.4), they also do not always enforce contractual termination
provisions. For example, if termination would inflict on the other party a loss
that seems to the court to be excessive (a “forfeiture”), courts may refuse to
give effect to an express condition, thus prohibiting the other party from ter-
minating the contract. In addition, clauses that purport to give one party the
right to terminate a relationship for any reason will sometimes be interpreted
more narrowly by courts, who may refuse to permit terminations that are not
made “in good faith” (a phrase whose exact content is difficult to pin down).
By requiring some degree of judicial approval of a termination decision, these
doctrines thus limit the parties’ ability to use termination as a self-enforcement
technique. Some of the economic effects of these limits are discussed in Klein
(1980).
113In some cases, the contract may itself specify that the seller has the right to cure, and
may even limit the buyer’s remedy to accepting the seller’s repair or replacement. Even in
these cases, though, the ucc allows courts to disregard such a clause (and bring the seller’s
right to cure to an end) if the seller’s inability to cure causes this remedy to “fail its essential
purpose.”
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5.5 Other law bearing on contract enforcement
It should also be kept in mind that the enforcement of contracts is often affected
by rules and institutions from other fields of law. For example, one common
way for parties to enhance the likelihood of contractual performance is to offer
collateral; and this device is regulated generally by the law of property and
specifically by the specialized law of secured transactions (see Schwartz, 1989;
Triantis, 1992). Similarly, contracting parties often enlist third parties as guar-
antors on their behalf; and the value of such assurance is determined by the law
of suretyship (see Katz, 1999).
Conversely, parties’ ability to use reputation or repeat dealing as private
enforcement devices may be restricted by other fields of law. For example, the
law of antitrust generally prohibits concerted boycotts or refusals to deal; and
the law of torts may treat some reputation-affecting communications as unfair
competition, defamation, or invasion of privacy. To this extent, some private
attempts to enforce contracts may be actionable in their own right.
6 Conclusions
This chapter is lengthy and many of our conclusions have already been given.
Consequently, we limit ourselves here to a few remarks.
Given the vastness of the literature on the law and economics of contracts,
even a survey as long as ours must omit certain topics. One topic that has
been omitted is the connection between the literature on contracts and those
on torts, takings, and regulation. In particular, much of the economic analysis
of regulation takes the view that the regulator and the regulated entity are
entering into what is, effectively, an agency contract between the regulator (the
principal) and the regulated entity (the agent). See, for instance, Laffont and
Tirole (1993). But even torts and takings can be related to contracts if, as
some analysis has done, one views the state as seeking to approximate, in some
way via law, the contract that it would have liked to have written with the tort
malfeasor or the owner of the property to be taken if their identity were known
in advance.114
We have also omitted the entire literature in which the state itself is a party
to the contract. Government contracts raises a number of additional issues, in-
cluding the need for public accountability, risks of corruption and political cap-
ture, the problem of establishing credible commitment that will survive changes
of governmental regime, and the special difficulties of enforcing contract rights
against a sovereign state. For instance, the risk of nations repudiating their
debt contracts or abrogating licensing agreements is well documented, espe-
cially in the context of developing economies. Creditors or technology providers
who contemplate entering into agreements with such governments, accordingly,
must find ways to mitigate or insure against such risk. At the same time, citi-
zens and regulators have an interest in preventing state officials from entering
114See, e.g., Hermalin (1995) for an application of this approach on the takings issue.
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into contracts that are not in the public interest ex ante. To an extent, these
issues relate to our discussion of alternative means of enforcement in §5.4.2 and
§5.4.3, but the area is broader than this.
Any chapter of this sort should close with some suggestions for future re-
search. Some suggestions have made already: (i) more economic analysis of
non-Anglo-American contract law; (ii) more positive analyses of contract law;
(iii) more efforts in modeling to treat monitoring and measurement as endoge-
nous with respect to what information is observable or verifiable; (iv) empirical
studies of how courts employ certain rules, such as the parol evidence rule; (v)
economic analyses of some of the doctrinal complications associated with the law
of contract formation (e.g., promissory estoppel); and (vi) more analysis of the
interactions between private and state enforcement of contracts. To this list we
would add greater use of new economic paradigms such as behavioral economics.
The behavioral paradigm in particular holds out the promise of increased under-
standing of the phenomenon of bounded rationality, and of legal doctrines that
respond to it. Consider, for instance, the literature discussed in §2.3.4 above, as
well as more recent work such as that of DellaVigna and Malmendier on issues
of contract design and self control and their application to questions of how do
health clubs design their contracts (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004, in press,
respectively).
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